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Preface  
 
This PhD research experience is summed up by this quote from Marcel Proust the 
French novelist: 
"We are not provided with wisdom, we must discover it for ourselves, after a journey 
through the wilderness which no one else can take for us, an effort which no one can 
spare us" (trans. Moncrieff, 1924, p. 455). 
 
I grew up in an environment where entrepreneurship, economic policy issues, 
innovation, firm internationalisation, the role of the EU and the Balkan periphery 
were everyday topics of critical discussion and rationalization. This likely drove my 
initial interest in economics and was the later motivation for my interest in European 
Union studies (an integral part of my family's heritage). However, an important 
element was missing: the Balkans and entrepreneurship. 
I pondered upon this aspect for a long time because it did not exist as a field of study 
and because I wanted to do something ground-breaking that would be thought 
provoking and also of use to academics and entrepreneurs - which is the most 
important objective of my research. 
At some point, whilst walking in Thessaloniki, I noticed something that was also 
evident in my hometown of Katerini. Industrial buildings had been abandoned and 
labour intensive industries had ceased; the voices, noise and laughter were missing. I 
did not like what I saw, and found it frustrating. Many firms had closed overnight and 
relocated to the Balkans attracted by lower operating costs. Of course, this exodus had 
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happened before – but in the other direction. Many labour intensive industries had 
come to Greece from other European countries. 
Over the years I met many frustrated entrepreneurs and identified many problems, but 
very few solutions. All I could see was stagnation. However, I believed that 
entrepreneurship, foreign direct investment (FDI) and a change of business 
philosophy could reinvigorate both industries and firms. This was the motivation for 
my research. 
I found it puzzling that there was a lack of significant inward FDI to Greece; the FDI 
was mainly outward. Even more peculiar in my view was that there were experienced 
and cosmopolitan entrepreneurs who were unable to create financial value by 
investing in Balkans, while Greek entrepreneurs who had faced serious domestic 
problems, were profiting from the outward FDI. This paradox took over; that was it, 
the journey had started. 
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Abstract  
The thesis explores the dynamics and determinants of Greek outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) in Bulgaria and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM). Greek investors do not possess strong ownership advantages, they face 
adverse home market conditions and yet they have expanded into neighbouring 
countries. This situation is not explained by the mainstream and emerging literature. 
Hence, we propose a framework based on push and pull factors which we test at the 
country, industry and firm levels. Pull factors include the advantages of firms and host 
countries advantages, while push factors include home market disadvantages and 
weak advantages of firms.  
The research is based on an extensive face-to-face survey of 152 Greek OFDI firms 
(in Bulgaria and FYROM) and employs quantitative methods (descriptive statistics 
and logistic regression models) as well as case studies. At the country level, we find 
that beside significant pull factors, adverse demand conditions represent a significant 
push factor. At the industry level, we examine four industries and check for 
differences and similarities in their characteristics and their relevance using the 
Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) framework. We show that OLI variables 
vary significantly across the four industries and that new variables which are not in 
OLI framework also matter.  Finally, we identify four main types of Greek investors: 
crisis, healthy, satellite and lead and we explore differences in the drivers of their 
OFDI. The thesis provides a conceptual and empirical contribution to the literature by 
proposing an alternative framework to explain OFDI based on integrating the OLI and 
Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) and Comparative Ownership Advantage (COA) 
models. A joint push and pull model might indicate when FDI at country, industry or 
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firm level, is expansionary or escapist, that is, whether the push factors lead to escape 
FDI "forced internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market 
conditions), or whether pull factors lead to expansionary FDI. 
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Chapter 1  
1.1 Introduction 
 
Globalization of the world economy has made foreign direct investment (FDI) a 
complex, but interesting firm activity, driven by different external and internal 
socioeconomic factors operating in both the home and host countries.  
In this work, we examine the dynamics and determinants of Greek outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI), which we find are quite different from those in other 
developed economies and thus merit in depth research. Greece has relatively dynamic 
OFDI, despite being a small country with no history of such investment. Its firms do 
not possess strong ownership
1
 advantages (except in a very few cases, which are 
already global FDI players) and its OFDI are concentrated in neighbouring countries. 
We examine Greek OFDI in South East Europe (SEE) and especially in Bulgaria and 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  
SEE is a much less attractive region for FDI compared to Central East Europe (CEE) 
which further distinguishes Greek FDI. Typical FDI investors from developed 
countries adopt a conservative "wait and see" (Karagianni and Labrianidis, 2001) 
attitude to investment in SEE while Greek investors have demonstrated exceptional 
enthusiasm with regard investing in their neighbour countries.  
The objective of this thesis is to present the generic factors that drive firms to invest 
abroad and to examine these factors at the levels of: 1) country, 2) industry, and 3) 
firm. A multi-level analysis should help to capture and conceptualize the dynamic 
nature of FDI. Thus, using firm-level data on Greek OFDI in Bulgaria and FYROM, 
                                                          
1
 Ownership advantages, firm specific capabilities and core competencies are used interchangeably. 
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we attempt to analyse the importance of push and pull factors for explaining the 
patterns of Greek OFDI, exploring cross-country, cross-industry and cross-firm 
differences. 
A main distinctive feature of the Greek case is that in the last 10 years home market 
conditions have been worsening and the country has been losing global 
competitiveness, which indicates weak firm ownership advantages. In our case, 
negative home market conditions constitute a push factor for FDI, which can be 
characterized also as "forced internationalisation"
2
 or "escape"
3
 investment. 
Mainstream theories (e.g. OLI framework - ownership, location, and internalization) 
assume that firms possess ownership advantages before expansion to foreign markets 
and are pulled to exploit these advantages in the host markets. We develop a 
framework of push and pull factors to explain when FDI at country, industry or firm 
level is expansionary or escapist, that is, to explain whether the strongest push factors 
lead to escape FDI (forced internationalisation) and the strongest pull factors lead to 
expansionary FDI.  
In our framework both push and pull factors are important to explain the Greek case; 
however, we highlight the push factors because they are not explored in the literature, 
but their existence is supported by the empirical results. This is a novel contribution 
of this thesis. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 provides an 
overview of the Greek economy from the perspective of competitiveness and FDI, 
                                                          
2
 The term "forced internationalisation" is used in the literature although in a different context to 
describe the Fiat automotive company's market segments (see Volpato, 2003).  
 
3
 The concepts of escape and expansionary FDI are discussed in section 3.1 "Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment as an Escape Response and push-pull conceptualizations" (pp.102-103) 
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section 1.3 presents an overview of Greek investments in FYROM & Bulgaria, 1.4 
outlines the literature and their findings on the issue of Greek OFDI in SEE and 
section 1.5 concludes by outlining the potential contribution to FDI empirics and 
theory.  
1.2 Greek Economy, Competitiveness & FDI 
 
Greece (or Hellas) has almost 11 million inhabitants located in the Southern Balkan 
Peninsula. It is at the crossroads of Europe, Western Asia and Africa and shares land 
borders with Albania (north-west), FYROM and Bulgaria, (north) and Turkey (north-
east). Athens is the capital city and is located in the south part of Greece; Thessaloniki 
is the second-largest city, with an important economic and industrial role, and is in the 
north of Greece adjacent to the above mentioned Balkan countries.  
Figure 1: Greece & Adjacent Countries             Figure 2: Greece & Europe 
 
  
Source: http://atlas.freegk.com/world/europe/greece/greece.php  Source: http://www.greece-athens.com/page.php?page_id=489 
 
Greece has faced many setbacks following the two World Wars, the Civil War and 
military junta which were accompanied by huge social and economic changes. Greece 
has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1981 and adopted the euro as 
its currency in 2001. Although part of the EU market, Greece was geographically 
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isolated from the rest of the EU and its adjacent countries, until recently, had 
communist regimes. The demise of the communist regimes and the restoration of a 
free market economy has created investment opportunities and generated potential for 
mutual growth. 
Greece had very little OFDI activity until the opening up of neighbouring post-
socialist markets; since then it has become a rather dynamic player in those markets, 
despite its low level of competitiveness compared to other developed countries. 
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Figure 3: Inward FDI Vs. Outward FDI Flows in the Greek Economy (1980-2010) 
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Source: Author's elaboration based on  UNCTAD FDI/TNC database, (www unctad.org/fdistatistics) data 
from the Bank of Greece.  
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Our analysis starts with Greek inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) versus outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows during the past 30 years (see Figure 3). This 
should provide a better understanding of patterns or trends of inbound and outbound 
Greek FDI. Figure 3 shows that from 1980 to 1997 levels of IFDI were low and OFDI 
was nearly non-existent. Despite Greece joining the EU in 1981 this seems not to have 
had an impact on inward or outward FDI levels.
4
 Nevertheless, restoration of the free 
market economy in adjacent countries has created more investment opportunities. 
In 1999, both inward and outward FDI flows became more dynamic with OFDI 
increasing to a peak in 2006 after which both IFDI and OFDI dropped sharply.  
To sum up, patterns of Greek outward and inward investment were at low levels up to 
the end of 1990s when both began to show an upward trend. FDI stocks provide a 
clearer picture (see Figure 4). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 However,  EU membership of Portugal, another peripheral economy has "affected significantly the 
levels of inward FDI" (Fonseca, Mendonça et al., 2007,  p.16) 
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Figure 4: Inward Vs. Outward Stocks in the Greek Economy (1980-2010) 
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While flows refer to the amount of FDI in a given period of time (usually 1 year), 
stocks represent the total accumulated value of foreign assets at a given point in time. 
So, the cumulative FDI stock index illustrates that FDI was marginal up to 1998, after 
which it shows a strong upward trend even until the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
More specifically, IFDI increased up to 1989 and then dropped and recovered and 
continued an upward trend until the 2008 Global Financial Crisis when faced a down 
turn. OFDI increased after 1999 and this growth accelerated to 2005 and even after 
2008. The inward stock of FDI compared to outward is higher up to 2008 when the 
outward stock continues to rise before becoming stable; even with the forthcoming 
Greek crisis, OFDI does not face a downturn. To explore the impact of inward FDI on 
the Greek economy, we compare FDI inward stocks as a percentage of GDP, between 
Greece and the EU members (Figure 5). Initially, the indicator for both the EU and 
Greece was low; after 1998 the share of EU countries’ FDI greatly increases, while 
Greece stays at more or less at the same low level. 
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Figure 5: FDI Inward Stocks as % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Greece Compared to European Union 
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Figure 6: Greek Inward FDI Flows by Industry (2000-2010) Figure 7: Greek Outward FDI Flows by Industry (2000-2010) 
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Figures 6 and 7 show Greek IFDI and OFDI flows by primary, secondary and tertiary 
industries during 2000-2010.
5
 The majority of IFDI and OFDI is in the tertiary sector 
with secondary industry FDI at low levels and primary industry investment almost 
non-existent. This structure of FDI reflects the structure of economic activities in 
Greece which is a largely service oriented economy.  
                                                          
5
 There are no data available for 2000-2003  
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The structure of GDP shows a strong process of tertiarization of economic activities and decreasing share of other industries (Figure 8).  
Figure 8: GDP as % Type of Expenditure & Value Added by Kind of Economic Activity 
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Figure 9: Imports & Exports in Greece (2000-2013)  
 
Figure 9 shows that balance of trade was traditionally negative for the Greek economy. After 2003 imports surged while exports continued a 
gradual increase that resulted in an increased trade balance up to 2008. After 2008, there was a sharp decline in imports while exports continued 
to increase gradually and seem to have been unaffected by the debt crisis. The unchanged rate of exports during a period of crisis (see Figure 10) 
further supports the idea that "negative home market conditions" continue to operate to a certain extent as a push factor for "forced 
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defined by the questionnaire) were also present throughout the period of relatively high growth during the second half of 1990s and first half of 
2010s. GDP growth rates show how fast the Greek economy has been growing (Figure 10).  
Figure 10: Real GDP and Annual Average Growth Rates in Greece  
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GDP growth rate reflects the development of the domestic market and is an inflation-
adjusted value. Up to 1993, Greece followed a very short term cyclical growth path 
which was followed by high growth up to 2006. In hindsight, this can be seen as a 
growth spurt driven by public investment and debt supported by low interest rates. 
Since this mode of growth was unsustainable in the long-term there was a collapse 
after 2006, when the Greek economy slowed sharply and began to shrink.  
This sharp decline which depressed the economy created negative home market 
conditions, which in turn played a fundamental role in the rise of Greek OFDI (Figure 
4). However, Greek outward investment began rising earlier, reflecting two factors 
documented in succeeding chapters. First, some firms sensed the adverse market 
environment earlier than suggested by the official statistics, and, second, other firms 
were pulled abroad by new investment opportunities. After 2008, the real GDP 
growth rate turned negative and the economy entered a deep recession. This further 
accelerated the rise of OFDI.   
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Figure 11: Government Gross Debt Annually as % of GDP  
 
A good illustration of the depth of crisis is the rise in government debt (Figure 11). At the start of the decade, the share of Greek public debt was 
higher than the share of the EU/euro countries. In 2006, with the onset of the Greek recession the magnitude of macroeconomic imbalances 
became obvious in the looming public debt which increased from 100% of GDP in 2005 to 170% in 2011 (Figure 11). 
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We have outlined the macroeconomic features of the Greek economic environment 
including the striking decline in GDP and rise in public debt. However, the Greek 
economic crisis had micro-economic roots that were evident before the 
macroeconomic crisis. These were structural and competitive weaknesses which were 
present even during the period of growth. These weaknesses in the real economy are 
demonstrated by the falling Global Competiveness Index (GCI) (Figure 12). The GCI 
shows the competitiveness rankings for more than 140 countries and "is a 
comprehensive tool that measures the microeconomic and macroeconomic 
foundations of national competitiveness" (Schwab 2012, p.4). Greece is among the 
lowest GCI ranked EU countries; it was ranked 36th in 2001-2002 and declined to 
96
th
 place (2012-2013), a historically exceptional fall. So, although more economies 
have been included in the GCI, in the last decade Greece lost 60 places. This falling 
behind in competiveness is evident also if we compare Greece with the EU periphery 
or the South EU economies which, like Greece, have experienced severe Eurozone 
debt crises (Figure 13), but show significantly smaller losses of competiveness. 
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Figure 12: The Global Competitiveness Index-Greece (2001-2013) 
 
Note: The indicator assesses the competitiveness landscape of economies. Ranking: 1 is the best performance each year  
Source: Compilation of Global Competitiveness Reports (World Economic Forum 2001-2013) 
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Figure 13: Global Competitiveness Index-Selected Countries (2001-2013) 
 
Source: Compilation of Global Competitiveness Reports (World Economic Forum 2001-2013) 
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These features of the Greek economy have had an impact on OFDI, and produced the 
situation which we call "forced or escape internationalisation". We argue in 
subsequent chapters that Greek firms were in part forced to expand into SEE due to 
negative home market conditions. Louri, Papanastasiou et al. (2000) also suggest that 
Greek firms increased their OFDI in the Balkans as a result of loss of comparative 
advantage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Figure 14: Greek Outward FDI by Regions (2001-2012)  
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Figure 14 shows Greek OFDI by regions for 2001-2012.
6
 The main observation is that 
Greek OFDI is markedly higher towards SEE countries
7
 compared to other areas. 
Although Greek investments in SEE is higher than other regions real Greek OFDI is 
larger than reported by the official statistics in SEE countries (Kekic, 2005). This is 
because some Greek companies prefer to establish their FDI via other countries which 
offer favourable corporate taxation regimes (Bitzenis and Vlachos, 2012). In 
particular, Bitzenis (2004, p.12) argues that "More than half of Bulgaria’s IFDI flows 
from tax havens such as Cyprus or Luxembourg which reflect investments by Greek 
MNEs". So, the real share of Greek OFDI towards SEE seems to be even higher. We 
isolated the data for Luxemburg and Cyprus and found that the trend is similar to the 
pattern of OFDI in SEE. If we add the level of OFDI from Luxemburg and Cyprus to 
investments in SEE the overall figures double.  
                                                          
6We grouped countries as follows: EU developed economies include Austria, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, 
United Kingdom, Netherlands; other developed counties include USA, Russia and Hong Kong. The euro area 
includes countries in the Eurozone; and "other countries" includes unclassified countries. 
 
7
We include Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Serbia, Republic of Romania and Turkey. The reason for including 
Turkey in this dataset, is that we want to show the regional direction of Greek OFDI (irrespective of whether these 
countries are post socialist countries or not). 
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Figure 15: Inward FDI Stock in SEE Countries Vs. CEE Countries 
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Greek investments in SEE are substantial which not the case is for FDI in SEE 
generally. There is a huge disparity in inward FDI between SEE and CEE (Figure 15), 
which went through similar transition
8
 processes though with some delays in the case 
of ex-Yugoslav countries. SEE countries
9
 attracted considerably lower levels of FDI 
compared to CEE
10
 even if we take into account differences in the sizes of the two 
regions. Potential reasons for this difference may be related to political risks and 
economic instability (Estrin and Uvalic, 2014). Inward FDI stocks in 2012 were 
$210,165 million for the SEE countries and almost three times higher ($589,820 
million) for the CEE countries. 
 
                                                          
8We use the term transition, emerging and developing interchangeably. 
 
9 SEE countries include Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova, 
Romania and Bulgaria. Cyprus and Turkey are not included in this figure for SEE countries because we are 
referring here to former communist countries.  
10CEE includes Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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1.3 Greek Investments in FYROM & in Bulgaria 
 
Our empirical research is focused on two countries: FYROM and Bulgaria where 
Greek investors play a quite significant role. 
Figure 16: Inward FDI in FYROM by Country of Origin (1997-2008)  
(In Millions of Euros) 
Source: (United Nations Conference on  Trade and Development 2012 p.21)
11 
Figure 16 shows FDI flows in FYROM by investing country, and shows that Greece 
is the largest FDI investor, slightly ahead of the Netherlands. This suggest that Greek 
MNCs invest in countries where traditional MNCs are adopting a ''wait and see 
attitude" (Karagianni and Labrianidis, 2001). 
                                                          
11
 Note that UNCTAD estimates are based on data from the Central Bank of FYROM (NBRM) 
(investor countries only) and company reports. Part of the bars are white because "Investment in the 
country's public Telekom can be attributed to either Hungary (direct investor) or Germany (ultimate 
owner), although official data register it as Hungarian only".  
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Figure 17: Inward FDI in Bulgaria by Country of Origin (1996-2013)  
(In Millions of Euros) 
 
 
Source: Bulgarian National Bank, cited by (Invest Bulgaria Agency 2014) 
 
Figure 17 shows FDI flows in Bulgaria by investing country, in millions of euro. 
Greece is the third largest investor after the Netherlands and Austria which are also 
among the main investors in FYROM. Total Greek FDI investments from 1996 to 
2013 in Bulgaria were €3560,1 million. Data for Bulgaria suggests also that Greek 
companies invest in countries where other traditional MNCs are adopting a "wait and 
see attitude" (Karagianni and Labrianidis, 2001; Bastian, 2004).  
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1.4 Literature on the Issue of Greek OFDI in South East Europe 
 
In this section, we position our research in the context of research by other scholars 
interested in Greek FDI in SEE.  
Iammarino and Pitelis (2000) administered questionnaires to 85 Greek enterprises in 
Romania and Bulgaria to discover the factors that influence the type and mode of 
control of FDI in manufacturing and services. They found the following types of 
investors: exporters, local suppliers and distributors, and joint ventures. The motives 
for FDI (based on responses to 8 questions) revealed that expected economic growth 
in the foreign market, geographical location, labour costs, and increase in market 
shares were the main incentives.  
Labrianidis (2001) used country level data to examine the role of geographical 
proximity in influencing Greek FDI in CEE and found that geographical proximity, 
FDI importance globally and the trend towards SME internationalisation were the 
main factors explaining why Greek firms started to invest abroad.  
Salavrakos and Petrochilos (2003) examined firm specific and strategic home and 
host country motives (88 questions with 16 variables) which affect Greek FDI 
decisions in the Balkans. Based on general theoretical considerations of FDI, they 
found that by investing in SEE, Greek companies had achieved profitability and 
competitiveness compared to the home market.  
Demos, Filippaios et al. (2004) used an event study methodology to research Greek 
based firms listed on the Athens stock exchange market, and the impact of FDI on 
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stock returns. They show that successful OFDI projects tend to be located in 
developed countries and invest horizontally in the high-technology sector.  
Jens Bastian (2004) showed that geographical proximity and investments by banks 
and telecommunications firms in SEE, serve as catalysts for other Greek firms to 
expand in the area and that these investments were a strategic decision based on 
longevity.  
Stoian and Filippaios (2005) explored OFDI patterns in EU small peripheral 
economies, examining entry modes of Greek firms and the institutional determinants 
of FDI. They found that Greeks with low R&D and no established distribution 
channels were able to invest in SEE due to slow economic growth and absence of 
competitors in these countries. They found ownership advantages were not essential 
in this initial phase of Greek OFDI.  
Bitzenis (2006), based on questionnaires administered to 37 Greek firms that invest in 
Bulgaria, examined the drivers of and obstacles to FDI. Bitzenis found that 
geographic proximity, market size, low labour costs, prospects for further investments 
in neighbouring countries, lack of competition and cultural proximity are significant 
for Greek MNEs, but found no association between investment risk or bureaucracy. 
Finally, Kitonakis and Kontis (2008) found that Greek FDI has a positive impact on 
the host countries, with respect to EU accession. They found also that Greek 
companies disregard the unfavorable conditions in the host markets compared to other 
investors. They argue that the variables generally used to explain FDI do not apply in 
the Greek case.  
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All these important contributions explaining Greek OFDI and others cited in the text 
of this thesis constitute inspiration for our final thoughts and the construction of a 
more complete framework to explain Greek OFDI. In summary, motives for Greek 
FDI in SEE countries are market growth, geographical proximity, labour costs, 
profitability, the presence of other Greek companies in the host countries, low levels 
of competition in these markets, the role of EU membership as a catalyst for 
investments, capability to operate in countries with unfavourable conditions, etc.  
The novelty of our research is that we examine all these factors jointly in a conceptual 
push-pull framework which includes new variables such as adverse demand 
conditions in the home market. In nutshell, we examine both the role of home and 
host motives and obstacles to OFDI. We questioned 152 CEOs (structured interview 
with the use of the questionnaire) face to face in these countries and used 
approximately 500 variables. In addition, this thesis explores both conventional and 
emerging market theories. Finally, in order to get a holistic perspective, we examine 
the issue of OFDI at three levels: country, firm, and industry. Also this research 
covers 65% and more than 80% of the sample populations in FYROM and Bulgaria 
respectively
12
.  
The end result of this research is a push-pull framework that can explain not only 
Greek OFDI but also when FDI is expansionary, which means that the company 
possesses ownership advantages, and when it is escape FDI, which means that the 
company does not possess ownership advantages and faces negative home market 
conditions and is pushed into FDI.  
                                                          
12 See, Table 7: Sample of Business Research Population (p.110).  
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1.5 Key Findings & Contributions 
 
In a continuously changing business world FDI patterns cannot be static. FDI theories 
primarily interpret FDI trends in strong economies and firms towards other developed 
or less developed economies as "expansionary" FDI from the domestic economy to 
destinations abroad.  
Nevertheless, some developed economies are falling behind and face push factors 
while some emerging economies already have features of developed markets. So there 
is a need to develop an approach that is not restricted to either develop or emerging 
MNCs and markets classifications.  
However, there is no single FDI framework able to describe and categorize all these 
phenomena. We propose a generic framework based on push and pull factors (chapter 
3).  Greek OFDI provided an excellent case for applying the push-pull framework 
because it integrates interpretations and characteristics of FDI from both developed 
and emerging economies, within a holistic conceptualization of OFDI.  The next step, 
following Narula and Guimon’s (2010) recommendation of a deeper understanding of 
FDI, is to test this framework at the three levels of country, industry and firm.  
At the country level, (chapter 4) we try to explain the Greek FDI paradox: "How can a 
country with low inward FDI and adverse home market conditions be a strong 
investor via OFDI in SEE?" In particular, we observe the behaviour of Greek firms in 
Bulgaria and FYROM, countries with very high levels of Greek OFDI activity. We 
made some 450-500 phone calls to identify Greek companies involved in FDI in these 
countries (they have parent companies in Greece) and constructed a questionnaire 
comprising approximately 500 questions, which was administered to 152 firms . The 
aim was to capture and understand whether the mainstream (e.g. OLI) and emerging 
49 
 
(e.g. LLL, COA) literatures could explain this phenomenon. Based on all three 
theories it would be expected that negative home market conditions would impede 
OFDI.  
Our analysis shows that these theories do not provide an adequate explanation of 
Greek OFDI, so we propose an alternative interpretative framework. In particular, we 
argue that OFDI can be determined, firstly, by four main groups of factors in the 
home market, which push the company to invest in another country in order to 
survive. Similarly, we propose a second group of host market factors that pull the 
company to invest in that country. In short, our finding is that mainstream and 
emerging theories (e.g. OLI, LLL and COA) do not explain the phenomenon of partly 
"forced internationalisation", which it would seem, best describes Greek outward 
investment. 
We find that, at country level, (chapter 4), Greek OFDI is not an expression of 
superior ownership advantages, but is a vehicle for these companies to survive by 
internationalising in neighbouring markets. In particular, we find that adverse demand 
conditions are a significant push factor, and geographical proximity, linkages and 
institutional specificities are significant pull factors. We find also that Greek investors 
in FYROM are more determined and are pushed more than those investing in 
Bulgaria, although both are affected by push factors. Our framework suggests that 
stronger push factors mean escape type investment, while stronger pull factors mean 
expansionary type investment. 
After discussing the factors that push Greek investors to different countries, we try to 
identify whether there is any difference in the behaviour of Greek firms among 
industries (chapter 5). The novelty of this approach is that we investigate four 
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industries simultaneously (rather than just a single industry) and check for differences 
in their characteristics. In other words, we are interested in whether the behaviour of 
Greek manufacturing and trade industries, in terms of FDI, differs from that of Greek 
services and construction industries. In particular, we explore industry differences as 
well as the industry relevance of the OLI framework in the context of "forced 
internationalisation"(i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market conditions). To 
achieve this we operationalise, expand on and add new variables to the OLI 
framework. The next step is to test which of these operationalisations, expansions and 
novelties is empirically proven by our data. We conduct a statistical analysis  in order 
to understand which OLI factors are industry specific, group shared or common. 
Overall, we found that the OLI varies significantly across the four industries, and 
across all industry pairings; therefore, it can be argued that it is an "eclectic" 
framework since different parts of it can be used selectively to explain various 
differences. After identifying the variability in the operationalisation of the OLI, the 
next step is to apply our own framework and try to understand how the FDI behaviour 
of firms in different industries can be explained. To achieve this, we create two 
groups of industries which are quite similar - manufacturing and trade, and 
construction and services. 
Our results show that both push and pull factors are significant for explaining the FDI 
behaviour of these industries, and highlights underexplored push factors which are 
evident and relevant in the context of "forced internationalisation". 
Across all specifications, we see that there are both push and pull factors that explain 
if the company is a manufacturing/trade or services/construction, which supports the 
relevance of a push/pull framework. We find that industry specific push factors 
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include adverse demand conditions such as de-industrialization in the home market, 
cost pressures and adverse institutional environments such as credit time payment
13
 
between supplier and customer in the home market which create further money 
liquidity setbacks. This money liquidity problem in the home market reduces home 
market profitability and pushes the company to invest in host markets which eases 
liquidity constraints. 
Pull factors include presence of Greek companies in the host market, fast raw 
materials provision from the parent company, bilateral agreements with post-
communist neighbours, and asset acquisition investment, all of which are significant 
for explaining the differences among industries. To sum up, we suggest that stronger 
push factors suggest escape FDI while stronger pull factors suggest expansionary FDI. 
In our case, the manufacturing and trade group faced more and stronger push factors 
than the other group.  
Finally, at a firm level, (chapter 6),  we are interested in whether there are other 
characteristics that group companies together and, potentially, identify differences and 
similarities in their OFDI behaviour. We found four main types of Greek investors: 
crisis, healthy, satellite and lead.  
We define crisis and healthy investors based on whether push factors were the main 
criterion for their decision to engage in OFDI. For satellite and lead investors, we use 
the concept of linkages as the defining criterion, and argue that companies that follow 
their customers (cf. lead investors) abroad are pulled by them and are satellite 
investors.  
                                                          
13
 The credit time between supplier and customer is the time of product/service payment between the 
parties. 
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Interestingly, crisis and satellite investors are driven by increased competitive 
pressures. Lead and healthy investors are not affected by major push factors to 
internationalise, but want to expand in the host market.  
In terms of outcomes, our results are similar to Mathews (2006a; 2006b; 2006c), who 
argues for some modification of the OLI. However, while he considers his LLL 
framework as complementing OLI, our push-pull framework is intended to be a 
generic framework that integrates both the OLI and LLL models.  
To conclude, this research demonstrates the important role of push-pull factors for 
explaining OFDI. The context and, especially, negative home market conditions 
which we label push factors, are not present in either Dunning’s OLI or Mathews' 
LLL frameworks. 
Overall, this work provides a conceptual contribution to the literature by proposing an 
alternative classification framework to explain OFDI which encapsulates the 
continuous positive and/or negative home market changes in developed or emerging 
countries. A joint push-pull model could explain the OFDI behaviour of countries, 
industries or firms and indicate when investment is expansionary or escapist, that is, 
whether the push factors lead to escape FDI "forced internationalisation"(i.e. OFDI 
affected also by negative home market conditions) or the pull factors lead to 
expansionary FDI.  
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Chapter 2:  Background Theories on FDI and the MNCs 
 
2.1 FDI Mainstream Theories  
 
This section reviews the main theories of FDI in the context of their role in explaining 
the Greek OFDI in transition economies with special reference to SEE countries, 
Bulgaria & FYROM. The underlying aim is to examine the adequacy of well-
established FDI theories vs. the need for a new conceptual perspective to explain 
patterns of FDI similar to those for Greece.  
2.1.1 Neoclassical International Trade and Capital Market Theories 
 
Neoclassical international trade and capital market theories
14
 consider FDI strictly in 
financial terms, as the movement of funds given immobile factors. The movement of 
funds is driven solely by differences in rates of returns which are usually proxied by 
interest rates. In developing these theories, neoclassical economics assumes perfect 
capital markets, perfect knowledge, no risks or uncertainties, and a rational investor 
who shifts funds to locations with the highest returns. Some theories, assume that 
each country has different labour, capital and natural resource endowments (different 
factor endowments), which then influence the costs of production and, thus, the rates 
of return. The proponents of these theories argue that scarcity of resources and high 
labour costs drive funds one way, from developed to less developed countries with 
lower production costs (Caves, 1996, cited in Vasyechko, 2012). 
 
                                                          
14
 These theories related not only to FDI but to all foreign investments in general (capital movements). 
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Critique of Neoclassical Theories 
 
The assumptions in neoclassical theories (e.g. Ricardian, the Heckscher–Ohlin 
Samuelson, Leontief Paradox, Mundell’s model) are too idealistic and lack predictive 
power in a complex international environment; consequently, they fail to explain FDI 
and the existence of MNCs (Hosseini, 2005). We do not discuss these arguments 
extensively. Suffice it to say that Hymer (1976) concludes that the assumption of 
perfect competition in neoclassical theory is incompatible with the existence of FDI. 
Capital markets are not perfect and can be distorted by government policies that 
impose taxes on international capital movements (Faeth, 2009, p.167), and by 
pervasive information asymmetries and uncertainties. These theories do not provide a 
good explanation for capital movements in the context of transition countries, where 
capital markets are far from perfect and fundamental market institutions are 
underdeveloped (Vasyechko, 2012, p.122). 
 
2.1.2 New Trade Theories Applied to the MNC 
 
International trade refers to the exchange of products (finished or semi-finished) 
across national borders. Following Smith's, Ricardo's and Heckscher-Ohlin's classical 
trade theories, new perspectives, described generally as New Trade Theories, were 
proposed by numerous contributors  including:  (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Krugman 
1979, Ethier 1982, Helpman 1984, Krugman 1985, 1991, Dunning 1995b, Krugman 
1995, Markusen 1995, Markusen and Venables 1998, Ietto-Gillies 2000, 2007, 2012, 
2014).  
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New trade theories reflect the increasing importance in the world economy of 
specialization, which stems from agglomeration economies, technology and 
networking, which, in turn, lead to imperfect competition. The application of new 
trade theory to MNCs was from two perspectives. The first and most long-established, 
analyses FDI in developing countries, the second focuses on FDI in developed 
countries (Ietto-Gillies, 2012). In this section, we investigate the former in order to 
explain Greek OFDI towards SEE economies (OFDI from a developed to developing 
economies).
15
   
The key emphasis in new trade theories and FDI from developed to developing 
countries
16
 is on differences in factor endowments, and vertically integrated FDI as 
the mode most suited to exploiting these differences. In the context of new trade 
theories, MNEs can either integrate different activities across countries at different 
levels of development, or they can separate these activities geographically. In either 
case, these actions provide the MNEs with strong internalization advantages. So, 
under this framework, the MNC is characterized by direct production in the host 
market (in order to exploit differences in factor prices while supporting intra-
firm/industry transactions) and not establishment of a foreign affiliate to sell at arm’s 
length from the parent company (Ietto-Gillies, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 An overview of the literature on developed/industrialized countries, MNCs and new trade theories is 
provided in  Markusen, J. R. and A. J. Venables (1998) , Barrios, S., H. Görg and E. Strobl (2003), 
Ietto-Gillies, G. (2012).  
 
16
 Some of these are assumed also in the case OFDI between developed countries.  
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Critique of New Trade Theories  
 
The role of new trade theories to explain MNCs tends to be extremely restrictive with 
limited applicability
17
and empirical validity even for developing countries, (Lucas 
1988, Alam 1994, Bardhan 1995). Although, these models were developed to 
acknowledge the important role of MNEs in world trade, operationally they were not 
successful and rather were problematic and contradictory (Ietto-Gillies 2007, 2012, 
2014). Main conflicting elements for these theories are the interrelationship of trade 
and FDI and the costs versus benefits which can be revealed when operating inter-
regionally versus inter-nationally (Ietto-Gillies, 2000,2012, 2014). 
Fundamental to this framework is the production of finished or semi-finished products 
linked to increased economies of scale, joint inputs (scope), and increased intra-
firm/industry trade. However, these attributes fit the manufacturing industries, but do 
not consider the industry features of services and construction firms which have no 
trade links with the host or home markets or the parent company. Although new trade 
theory considers also service activities, such as R&D and advertising, they are 
perceived as joint inputs involving the parent firms. Thus, manufacturing industry 
theory does not explain the developments in other industries.   
New trade theory assumes that the motive for OFDI is the difference in factor 
endowments between two countries, e.g. developed versus developing countries, and 
assumes technology advantage of advanced economies (Wangwe, 1993) combined 
with strong internalization advantages. New trade theory cannot explain the existence 
of internationalised firms which do not possess such advantages, e.g. how Greek 
OFDI firms with weak technological advantages, under pressure from foreign 
competition in their home market, can expand into SEE countries.       
                                                          
17
 For extensive critique of New Trade Theories see Ietto-Gillies, G. (2000, 2012, 2014)  
57 
 
Also, new trade theories are applicable to monopolistic and to oligopolistic 
industries,
18
 but they cannot explain MNEs in more competitive industries, e.g. 
services. In addition, monopolistic and oligopolistic industries are based on company-
generated scale economies; other important external factors such as negative home 
market conditions, de-industrialization and shrinkage of the home market are not 
included in the framework. New trade theories predict direct production and ignore its 
complementarities with trade. For example, in the case of Greek OFDI, many 
manufacturing companies use the foreign affiliate as an arm's length firm to deliver 
exports to the host market, i.e. as tool to facilitate trade. New trade theories see the 
foreign affiliate as the supplier of joint inputs (e.g. labour intensive components) for 
the parent company. 
In addition, based on new trade theories, we would expect investments between 
developed and developing countries to be associated largely with vertically integrated 
firms (joint inputs e.g. labour intensive components produced and used within the 
firm) (Ietto-Gillies, 2007). However, Greek OFDI towards SEE countries is primarily 
horizontal investment
19
. New trade theory sees horizontal investments as occurring 
only between developed countries.   
So new trade theories have some shortcomings for explaining some of the stylized 
facts related to the current world economy and MNEs. On a theoretical level, the  
numerous assumptions of new trade theories minimizes a lot the importance and their 
influence to international business (Morgan and Katsikeas, 1997). Ietto Gilles (2012, 
p.142) points out that "new trade theorists find the empirical reality does not quite fit 
                                                          
18 The use of this framework to explain oligopolistic industries and conditions has been questioned  for 
discussion please see, Alam, A. (1994) and Ietto-Gillies, G. (2014) 
19
 This issue is discussed extensively in the following chapters, particularly in chapter 6 Table 43 
(p.241)     
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the conclusions of their models". She adds also that other issues, such as institutional 
or political, should be considered in relation to MNCs and their operations. We would 
suggest that push factors (e.g. negative home market conditions) should be taken into 
account when discussing determinants of MNEs behaviour.   
2.1.3 Monopolistic Theories as Determinants of FDI  
 
With the emergence of multinationals in the 1960s, and the inability of neoclassical 
theories to explain their behaviour, a new set of theories was proposed, aimed 
primarily at explaining the behaviour of MNCs. These theories refer to 
microeconomic analysis of MNCs based on industrial organization theory (Cantwell, 
2000; Vasyechko, 2012) 
According to the theory, the motivation for OFDI is not simply better rates of return, 
it is based also on the desire to exploit the firms' ownership advantages and market 
power abroad to increase its profits (Hymer, 1976; Ietto-Gillies, 2005, p.197), which 
suggests it is expansionary FDI (Chen and Ku, 2000). The firm first develops market 
power in the home market, acting on its own or through mergers or collaboration with 
others, and eventually dominates the home market. When it is clear that there is no 
more space for the company to grow domestically it expands abroad and eventually 
dominates the foreign market (Hymer, 1976; Cantwell, 2000). To achieve this, MNCs 
need to possess "monopolistic advantage" (Hymer, 1976), based primarily on non-
financial and ownership-specific intangible assets.
20
  
 
                                                          
20  Examples of such advantages include: product differentiation, managerial and marketing skills, 
technological advantages, firm-level economies of scale (Kindleberger, 1969, cited in Forsgren, 2008). 
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The issue of control is one of the most important developments in this theory. Hymer 
(1976) refers specifically to neoclassical capital movements as portfolio investment, 
and classifies the behaviour of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as direct investment. 
The main difference between portfolio and direct investment lies in the issue of 
control, which is specific to FDI. Control allows the company to expand its market 
power by removing competition and avoiding conflicts among firms while exploiting 
its advantages (Ietto-Gillies, 2005, p.197). Thus, instead of exporting/licensing to the 
investing economies the firm decides to exchange intermediate inputs across countries 
by acquiring control of the new firm in the foreign country. These ownership 
advantages (developed further by Dunning in his OLI framework) allow the firm to 
overcome the additional costs involved in operating in a foreign environment or the 
"liability of foreignness" (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995; Hosseini 2005; Chen, 2006; 
Rugman, 2010). 
Critique of Monopolistic Theories 
 
As discussed above, a firm must possess counterbalancing advantages in order to 
expand and overcome the liability of foreignness. Kindleberger (1969), (as cited in 
Forsgren, 2008, p.17) contributes to this theory and proposes a number of potential 
advantages that the firm should possess in order to invest abroad. However, he does 
not explain which of these advantages is the most important for the retention of 
market power. The theory assumes that large companies have control or market power 
(Faeth, 2009, p.167). However, there are Greek companies
21
 which internationalise 
while declining or experiencing industry shrinkage. Thus, we cannot argue that they 
transfer their monopolistic power and control from the home market to the host 
                                                          
21
There are of course some exceptions, such as OTE (telecom industry - regional player) and Titan 
(cement industry – global player), but these are few. 
60 
 
market via FDI. Also, the majority are in competitive industries and the market power 
approach is a monopoly approach related to monopoly or oligopoly industries. 
The theory proposes that a company, in order to invest in an unfamiliar environment, 
should possess firm specific advantages which enable it to overcome the liability of 
foreignness. So the question arises: "How do Greek entrepreneurs overcome this 
liability if they do not possess these kinds of advantages?" 
There are other aspects that suggest that Hymer’s approach cannot explain Greek FDI. 
For example, he assumes that direct investment is concentrated in specific industries 
throughout the world, rather than in various industries in a particular country (Hymer, 
1976). This means that direct investment is industry-focused. However, Greek 
entrepreneurs invest in various industries, such as telecommunications, banking, 
tobacco, food/beverages, retail, aluminium – non-ferrous metals, construction, etc. 
and mainly in the SEE region.
22
 Therefore, Greek FDI is not industry-focused as 
assumed by the theory, but covers a wide range of industries in a specific region.  
The market power approach assumes that Greek firms build positions of market 
power in the domestic market and then in their respective international markets. 
However, it seems that the majority of Greek firms expand abroad based not on high 
industry concentration or increased market power share. Greek firms would seem to 
establish FDI activities in SEE because they are unable to secure market share in the 
domestic-EU market. Greece is at the bottom of the EU league in terms of 
competitiveness indicators so the market power approach ignores loss of 
competitiveness as a potential determinant of FDI.  
                                                          
22
 See Appendix 1 Greek Parent Industries, Investors in Bulgaria & FYROM (p.298). 
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This theory also does not consider adverse demand conditions in the home market, 
such as low customer purchasing power, as a determinant of FDI. It perceives the firm 
as an active rather than a passive agent in the market. In Chapter 6, we show that 
Greek investors are crisis driven investors; in other words, they are investing in SEE 
due to adverse home market conditions.  
Greek enterprises are investing in countries where well established investors are 
adopting a ''wait and see'' tactic (Karagianni and Labrianidis, 2001). Why is Greek 
FDI not confined MNCs with the advantages that market power theory conventionally 
advocates?. This theory emphasize that there are cross investments between countries. 
However, SEE countries are not OFDI investors in Greece. 
 
2.1.4 Theory of Internalization-Transaction Costs 
 
The theory of internalization (or transaction costs),
23
 is based on Coase’s (1937) 
conceptualization in his article "The Nature of the firm". Although Coase developed 
his theory for domestic firms, Hymer (1976)
24
 and others
25
 have applied his notion to 
the context of international firms.  
The main idea is that the expansion to new countries can be achieved through internal 
managerial coordination and is preferred to the involvement of external firms through, 
e.g., licensing or/and market prices, since internal procedures are more advantageous 
and can increase efficiency and eliminate market transaction costs. 
 
                                                          
23 Internalization is similar to and linked to transaction cost theory, see Teece, D. J. (1986).   
24 In this sense, Hymer was the first transaction-costs/internalization scholar, "The firm is a practical 
devise which substitutes for the market. The firm internalizes or supersedes the market" (1976,  p.48) .  
25 There are many contributors such as: Buckley  P. J. and Casson  M. C., (1976,  2009),  Dunning 
(1979); Rugman  A. M. and Verbeke A., (2003) ; Henisz W. J (2003)  
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Internalization occurs for a variety of reasons including lack of markets, inefficiency 
and high risks for important intermediate inputs and intangible assets such as 
technology, knowledge, R&D, opportunism, bounded rationality, imperfect 
information, uncertainty, etc. The internalization process provides protection and 
allows the firm to retain its firm specific advantages (FSA) such as proprietary 
knowledge, without fear of competitive loss. The greater the company's risk of losing 
its FSA from outsourcing the higher the incentive is to adopt an internalization 
strategy. In addition, Hood and Young (1979) and Calvet (1981) note that a company 
is not only supposed to possess FSA, it should also have the ability to internalize these 
advantages, rather than selling them. 
Critique of Theory of Internalization-Transaction Costs 
 
Rugman (1986, p.104) states that "due to its generality, internalization can be seen as 
an approach rather than a theory". This theory includes internalized investment of 
scarce resources and superior assets, which leads to the firm achieving a monopoly 
position. Thus, this theory applies mainly to oligopolistic/monopoly industries. 
Buckley and Casson (1976, as cited in Ietto-Gillies, 2007) point out that 
internalization theory explains the necessity for direct investment especially for 
companies with high levels of R&D. However, this does not apply to Greek firms. 
Internalization theory better explains the behaviour of specific oligopolistic industries 
such as Hellenic Petroleum vertical investments rather than the majority of Greek FDI 
which involves a wide range of horizontal industries. Furthermore, FDI inflows in 
SEE are generally low compared to CEE due to poorly developed infrastructure and 
institutions in these countries. So, the questions that arise are: "Why is it efficient for 
Greek firms with no R&D or other ownership advantages, to exploit the benefits of 
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internalization? Why is it not possible for other developed MNC firms to exploit these 
benefits?" 
According to internalization theory, in a high-risk environment such as SEE, it is not 
optimal to invest due to difficulties involved in internalizing FSA. Another argument 
is that firms with strong advantages and sufficient resources use greenfield as the 
mode of entry
26
 (Hennart and Park, 1993; Nitsch, Beamish et al., 1996). Our findings 
suggest that Greek firms do not have these advantages although 70% of them enter 
through greenfield investment.
27
 
2.1.5 Vernon’s Product Life Cycle Theory 
 
In 1966, Raymond Vernon proposed the product life cycle (PLC) approach, which 
argues that a product’s development goes through stages. The advantage of this theory 
is that it explains the relationship between product, technology (R&D), trade and FDI 
and describes it is as an orderly sequential process (Ietto-Gillies, 2005). The key idea 
is that a product can be conceptualized, standardized and matured in a developed, 
high income country such as the USA. The firm, as a technology leader and product 
innovator in a developed country, will complete the stages from exporting to FDI. 
PLC theory is based on the concepts of location and product innovation. The rationale 
is that international production can be viewed as taking place in three stages (Vernon, 
1966), each of which is associated with a specific oligopolistic behaviour:  
                                                          
26
  Applications of transaction cost theory have become fairly common in entry-mode investigations see 
Anderson and Gatignon, (1986); Erramilli and Rao, (1993); Brouthers and Brouthers (2000). 
 
27
 Appendix 2: Parent Company Export/Investment Activities Prior FDI & Ownership Structure and 
Mode of Entry, FDI in Order to Re-import Products/Services (Row 2D, p.299).  
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New Product Stage 
In a large developed market such as the USA,
28
 new products are introduced by an 
innovation-based oligopolistic firm. At this stage, the new innovative product is still 
not standardized. The role of a developed market with high average income per capita 
consumers is important because this type of consumer will provide feedback to enable 
further development of the product towards standardization.  
Maturing Product Stage 
Once the product has become standardized in the home market, it can be exported to 
other countries. There are growing markets, but also increasing competitive pressures 
as the product matures. At this stage, there is increasing demand and need for mass 
production and lower costs. This prompts companies to re-locate production abroad.  
The Standardized Product Stage 
This is the stage of mass production, where there is intensive imitation, price 
competition and need for lower production costs. ''FDI becomes inevitable, as tariffs 
tend to constrain further exports. Scale economies tend to be exhausted at home and 
servicing foreign markets becomes very difficult" (Pitelis and Argitis, 2009, p.13). As 
a result, home country exports are displaced via FDI in low-cost-locations such as 
developing countries. From these new low cost-locations, products are shipped to the 
home market and to other destinations. In the meantime, the headquarters company is 
forced to develop new products and technologies (Vernon, 1966) as a ''prime global 
innovator'' (Gao and Tisdell, 2005, p.38). 
 
                                                          
28 "Vernon argues that the economic and social environment of a high per capita income and capital 
abundant country – the USA – creates the conditions for new products to be developed. '' (Ietto-Gillies, 
2007,  p.198) 
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Vernon’s Product Life Cycle Theory Mark II 
 
The original PLC theory has experienced several revisions and criticisms (Cantwell 
1995; 2000; Ietto-Gillies, 2005) including from Vernon (1979) himself. Vernon 
understood that changes in the international environment and conditions affected his 
primary theoretical pillar, which assumes a leading advanced industrialized country 
(USA) with innovative firms and high income consumers. More specifically, the 
development and convergence of other countries as advanced industrialized 
innovative areas, e.g. European common market countries and Japan, extend the 
"map" of internationalisation and innovation. Moreover, innovative firms, high-
income sophisticated consumers and MNCs geographical spread in many more 
developed markets created issues regarding product diffusion. For example, the speed 
of new market product entry in other areas largely decreased (Ietto-Gillies, 2005).  
As a result, (Vernon, 1979, p.265) suggested that his theory was still useful for 
explaining the activities of smaller innovative firms, without global networks, 
producing un-standardized products and following the PLC sequence of export and 
investment.  
Moreover, he accepted that there was still explanatory power related to product 
diffusion between developed and developing markets (Ietto-Gillies, 2005).  But, the 
main idea of product innovation and firms' technological monopolistic advantage 
remains the same.  
Critique of Product Life Cycle Theory 
 
At least in the initial stage, this theory refers to oligopolistic R&D firms so cannot be 
applied to competitive industries. Furthermore, PLC theory assumes that FDI flows 
66 
 
one way, i.e. from the USA to European developed countries and then to developing 
countries thus, it cannot explain the phenomenon of simultaneous and reverse flows 
of FDI from developed to developing and vice versa (Vasyechko, 2012).  
Another problem is that it can be applied to companies with export activity, such as 
the manufacturing industry, but does not explain the behaviour of the services or 
construction industry, or sectors such as banking. Also, even for the manufacturing 
industry, as a stage theory it has limitations (e.g. the company could omit a stage or it 
might invest in a country without having previous exports links). 
This theory, even after Vernon's revisions (which still emphasize the firm’s 
oligopolistic position), can be applied only to manufacturing firms in the Greek 
market that hold a monopolistic/oligopolistic position. This theory assumes that R&D, 
innovation and technology advantages are essential for product development and 
internationalisation, although, as already mentioned, this is not a competitive 
advantage for most Greek firms. 
Also, most Greek enterprises that are expanding operations to SEE market are not 
producing fully innovative and differentiated products. Even in the case of 
telecommunications, most of them buy technology know-how from other countries 
e.g. Italy.
29
 In addition, the same standardized products that they are producing/ 
selling in the Greek market are the products they provide in the host market. Also, 
they do not re-export them back to the home market.
30
 
                                                          
29
 Table 5: Parent Company Technology Advantages (p.100). 
30
 Appendix 2: FDI in Order to Re-import Products/Services for Parent Company or/and Greek Market 
(Row 2F, p.299). 
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Thus, firms that are not characterized as global technological leaders in the home 
market are investing in SEE efficiently, which is not explained by this theory. 
2.1.6 The Internationalisation Stages Approach 
 
Scandinavian scholars (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977; Johanson, 1990) worked on the internationalisation of Swedish manufacturing 
firms and first described the mechanisms of internationalisation stages. This is a 
behavioural approach to the firm, characterized by a gradual process of international 
involvement which came to be known as the Uppsala School or U-Model.  
According to the U-model, internationalisation stage theory takes place in four main 
steps in a linear pattern. In the first phase, firms have no regular export activity; in the 
second, they export through independent representatives (local agents); in the third 
stage, they establish a sales subsidiary; and in the fourth stage create a 
production/marketing subsidiary (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). 
Two elements that influence this process are "psychic distance" and "market size" 
which determine the level of commitment. Initially, the firm will start to 
internationalise in smaller (less need for firm resources and less competitive market) 
and more familiar (shorter psychic and socio-cultural distance) countries and 
gradually, as they acquire appropriate knowledge and experience, they expand to 
other foreign markets (Quer, Claver et al., 2008, p.15). According to this theory, as 
knowledge/experience of investing in foreign markets increases (as they proceed from 
one stage to the next, from no regular export activity to increased market knowledge, 
to export through independent representatives) there is increased commitment to the 
host country and development of "market resource commitment". FDI then is the 
outcome of the interaction between these processes (Johanson, 1990; Meyer, 1998). 
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So, the firm’s competitive advantages are based on experiential market knowledge. 
This knowledge facilitates the identification of business opportunities and difficulties 
in a foreign environment, and reduces market uncertainty. 
Internationalisation stage theory has also been revised. The core theory is unchanged, 
but it includes a view of the business environment and markets through the lens of 
firms’ networking relationships. It recognizes that knowledge is gained through 
networking, which is a source of trust and further commitment (Johanson and Vahlne, 
2009). Also the concept of liability of foreignness is described as the liability of 
outsidership.  
Critique of Internationalisation Stages Approach  
 
Internationalisation stage theory is a behavioural theory which is based on certain 
stages during which the firm overcomes the initial limitations of that stage and 
progresses to the next towards further internationalisation. Although the theory 
developers have tried to be flexible and to note that is not necessary to follow all the 
stages strictly (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), there is a problem related to 
the basic corollary of the theory which says that a firm expands abroad based on 
experience and knowledge gained in foreign markets (Guillén and García-Canal, 
2009, p.26). As the company slowly and gradually expands abroad and as its 
experience increases, it invests more, but this implies that the theory cannot explain 
cases where companies invest directly in a country without any prior experience in a 
foreign market (e.g. investment patterns that telecommunications or construction 
industries follow). 
This model assumes also that "when market conditions are stable and homogeneous 
relevant market knowledge can be gained in ways other than through experience" 
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(Johanson and Vahlne, 1990, p.12). However, SEE countries are not stable markets. 
They are in a state of political and economic instability, which makes dissemination 
of knowledge and information difficult.  
According to the theory, even in the revised model, the firm's incremental 
involvement abroad depends on the development of knowledge, and market 
commitment, which are time consuming (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). However, 
looking at the Greek case in particular, this theory does not explain the fact that Greek 
firms have not expanded "gradually" abroad, and that their expansion could be 
characterized as "boom" expansion since the end of 1990s.
31
 In addition, OFDI is a 
new activity for the vast majority of Greek enterprises; this implies that Greek 
entrepreneurs have limited knowledge of these foreign markets. Although Greek firms 
can recognize opportunities and difficulties in SEE markets, this is the result of ability 
developed through operating in a rather uncertain home market environment, e.g. 
unstable tax system. This experience is not related to previous entrepreneurial 
relationships with the host market, as the theory suggests.  
 
 
The revised theory, which considers changes in business conditions and firm 
behaviours, cannot predict the case of partially "forced internationalisation". It also 
does not apply to adverse home market conditions and their role as a push factor for 
foreign investment. The Uppsala model explains the characteristics of firm 
internationalisation stages (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009) and, thus, is an "internalist" 
FDI theory focused on networking with little attention to other external factors such 
as negative home market conditions as an FDI push factor. 
                                                          
31
 See Figure 4: Inward Vs. Outward Stocks in the Greek Economy (1980-2010) (p.25). 
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2.1.7 The OLI or Eclectic Paradigm Approach 
 
The eclectic paradigm (or OLI framework) was proposed by John Dunning. He 
offered an influential theoretical framework and a useful tool for empirical FDI 
analysis, (Dunning 1979; 1980; 1988; 1995; 2000; 2001). Thus, Dunning’s 
contribution is not a MNE or FDI theory per se (Dunning, 1988), but rather a 
synthesis of elements from diverse FDI theories. The key to his OLI framework is the 
co-existence of ownership, location and internalization advantages and the firm’s 
prior engagement in FDI activity (Dunning, 1979). 
Ownership Advantages 
Dunning (2001, p.175) considers ownership advantages as income generating assets 
which provide the firm with the ability to undertake FDI activities in foreign markets. 
These advantages are tangible (e.g. capital, technology intensity, economies of scale) 
and intangible (e.g. brand name, reputation, technological superiority, patenting, 
innovation capacity, R&D, organizational and managerial expertise, marketing know-
how and international experience) assets that are required prior to FDI by the MNE. 
They provide competitiveness, and overcome the various potential costs in a foreign 
environment and the liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1988; Zaheer, 
1995). Dunning and Lundan (2008) distinguish among three types of ownership 
advantages: O= Oa + Ot + Oi. Ownership asset (Oa) advantages are company specific 
assets which are not related to the firm’s multinationality, (Ot) refers to ownership 
transactional advantages which are firm assets that are coordinated and internalized 
with the firm’s capabilities, ownership institutional advantages (Oi) include firm 
specific beliefs and incentives and constitute the firm’s code of operation (Dunning 
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and Lundan, 2008, p.321; Eden and Dai, 2010). Dunning explains that ownership 
advantages are shaped by and related to home market endowments. So, he points out 
that, the country's economy will influence the firm's ownership advantages (Dunning, 
1980, p.10; Dunning, 1988).  
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, we do not analyse the OLI further; the aim 
here was to discuss ownership advantages. Internalization was also discussed above. 
OLI theory is presented and tested empirically in the following chapters.  
Critique of OLI 
 
The eclectic paradigm, although the most widely used empirical tool in international 
business for FDI analysis, has some limitations. The main drawback is the extensive 
list of variables in the three categories which risk loss of explanatory power, which 
Dunning (2001) acknowledges. He justifies it, arguing that OLI is more a theoretical 
tool to analyse and describe FDI than a predictive theory of FDI (Dunning, 2001 
p.176). He adds that the paradigm does not explain the firm’s international production 
and behaviour (Dunning, 1988).  
OLI theory only partly explains Greek FDI in SEE. As already discussed, ownership 
advantages are influenced by home market conditions, which give rise to or eliminate 
these advantages. The Greek economy experienced critical problems such as loss of 
competitiveness, low R&D, and low levels of multinationality which did not provide 
their firms with the essential elements to strengthen their ownership advantages.   
On the other hand international companies that possess the conventional advantages 
included in this theory are not keen to invest in SEE while Greek firms with all their 
disadvantages are investing and operating successfully in this region. 
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The theory notes also that locational advantages are required in combination with 
ownership and internalization advantages (Ietto-Gillies, 2005, p.114). This element of 
the theory does not explain why location advantages are exploited by Greek FDI and 
not by the major established MNCs. Also, OLI does not explain why Greek firms are 
among major investors in FYROM and in Bulgaria
32
, but are less prominent in more 
developed areas. 
However, OLI can be used to explain individual cases of Greek investment with 
ownership advantages, e.g. TITAN (cement industry), which is a global FDI player, 
but does not explain cases of OFDI, where there are no traditional ownership 
advantages and FDI is a survival strategy. According to an empirical OLI study 
"Firms that have lower levels of ownership advantages are expected to either not enter 
foreign markets or use a low-risk entry mode such as exporting" (Agarwal and 
Ramaswami, 1992, p.2). Nevertheless, Greek FDI show different results. 
Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) find that company size and low levels of 
multinationality do not encourage investment. Smaller firms use joint venturing as a 
mode of entry to foreign markets. Again, these predictions do not apply in the case of 
Greek firms with limited multinational experience, which prefer greenfield 
investments in rather risky markets and have low levels of international 
competitiveness. 
Dunning was open-minded and pointed out that competition, recent technological 
advances, high mobility of some firm advantages, and investments in new emerging 
markets enable companies to exploit and augment their core advantages (Dunning, 
                                                          
32
 We should point out that ownership advantages of Greek firms can be compared not only to 
international MNCs but also to the O advantages of firms in the host countries (Bulgaria and FYROM), 
so these are also considered in the empirical analysis.   
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2001, pp.182-183). These business changing conditions complement existing firm 
advantages. Thus, Dunning recognizes changes in the global business environment, 
but without examining negative market conditions such as adverse demand conditions 
(push factors) as potential drivers of OFDI. He uses the eclectic paradigm as a 
framework to explain FDI at the level of a country or group of countries. He did not 
envisage it being applied to the individual firm (Dunning, 1988; 2002).  
All of these classical theories describing the behaviour of FDI assume that FDI 
originates in countries with positive domestic economic conditions. We argue that 
negative domestic market conditions can operate to spur investment in foreign 
markets. This could be a strategy for firm survival and can be described as partly 
"forced internationalisation". This leads us to examine also the important 
phenomenon of MNCs from developing or emerging markets which Dunning does 
not address.  
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2.2 Macro and Regional Approaches 
 
2.2.1 Investment Development Path 
 
The Investment Development Path (IDP) approach aims to explain the relationship 
between FDI and levels of country development. This theory is in line with Dunning’s 
early work based on  Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) (Dunning, 1979, p.3; 
1986; 1988) and expanded in a more macroeconomic and dynamic approach by 
Dunning and Narula (1996a), and called the IDP model. It suggests that the level of a 
country’s economic development influences its inward and outward investments. It is 
measured by per capita gross national income (GNI)
33
 and the country's net outward 
investment (NOI) position
34
 (Narula and Guimon, 2010). The model identifies and 
classifies five different phases according to NOI and the country’s level of 
development. 
 
Stage I  
This stage (Dunning and Narula, 1996, pp.2-3; Dunning, 2002) refers to under 
developed, pre-industrialized countries and assumes that, with the exception of 
location advantages (L) arising from possession of natural assets, there are no other 
location advantages to attract inward investment. Its main economic features include 
inadequate infrastructure, unskilled labour force, underdeveloped commercial and 
legal frameworks, limited domestic markets and demand as a result of low per capita 
income, economic and political instability and market inefficiencies. OFDI is 
                                                          
33
GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is gross national income. 
34
NOI is the difference between a country’s outward and inward investment stocks. 
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insignificant, and foreign investors mostly export to and import from the country 
rather than investing via FDI. Domestic firms have no strong ownership advantages. 
Stage II 
Increased domestic consumer purchasing power leads to market growth and 
development. Firms acquire intangible assets (e.g. technological capabilities), 
developed locally or as a result of cooperation with other foreign firms, thus creating 
ownership and location advantages. Home market infrastructure develops and inward 
direct investment starts to rise, mainly in labour intensive industries, while outward 
investment starts to emerge although at a low level. OFDI may be market seeking or 
trade related with adjacent countries or strategic asset seeking towards high-income 
countries. At the end of this stage inward and outward FDI seem to be balanced. 
 
Stage III 
The third stage in the investment development path is characterized by a gradual 
slowdown of inward FDI and an increase in the rate of growth of outward investment 
resulting in an increase in NOI. Industrialization, income and demand increases, 
government spending on education, training, and R&D strengthens intangible assets 
related to the workforce and local firms. Local firms start to compete in the domestic 
market on equal terms with foreign counterparts.  
As the economy develops, the country acquires location advantages due to the 
development of external scale economies through firm clustering. There is a reduction 
in labour-intensive industries which are replaced by industries with technological and 
innovation capacity, which produce capital intensive and value added products similar 
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to developed MNCs. Outward investments are largely market seeking or export 
related FDI and gradually become strategic seeking FDI.  
Stage IV  
At this stage, a country is a net outward investor
35
 and the NOI position turns positive 
with an increasing rate of growth. Domestic firms do not possess only Ownership 
Asset Advantages (Oa) (which are based on home country competitive advantages), 
they have also Ownership Transactional Advantages (Ot) (managing and coordinating 
geographically dispersed assets). As a result, they can compete with domestic and 
international investors in both the home and host markets. Products and services are 
capital intensive and very sophisticated, thus, home market location advantages are 
the result of created assets. Inward investment is mainly asset seeking while outward 
investment continues to increase. In order to maintain their competitiveness, firms 
will invest in countries at lower stages of IDP and will prefer to internalize their firm 
activities in the global market, thus, more FDI than exports characterizes their mode 
of internationalisation.  
 
Stage V 
Stage V refers to advanced industrialized countries where NOI after fluctuations 
emerges at a zero level while there may be continuous rises in both types of FDI. FDI 
almost substitute for cross-border transactions e.g. exports. There are no location 
advantages e.g. asset creation from only one leading country. Ownership advantages 
are even more strongly related to "transactions" rather than "assets".  
                                                          
35
 Outward direct investment stock exceeds or equals inward investment stock. 
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Critique of IDP 
 
Table 1 shows the main characteristics of outward FDI at different stages of IDP 
which is our primary focus in this thesis.  
Table 1: Characteristics of Outward FDI at Different Stages of the IDP  
 
Source: (Dunning, Narula et al., 1996b, p.6) 
Table 1 includes stages II to V because in stage I there is nil OFDI. According to the 
literature, Greece could be classified as stage III country, (Louri, Papanastassiou et 
al., 2000; Bitzenis and Vlachos, 2012), however, this would be only partially correct. 
Currently, the vast majority of Greek FDI is regionally developed, as expected under 
stage II (of the IDP approach), whereas in stage III the model suggests that FDI 
should be not only regional but also expanding globally, a situation that does not 
apply to Greece.    
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The Greek case reflects the model insofar as it concerns market seeking in developing 
countries (stage II) however it should be noted that the type of Greek OFDI includes 
all industries as market seekers.  
When referring to ownership advantages, we agree with Dunning, Narula et al. 
(1996b),  who state that adapted technology and management, and conglomerate 
group ownership (e.g. Satellite investors
36
 ) - which are a feature of Greek OFDI - are 
an advantage for firms in third world countries, but our findings contradict other 
aspects of their approach, namely the simultaneous growth of OFDI and loss of 
competitiveness in a global level. Moreover, Greek enterprises - as we elaborate later 
- pushed their OFDI due to adverse economic factors e.g. increasing costs, which was 
not an advantage for them. The authors (Dunning, Narula et al., 1996b) also refer to 
an "ethnic" advantage (Table 1, Stage III, examples of ownership advantages); even 
were this to occur, it is unclear how much compensation it would be for other 
limitations such as the accompanying loss of competitiveness.  
Revisions to the IDP Model  
The original IDP has been criticised (Buckley and Castro, 1998; Liu, Buck et al., 
2005) and revised. However, its main assumptions remain unchanged. It has been 
suggested that there is a need for a broader perspective (e.g. the historical, social, 
government and political issues and their impact on FDI should be considered), when 
applying the IDP model due to the different economic structures of each country and 
FDI heterogeneity (Narula and Guimon, 2010).  
                                                          
36 See discussion in chapter 6: Greek OFDI Examined at Firm Level (pp.238-283). 
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Table 2: Characteristics of Outward & Inward FDI at Different Stages of the 
IDP (Revised)   
Source: (Narula and Guimon 2010, p.9) 
In the revised IDP model (Narula and Guimon, 2010) again Greek OFDI possesses 
few features similar to stage II-III e.g. market seeking FDI in developing countries 
(stage II). However, it refers also to "escape" investments but specifically in natural 
assets and in technology manufacturing in developed countries which does not apply 
to Greek OFDI. In stage III, even though Greek OFDI is growing, the development is 
market seeking for many industries, as opposed to resulting - as the model suggests - 
from all kinds of investment seeking. Nevertheless, although there are few 
characteristics of OFDI similar to the Greek case, in the case of IFDI, Greece shows 
some deviations; IFDI declined with the onset of Greek crisis (see Figure 19). 
Ultimately, we should mention that even the revised model does not include negative 
home market conditions that could operate as push factors for FDI.      
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In order to examine the Greek IDP path further and to try to classify it appropriately, 
we include the original graphical representation of NOI (Figure 18) and then NOI for 
Greece (Figure 19).  
Figure 18: Graphical Representation of the Investment Development Path (IDP) 
 
 
Stages of the IDP 
Source: Narula and Dunning, 2010 cited by  (Narula and Guimon, 2010, p.8) 
We include the graphical representation of the IDP in order to compare it with inward 
and outward Greek stock of FDI (see Figure 4); we start with this, and then continue 
with key idea of NOI analysis. Greek OFDI is in line with the model, whereas IFDI is 
not. The slope of Greek IFDI is slightly different; in particular, we would expect, as 
the model suggests, this to rise at an increasing rate and then to become stable (Figure 
18). However, what we observe is that Greek IFDI shows fluctuations, starting with 
an increasing rate, followed by a sharp decrease, before continuing on an upward path 
and then finally decreasing sharply (Figure 4). Thus, we can detect a deviation 
between the model and our case. As a result (Figure 19) the NOI position of Greece 
shows an unusual trend. More specifically, Figure (19) shows the NOI position of 
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Greece with respect to the GNI per capita level from 1980 up to 2012 and provides us 
an overview of the pattern of Greek IDP. As can be seen, when using the IDP 
approach with GNI, these data suggest that Greece is in stage V.  
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Figure 19: Net Outward Investment Position of Greece (1980-2012)  
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When compared to the original graph, negative NOI followed by low GNI level, is the 
stage I of the IDP. The negative NOI value is the result of higher rise in inward FDI, 
than OFDI, thus, Stage I is in line with the IDP pattern. The shift from the second to 
the third IDP stage, in the Greek case, does not seem to be as smooth as in the original 
model. It seems that there are many sharp fluctuations up to the lowest negative NOI 
position, when the third stage starts to emerge. Next, from stage III to stage IV, even 
though the original pattern assumes a smooth upward trend for NOI this does not 
apply to Greece which shows a sharp increase in NOI, which indicates a forced 
change between outward and inward levels.  
 
This seems to be caused in part by sharply reduced attractiveness of Greece as an FDI 
location and in part by "forced internationalisation" of its MNCs in search of liquid 
markets. Taken at face value this would suggest that Greek IDP is in the Stage V of 
the IDP. In reality, its positive NOI is an expression of its weaknesses rather than the 
strengths of Oa of its enterprises.  
A sharp increase in NOI is de facto an outcome of weak competitiveness, while the 
IDP assumes that an increase in OFDI is due to economic growth and increased 
ownership advantages among Greek firms. 
 
Finally, the model assumes that the growth in NOI is the result of a continuous 
developmental process which does not include push factors or factors that are not 
related to ownership advantages, but are rather related to weaknesses in the process. 
Thus, elaboration of the data shows that for categorizing the Greek case, the theory is 
weak in one particular stage. The IDP approach is based on two indicators, NOI and 
84 
 
GNI, which provide a limited empirical basis for understanding the relationship 
between FDI and growth which, basically, is multi-level relationship. So, caution is 
needed, because these classifications could be overly simplistic; using the relation 
between OFDI and GNI per capita "can be criticised as amounting to a mere 
common-sense hypotheses" (Liu, Buck et al. 2005 p.103). Moreover, it "raises the 
question of whether the concept of an individual country’s IDP is of any use." 
(Buckley and Castro, 1998, p.3) 
 
Narula and Guimon (2010) seem to be aware of these critiques as they suggest that 
IDP research should not use only country level data. They suggest identifying 
deviations and variations to provide potential explanations for the phenomenon. This 
should ensure a better understanding of FDI, especially combined with ownership and 
location factors at country, firm or industry level (Narula and Guimon, 2010, pp.8-9). 
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 we focus on these three levels (country, industry and firm).  
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2.3 Differences between Developed and Emerging Market FDI & MNCs 
2.3.1 Introduction (FDI Waves of EM MNCs & Debate) 
 
Mainstream FDI theories do not apply to Greek OFDI. Here, we address the case of 
emerging market (EM) MNCs their characteristics and their differences with old 
MNCs which have been the focus of the theories reviewed so far. The rationale for 
this discussion is twofold: first to uncover the differences between old and new MNCs 
and to reveal the limitations of conventional theories to explain the phenomenon of 
EM MNCs. We also explore whether the behaviour and features of EM MNCs are 
compatible with the Greek case.  
EM MNCs and their differences with conventional MNCs have led to an interesting 
academic debate. The argument is focused on the need for a new theory which better 
explains the presence of OFDI from emerging markets. In this section, similarities and 
differences between new and old MNCs are discussed. We point to the need for a 
push-pull concept as a tool for FDI analysis that combines the cases of both developed 
and emerging firms’ FDI. 
Before embarking on the main discussion, we note that the literature identifies three 
major waves in the development of FDI from EM MNCs: (a) 1960 to mid-1980s, (b) 
mid 1980s-1990s, (c) 1990s to 2000s (Gammeltoft, 2008).
37
 This shows that EM 
MNCs have been present for a long period of time, but are attracting a lot of attention 
recently because of the huge volume of FDI and the different patterns of international 
expansion (UNCTAD, 2006; Sauvant, 2008; Guillén and García-Canal, 2009; 
UNCTAD, 2011). 
 
                                                          
37
For a detailed presentation of these three waves in Gammeltoft (2008) and their characteristics, see 
Appendix 3 Three Waves of Outward Investment (p.300).  
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2.3.2 Similarities and Differences between New and Old MNCs 
 
The old MNCs developed after World War II originated mainly in the Triad 
economies of the USA, EU and Japan (Lipsey 2001).
38
 The main characteristic of 
these MNCs was their possession of resources and core competencies before global 
expansion (Guillén and García-Canal, 2009). These "home developed" ownership 
advantages enable firms to overcome the costs deriving from the liability of 
foreignness and to compete successfully in a foreign environment
39
 (Bano and 
Tabbada, 2012). 
 
The international market place has changed substantially since the 1990s with 
economic liberalization, the collapse of communist regimes, and many other changes 
in the global business landscape which have operated as a resource-tank for further 
FDI development. These opportunities have not all been exploited by developed 
countries' MNCs; "new species" have emerged in the FDI arena (Mathews, 2002; 
2006a; 2006b). FDI growth from emerging (transition or developing) economies has 
been significant since the 1990s (third wave) in terms of both number and size (Das, 
2013, p.95). 
 
However, emerging, (transition or developing) countries incorporate very 
differentiated economies with diverse initial conditions and different levels of 
development in the context of a rapidly changing political and economic environment 
(Sauvant, 2005; Vasyechko, 2012). The new emerging MNEs come from a large 
number of differentiated economies such as developing, emerging, upper-middle 
                                                          
38
For an extensive historical overview see Wilkins (1970). 
39
We do not elaborate on the characteristics of developed MNCs and their FDI because their behaviour 
and features are encapsulated by and have been developed theoretically in mainstream FDI theory, 
which, however, does not explain OFDI by Greek companies. 
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income and oil-rich countries (Guillén and García-Canal, 2009). We examine the 
Greek case within this context. Some Asian countries are similar to Greece in terms of  
per capita income although Greece is not perceived as an ''emerging market''. 
 
One of the most significant limitations of the conventional theories is that they do not 
include cases of limited ownership advantages or adverse home market conditions. 
Nevertheless, EM MNCs have engaged in FDI based on opportunities in global 
markets and pressures in their home markets. They have embraced FDI as a tool for 
sustainability and survival in a competitive global environment (UNCTAD, 2006, 
p.xxvii). FDI motives, such as market access, technology acquisition, innovation and 
even lower production costs, are due to tough domestic competition (Klimek, 2011). 
 
The basic difference between developed MNEs and EM MNEs is that the latter lack 
or have weak ownership advantages prior to their internationalisation (Mathews, 
2006a; 2006b; Luo and Tung, 2007). They engage in FDI in order to acquire or 
strengthen these advantages. In contrast, conventional FDI theories advocate that a 
MNC should possess significant home developed ownership advantages that can 
offset the additional costs related to investment in a foreign market (Dunning, 1988). 
It is interesting that new EM MNCs without monopolistic firm-specific advantages 
and assets have expanded globally and become successful OFDI players (UNCTAD, 
2006). Without these advantages how have they become MNEs and how do they 
expand? 
There is one main argument that says that EM MNCs expand internationally to 
acquire these assets and sustain their competitiveness in the global business 
environment, which is described as strategic asset seeking or springboard investment 
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(Makino, Lau et al., 2002; Luo and Tung, 2007; Li, Li et al., 2012). This strategy is 
aimed at exploiting gained assets and using the home country advantages to upgrade. 
(Ramamurti, 2012, p.46). Tables 3 and 4 summarize the differences between 
developed and emerging markets and their MNCs. 
Table 3: Differences between Developed and Emerging Markets 
 
Source: (Sunje, 2000, p.206) 
Table 3 shows that emerging markets are characterized by an unstable economic and 
institutional environment and strong government involvement, but have greater room 
for economic growth. 
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Table 4: Differences between Developed and Emerging MNCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 describes the differences between developed and EM MNCs. EM MNCs are 
internationalising at an accelerated pace whereas old MNCs engage more gradually in 
this process. Another important difference is the lack of competitive "homemade" 
advantages in EM MNCs and their need to upgrade compared to their counterparts.
40
  
The home market’s difficult conditions (e.g. weak institutional environments, unstable 
market conditions) create and shape firms which are able to survive in these difficult 
conditions. When they expand abroad especially in developing markets with similar 
adverse domestic conditions they are more flexible, and have greater organizational 
adaptability. They turn disadvantage into advantage compared to their developed 
market counterparts (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). 
So, familiarity with operating in a challenging environment gives them the capability 
to manage and compete using these institutional idiosyncrasies. This can be seen as a 
driver of a successful internationalisation (Henisz, 2003; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 
2008).  
 
 
                                                          
40 For further discussion see, (Mathews, 2002; 2006a; 2006b; Aulakh, 2007; Li, 2007).  
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If we look only at the ownership advantages of EM MNCs, the literature suggests that 
these firms have "a deep understanding of customer needs in emerging markets, an 
ability to function in difficult business environments, an ability to make products and 
services at ultra-low costs, … ability to develop 'good enough' products with the right 
feature-price mix for local customers" (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Guillén and 
García-Canal, 2009; Ramamurti, 2009b; Govindarajan and Ramamurti, 2011, cited in 
Ramamurti, 2012 p.42). 
The old MNCs internalize their ownership advantages and prefer internal growth via 
wholly owned enterprises for their FDI activities. Emerging market firms adopt 
external ways of internationalisation via alliances or mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) (UNCTAD, 2005; Mathews, 2006b; Luo and Tung, 2007). This external way 
of internationalisation strengthens their capabilities. EM MNCs also prefer to invest in 
locations where there are more learning opportunities (Estrin and Meyer, 2013). 
 
Ramamurti (2012, p.41) points out that "one way to discover areas in which existing 
theory is inadequate is to look deliberately for situations in which reality appears to be 
at odds with it". Therefore, in order to find something new, we should examine 
situations not explained by the theory, e.g. Greek OFDI. 
It was argued earlier that mainstream theories do not satisfactorily explain Greek 
OFDI and their MNCs. Although Greece is classed as a developed economy (member 
of the OECD), it possess characteristics of emerging markets and their MNCs. In 
what follows, we discuss the differences between old and new multinationals 
followed by a discussion of the particularities of Greek FDI and if the theoretical 
conceptual framework relevant to EM MNCs explains our case. 
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2.3.3 Similarities and Differences between Emerging Markets MNCs and the Greek 
Case 
 
EM MNCs tend primarily to invest regionally due to the advantages of operating in a 
similar cultural, political, economic context and style (Rugman, 2008). How they 
expand follows the predictions of stage theories of internationalisation, since they 
invest initially in neighbouring countries (Lall, 1983; Wells, 1983; Goldstein, 2007, 
cited in Guillén and García-Canal, 2009, p.33). The same pattern of investing in 
adjacent countries is followed by Greek firms, but not as a result of a stage theory of 
internationalisation. As argued above, this provides part of the story but not a 
complete picture of their behaviour.  
The dynamic presence of OFDI is the result of large receipts of inward FDI in the 
case of emerging markets (e.g. Taiwan, Singapore, BRICs). Inward FDI has helped to 
increase domestic growth and exports which in turn has helped in the achievement of 
high levels of OFDI (Sauvant, 2005; Bano and Tabbada, 2012). Also, investors from 
emerging markets used to export to foreign markets prior to FDI (Svetlicic, 2007; 
Das, 2013). This is an important mechanism that enables firms to acquire market 
knowledge and enhance their competitive advantage. 
These two points contrast with the Greek case. Greece is a country with low levels of 
inward FDI and cannot be characterized as an export oriented economy with good 
economic performance despite significant OFDI. In the cases of Greek FDI in 
FYROM and Bulgaria only half of our sample had exported previously.
41
 
Emerging market FDI prefers M&A or joint ventures (Demirbag, McGuinness et al., 
2010; Madhok and Keyhani, 2012; Panibratov and Abramkov, 2012), which provide 
                                                          
41
 See, appendix 2: Parent Company Export/Investment Activities Prior FDI & Ownership Structure 
and Mode of Entry, FDI in Order to Re-import Products/Services (Row 2A, p.299). 
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ownership advantages and reduce the liability of foreignness which is a serious 
problem in the case of market seeking FDI (Ramamurti, 2012). Greek investors are 
mainly market seekers and prefer greenfield as a mode of entry to the foreign market 
and usually do not seek M&As or JVs.
42
 
In a nutshell, we cannot apply the perspective of EM MNCs to Greece in a 
straightforward manner.  
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
 
As discussed in this chapter and in chapter 1, conventional theories have several 
limitations in relation to and EM MNCs behaviour and Greek outward FDI in SEE 
countries. Narula and Guimon (2010) argue that a useful way to understand FDI is to 
combine ownership (O) and location (L) advantages at country, firm or industry level; 
thus, we conceptualize them in a push-pull framework and tried to operationalise 
Narula and Guimon’s suggestion starting with a country level analysis. The aim is to 
propose a new taxonomy of factors influencing the determinants of outward FDI, 
based on the two major categories of push and pull factors, in order to provide a better 
explanation of Greek outward FDI within the context of expansionary or escape FDI.  
We draw on three major theories: OLI (Dunning, 1980; 1988; 2000; 2001), which 
best represents mainstream theories and developed markets, LLL (Mathews, 2002; 
2006a; 2006b) and COA (Sun, Peng et al., 2012). LLL and COA were proposed as 
alternatives to the OLI approach by those who were critical of it, at least in the 
context of emerging markets. 
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 See, Appendix 2 Parent Company Export/Investment Activities Prior FDI, Ownership Structure, 
Mode of Entry, FDI in Order to Re-import Products/Services (Row 2D, p.299). 
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2.4.1 Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) 
 
This theory was developed initially in the mid-1950s by Dunning in pioneering work 
to try to identify the determinants of the superior productivity of USA manufacturing 
firms in the UK. By combining theories of the firm (market power, internalization, 
and transaction cost theories) with location theories, Dunning developed a framework 
for understanding the drivers behind decision investments in a foreign country. 
 
The selective nature of his approach and the fact that it synthesizes various theories 
within one framework, led him to label it the eclectic paradigm: "This paradigm 
asserts that, at any given moment of time, this (cf. FDI) will be determined by the 
configuration of three sets of forces: the ownership, location, and internalization" 
(Dunning, 2001, p.176). In other words, "the why, where and when/how" decisions of 
international business (Ietto-Gillies, 2005). 
 
Starting with ownership, the eclectic paradigm suggests that firms have superior 
tangible and intangible assets prior to their internationalisation, which they use to 
create competitive advantage and exploit investment opportunities more efficiently in 
the foreign market compared to local firms. The benefits of these advantages should 
be sufficient to overcome the "liability of foreignness" (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995; 
Hosseini, 2005; Chen, 2006; Rugman, 2010), or the extra costs associated with setting 
up a firm and operating in a foreign market (Dunning, 1980; 1988; 2000; 2002).  
In relation to host country location advantages, Dunning (1988) argues that some of 
the factors of production that a company needs might be immobile and, thus, the 
company might choose to relocate some of its production facilities to the country in 
which these resources are located. Consequently, the more immobile the resources, 
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the higher the potential advantages and incentives to locate in the country that owns 
the resources (Dunning, 2000). 
Drawing on the transaction costs view of the firm, Dunning introduces the third pillar 
of his framework: internalization. The internalization element of the framework aims 
at understanding why some firms decide to expand "individually" (internally) beyond 
their national boundary. For example, why does the firm decide to invest in a foreign 
market via FDI rather than some other mode of foreign market entry (e.g. licensing, 
franchising, exporting, importing, etc.). The costs of FDI need to be lower than the 
costs of alternative modes of entry, i.e. the cost of using the market should be higher 
than the cost of using hierarchies within the firm. Thus, the higher the cost of using 
the market, the higher the benefits from of firm's internalization and, thus, the more 
likely the firm will expand its production abroad via FDI. 
The simplicity and clarity of the OLI has made it a benchmark in the field. However, 
it has been subject to severe criticisms, some from Dunning himself (1988; 2001). 
The main problem stems from its main strength, which is its generality. There are 
numerous variables that can be used to proxy for each of the advantages, which does 
not help to clarify which single factor explains FDI behaviour (Dunning, 1988; 2001). 
Dunning (2001, p.176) argues that ''the eclectic paradigm is best regarded as a 
framework for analysing the determinants of international production rather than as a 
predictive theory of the MNE qua MNE''.  
 
Moreover, in relation to this framework, it is crucial to consider the interrelationships 
among the three elements for the functioning of the model (Cantwell and Narula, 
2001): "Over time, the separate identity of the variables becomes even more difficult 
to justify" (Dunning, 2001, p.177). In other words, the large number of variables 
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related to each advantage weakens the model’s explanatory power since, instead of 
simplifying the model it overly complicates it and makes it difficult to identify causal 
relations, increasing the risk of transforming the OLI from an explanatory theory to a 
descriptive and classificatory device (Ietto-Gillies, 2005, p.117). 
Dunning (2000; 2001) acknowledges these criticisms although some of his reasons 
are different. He perceives the eclectic paradigm as a general framework, but he states 
that "the purpose of the paradigm is not to offer a full explanation of all kinds of 
international production but rather to point to a methodology and to a generic set of 
variables which contain the ingredients necessary for any satisfactory explanation of 
particular types of foreign value added activity" (Dunning, 2001 p.177). 
Thus, it is an analytical framework for empirical investigations (Cantwell, 2000) 
which is applied to a predefined specific context (Stoian and Filippaios, 2008). 
Finally, the internalization element has been the focus of significant criticism. For 
example, Guisinger (2001) replaces the 'I' (Internalization) factor with 'M' (Mode of 
entry); he argues that internalization focuses only on one mode of entry (control of the 
foreign affiliate), while contemporary businesses have many more means of 
international involvement (Guisinger, 2001), (e.g. joint ventures, M&As, alliances, 
etc.). Cantwell and Narula (2001, p.162) state that "In other words, hierarchical 
control and full internalization is no longer always a first-best option to MNCs, 
especially where innovatory activities are concerned. Even where this is so, full 
internalization may simply not be a choice available to the MNC". 
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2.4.2 Linkages, Leverage and Learning (LLL)  
 
One of the major criticisms of OLI is represented by Mathew's (2002; 2006a; 2006b) 
framework Linkages, Leverage and Learning (LLL). The LLL framework, which 
explains the situation in many emerging markets, challenges OLI’s key proposition 
that MNEs have developed superior resources/advantages in the home market which 
they then exploit abroad (Mathews, 2006b). The LLL framework argues that the 
MNE’s decision to invest abroad is driven by lack of ownership advantages at home, 
and the goal of acquiring or strengthening their advantages through FDI, which 
renders the OLI framework redundant.  
The LLL was pioneered by Mathews in his work on MNEs in the Asia-Pacific region. 
These firms, described as "Dragon Multinationals", emerged as industry leaders in a 
very short space of time, which is not predicted by the OLI model (Mathews, 2006b).  
In Mathews’ view, the main questions that the OLI framework cannot answer are 
related to the factors that explain "How MNEs from formerly peripheral areas such as 
the Asia Pacific established themselves successfully, against the sometimes fierce 
resistance of incumbents?" (Mathews, 2006b, p.5). Hence, he suggests that it was a 
combination of the company’s linkages, leverage and learning. 
The first L in the framework is linkages. Mathew argues that latecomer/newcomer 
MNEs’ decisions about where to expand are based on the potential benefits that might 
be acquired through links with incumbents. The importance of these links depends on 
the benefits/resources to be gained through this activity. Thus, for companies keen to 
enhance their ownership advantages, more links between the incumbents and other 
firms in the area mean greater competitive advantage (Mathews, 2002). 
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The second L refers to leverage. The LLL logic argues that once a firm establishes its 
network and connections with the other firms, it gains access to new resources. 
However, resources do not automatically lead to comparative advantage; rather, the 
firm must be able to leverage these resources and convert them into capabilities 
(Mathews, 2002). 
The final L is learning. The idea here is that the resource based view of the firm 
argues that the value of a company’s capabilities lies in their imitability, 
transferability and substitutability. In the ideal scenario, the links will give the MNCs 
access to resources that are the least rare, the most imitable and the most easily 
transferable (Mathews, 2002, p.481). 
Finally, as Mathews (2006c, p.154) states, the OLI framework is relevant when 
applied to long established firms from developed countries, while the LLL framework 
is more relevant to latecomer firms. Nevertheless, LLL can be viewed as 
complementing rather than competing with OLI, since only the O element is 
problematic and the emphasis is on explaining how ownership advantages emerge. 
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2.4.3 Comparative Ownership Advantages (COA) 
 
The COA model was developed to deal with the shortcomings of the OLI and LLL 
frameworks to explain the behaviour of especially Chinese and Indian EM MNCs 
which have engaged in aggressive cross-border M&As (Sun, Peng et al., 2012, p.4). 
Many firms from emerging countries suffer from low ownership advantages and even 
disadvantages (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Mathews, 2006b; Ramamurti, 2009a; 
2012; Sun, Peng et al., 2012). Therefore, based on the OLI assumptions, we should 
expect these companies not to engage in FDI activity. The COA was based on the 
theory of comparative advantage in international trade (Neary, 2007, cited in Sun, 
Peng et al., 2012) and OLI. COA proposes that EM MNCs expand internationally 
using cross border acquisitions in order to achieve and develop comparative 
ownership advantages.  
In particular, COA supports that EM MNCs have comparative ownership advantages 
that stem from "the possession and leverage of assets that are relatively (no 
absolutely) valuable, rare, hard to imitate, and organizationally embedded in 
comparison with MNEs from other countries" (Sun, Peng et al., 2012, p.7). 
Comparative ownership advantages allow firms to move up the value chain (Sunny 
Li, 2009, cited in Sun, Peng et al., 2012, p.7) and achieve a position in the global 
market (Rugman and Li, 2007, cited in Sun, Peng et al., 2012, p.7).  
Firms can gain access to COA through five main channels:(1) national industrial 
factor endowments; (2) dynamic learning; (3) value creation; (4) reconfiguration of 
the value chain; and (5) institutional facilitation and constraints (Sun, Peng et al., 
2012 p.8). 
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Starting with national industrial factor endowments, Sun, Peng et al., (2012, p.8) 
argue that MNEs are attracted to countries because of differences in the factors of 
production; e.g. a country that is interested in natural resources will expand in a 
country with such resources. The second source of COA is dynamic learning, which 
involves the transfer of knowledge, resources and capabilities from the acquired to the 
acquirer firm. If a company from country A acquires a company in country B, this 
will create synergies which will speed up the process of learning (Sun, Peng et al., 
2012). Also, COA enables value creation through the process of increased value and 
rents for the acquirer that emerges when the acquisition takes place. The fourth source 
of competitive advantage comes from the re-arrangement of the value chain which is 
enabled by MNE expansion and allows the firm to move up the value chain. Finally, 
institutional facilitation and constraints can directly influence the company’s ability to 
create COA through expansion (Sun, Peng et al., 2012). For example, in state 
capitalism, a state owned MNE can expand more easily than a private one, and vice 
versa (Economist, 2012). 
 
The COA contains elements of the LLL approach, such as the role of learning 
(dynamic learning; value creation), leverage and linkages (reconfiguration of value 
chain), and explains that, for latecomer FDI firms the sources of ownership advantage 
include home country specific factors (national industrial factor endowments) 
combined with home country institutional factors and policies (institutional 
facilitation and constraints). So, unlike the LLL approach, the COA recognizes that 
emerging market MNEs enjoy some home specific advantages, but these are more a 
"compensatory mechanism" for the lack of ownership advantages. 
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The Limitations of Current Theories 
 
The first problem related to OLI is location, which Dunning (1995, p.476) assumes 
provides opportunities for firms to exploit their ownership advantages. These can be 
home or host country location advantages. Dunning recognizes, in particular, that 
home country comparative advantages are a major source of firm's ownership 
advantages, and that the national economy influences the firm's ownership advantages 
(Dunning, 1980 p.10; 1988). However, he does not consider potential negative home 
market location factors, which might push the company into investing in a different 
country in order to survive.  
Also, according to OLI theory, firms should possess ownership advantages over both 
home country and host country firms in order to undertake FDI. Greek investors do 
not seem to enjoy typical ownership advantages in their home market. For example, 
Table 5 shows that Greek companies that invested in FYROM and Bulgaria were not 
innovative. 
Table 5: Parent Company Technology Advantages
43
 
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies) 
In the survey, we asked executives whether the parent company had technology 
advantages over its competitors in the home market. Among the companies surveyed, 
97.2% buy in technology and only 22.1% innovate. This suggests that Greek firms 
                                                          
43
 The survey question asked: Does the company buy or/and diversify or/and innovate or/and 
use exclusive technology in the home market? 
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lack ownership advantages with respect to technology, therefore, Greek FDI in 
Bulgaria and FYROM cannot be explained by conventional OLI theory.  
LLL (Mathews, 2006b) and COA (Sun, Peng et al., 2012) argue that globalization is 
the main driver of FDI, as newly emerging markets provide opportunities for firms to 
develop new links and networks. In other words, there are strong pull factors that 
attract FDI from emerging markets. However, in the case of Greek outward FDI, in 
addition to pull factors, the negative home market conditions seem important, e.g. the 
push factors.
44
 
 
LLL and COA also predict that EM MNCs expand through M&A rather than through 
greenfield investment because this allows them to acquire technology and access local 
distribution networks. Unlike EM MNEs, Greek firms expand not via M&A, but 
through greenfield investments. Almost 70% of Greek FDI in our sample expanded 
through greenfield investments
45
 to get access to local markets.  
COA theory suggests that M&As are favoured by EM MNCs to internalize home 
country specific advantages (CSA) and combine them with firm specific advantages 
(FSA) in capabilities (Sun, Peng et al., 2012). Again, the Greek case differs since 
Greek outward FDI are mainly greenfield investments and firms do not possess 
significant home CSA in terms of low labour costs, technological advantages or 
natural resources.  
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 This is elaborated theoretically in the following chapter (3) and empirically in chapters 4, 5 and 6 for 
the country, industry and firm level analysis respectively.   
 
45
See appendix 2: Parent Company Export/Investment Activities Prior FDI & Ownership Structure and 
Mode of Entry, FDI in Order to Re-import Products/Services (Row 2D, p.299). 
102 
 
Chapter 3 The Current Research (Conceptualization) 
3.1 Outward Foreign Direct Investment as Escape Response and the 
Push Pull Conceptualization 
 
Mainstream FDI theories that explain developed country FDI show that if firms 
possess ownership advantages, they can expand abroad and exploit their ownership 
competencies in foreign markets via FDI; this is described as expansionary FDI (Chen 
and Ku, 2000; Sun, Fulginiti et al., 2010). Theories of emerging market firms suggest 
that firms engage in FDI and use it as a tool to seek, acquire and strengthen ownership 
advantages. In emerging economies, OFDI is a kind of reaction to global-domestic 
pressures and sometimes a response to a negative home business environment, and 
has been described as escape FDI.  
Thus, there are two types of FDI, expansionary FDI (firms possess ownership 
advantages before their internationalisation) and escape
46
 FDI or "forced 
internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market conditions) 
(firms do not possess conventional ownership advantages before their 
internationalisation).  
The literature on expansionary FDI is well established, while research on escape 
OFDI is scarce (Witt and Lewin, 2007). We approach expansionary and escape or 
"forced internationalisation" issues through the notion of push and pull factors. Before 
explaining our approach, we refer to some initial studies of the notion of push/pull, 
with different rationales and conceptualizations. 
One of the most interesting preliminary attempts using the notion of push and pull is 
Kayam (2009) which states that "the formation of EM MNC's is a result of escape 
                                                          
46 Escape FDI is the term  used also by Kayam (2009), but in a different context. 
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response from the economic and political conditions in the home countries" (Kayam, 
2009 p.1). Kayam tries to explore both concepts of push and pull, but ultimately 
focuses on push factors. Masron and Shahbudin (2010) limit their research to push 
factors that drive OFDI from Malaysia and Thailand. They find that domestic market 
conditions and government policies are important. Sethi et al. (2002, p.702) use a 
push and pull type framework based on some institutional and strategic factors and 
argue that "the two together induce MNEs to restructure FDI, by making new 
efficiency and market seeking investments into developing countries".
47
 The above 
research refers to South–South FDI; it is quite partial and does not use the push and 
pull framework to examine firm, country and industry behaviour simultaneously.  
 
The most useful classification of push and pull factors for OFDI so far and one that 
helps to expand these concepts, is presented in the World Investment Report 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Home market conditions represent an important push factor for 
firms to invest abroad; the factors that operate as home market drivers of OFDI fall 
into four categories: a) domestic market conditions, b) trade conditions, c) costs of 
production, and d) home government policies (UNCTAD, 2006, p.158).  
The present research is the most comprehensive within this perspective. The variables 
selected reflect comprehensive treatment of push and pull factors, classified, analysed 
and presented at the country, industry and firm levels.  
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 See for their conceptualization, Appendix4: Push-Pull Frameworks in Other Contexts (p.301).  
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3.2 Key Conceptual Departures of this Research  
 
We have seen that there are differences, but also similarities between emerging and 
developed market firms and their FDI. Some scholars maintain that EM MNCs are 
systematically different from developed country MNEs; thus, there is debate in the 
international business literature on the adequacy of existing theory and its explanatory 
power. Is it possible for the existing theories, with some re-shaping, to encompass the 
behaviour of the EM MNCs? Several eminent scholars believe that it is (Dunning, 
2006; Narula, 2006; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Narula, 2012), while others call for 
the development of new theories to explain the characteristics of EM MNCs 
(Mathews, 2002; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Mathews, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; Guillén 
and García-Canal, 2009). We share the views of Ramamurti (2012, p. 41) who 
suggests that "the truth is somewhere in between and that the real challenge is to 
discover which aspects of existing theory are universally valid, which aspects are not, 
and what to do about the latter". 
It is generally accepted that the framework that best encapsulates FDI from developed 
countries is OLI
48
 whose main feature is prior possession of ownership advantages, 
while the Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) framework proposed by Mathews (2002; 
2006a; 2006b) is applicable to EM MNEs which do not have prior ownership 
advantages. The OLI model is based on internally focused developments, such as 
ownership advantages, while LLL is based on external linkages that help the company 
to acquire these advantages. So, in the LLL case, as is explained in Chapter 2 EM 
MNCs seek ownership advantages globally because there are no optimal domestic 
conditions from which to develop firm advantages before their internationalisation. 
                                                          
48 Quer, Claver et al., (2008) applied OLI to some emerging economies but there are many restrictions 
and peculiarities.  
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Thus, domestic conditions operate as a spur to FDI. Ramamurti (2012 p.45) points out 
that "the possibility that EM MNEs have different ownership advantages than 
developed MNEs (DMNE's), reflecting the distinctive conditions of their home 
market".  
The conventional FDI pull factors (e.g. market seeking FDI, resource seeking FDI, 
efficiency seeking FDI and strategic asset FDI) have been well researched (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008). However, factors including adverse home market conditions are 
apparent not only in emerging but also in developed markets, and have been 
underexplored in the literature. In the case of emerging markets, such as China, there 
are issues that can be considered push factors, such as high levels of competition, low 
demand (Sauvant, 2005) and saturated home markets (Taylor, 2002). 
Similarly, developed markets face push factors (adverse home conditions) such as 
increased home market competitive pressures, especially in specific industries 
(Guillén and García-Canal, 2009 p.33). So, it is not simply the differences between 
established and new MNCs that explain FDI patterns, it is also changing home 
environment conditions that affect FDI.  
 
We do not suggest abandoning either the old or the new theoretical developments 
outlined, but rather we propose a generic framework that encapsulates the home 
market conditions that might explain push and pull variables of both expansionary 
FDI (the company possesses ownership advantages, similar to old MNCs, and 
expands abroad) and escape FDI (the company does not possess conventional 
ownership advantages and operates in a home market with adverse economic 
conditions). We suggest that the best way to encapsulate differences and disparities in 
FDI factors is to develop a framework that includes push and pull factors capable of 
106 
 
explaining simultaneously rather than in isolation, when a country's, firm’s or 
industry's FDI is expansionary and when it is escape FDI. That is, if push factors are 
stronger, we would expect escape FDI, and if pull factors are stronger we would 
expect expansionary FDI. 
Greek OFDI is a suitable case for testing this framework because it integrates 
characteristics from both developed and emerging economies and allows a holistic 
conceptualization of the push-pull framework. In order to operationalise this 
framework, we examine it according to a country, industry and firm typology. 
3.3 Proposed Approach and Conceptual Framework 
 
Due to the inadequacy of the current conceptual frameworks to account for Greek 
OFDI described in the previous sections and in chapter 2, we propose a 
reclassification and new taxonomy of the factors that determine FDI decisions. The 
current research highlights home CSA (Dunning) and host CSA (LLL, COA 
framework), but they are treated as exclusive or substitute categories rather than as 
complementary. We propose simultaneous exploration of FDI determinants in the 
categories of push and pull factors (Table 6). 
Push factors are defined as all those negative pressures in the home market which 
force the company to internationalise in order to survive. Push factors capture the 
competitive pressure in the home market which effectively reduces the company’s 
competitive advantage: they "push" the firm to expand outside national borders. There 
are four types of push factors:
49
 
                                                          
49
We classify them according to concepts from UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2006). 
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 Increased Competitive Pressures: arising from domestic industry 
competition, reduced home market share, increased presence and growth of 
domestic market or/and foreign firms, pressure from imports, etc. 
 Adverse Demand Conditions: these include factors that reduce demand for 
the company’s products, and might induce a decrease in customer purchasing 
power, and a change in tastes and preferences. 
 Increased Production Costs in the Home Market: these include any costs 
related to production such as wage costs, primary resource costs, etc. 
 Adverse Institutional Environment: any formal and informal institutions 
that might increase the difficulties related to doing business in the local 
economy such as poor quality and poor enforcement of business regulations, 
which result in delayed payments between suppliers and customers.  
Pull factors are host market features that attract foreign investors: they "pull" the 
foreign company to invest in the host market. There are eight types of pull factors: 
 Geographical Proximity: This includes location specific factors that make 
the country attractive, e.g. proximity between home and host country which 
allows efficient control by parent company of the affiliate.  
 
 Financial Incentives Provided by the Host Market: these include various 
country specific financial advantages that influence the potential profitability 
of the investment, e.g. low cost of labour, FDI incentives and taxation levels. 
 
 Financial Incentives Provided by the Home Government or Other 
Regional Institutions: any potential support provided to the investor for 
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investing in the host country, e.g. tax credit from the home government or 
indirect subsidy from a supranational body such as the EU. 
 
 Business Linkages: any contacts that the company sees as giving it the 
opportunity to expand its assets, e.g. strong business contacts between the 
home company and the host country, and presence of other home 
public/private companies in the host market. 
 
 Positive Demand Conditions: any factors that might improve company sales, 
e.g. a large customer base or high growth potential for the company’s product. 
 
 Lack of Competitive Pressure: any factors that might indicate to the firm that 
there is limited competition in the host market, e.g. relatively sheltered 
markets, but outside the interests of the major players, highly regulated 
markets and specific costs and quality segments, or importance of informal 
networks for successful business.  
 
 Asset Acquisition: the potential for the firm to expand its assets, develop its 
capabilities and establish competitive advantage, e.g. access to raw materials, 
privatization opportunities or generally "cheap assets". 
 
 Institutional Specificities: any advantages from the institutional environment 
of the host country, e.g. similar culture, historical affinity, knowledge of 
informal networks, language, etc. 
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Table 6: Classification of Push and Pull Factors 
 
Source: Author's Conceptualization Based on UNCTAD 
Hypotheses 
Based on the stylized facts, the features of Greek OFDI, the traditional (OLI) and 
recent (LLL, COA) emerging market theories, and our conceptual framework, we 
expect push factors to play a negative role in FDI expansion and pull factors to 
operate as attractors. We hypothesize that push and pull factors represent a 
meaningful framework for understanding Greek OFDI, and expect our analysis to 
reveal several significant specific factors that fit with the push/pull logic. We 
hypothesize that: 
H0: Both push and pull factors explain Greek outward FDI. 
H1: Push and pull factors cannot explain Greek outward FDI. 
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3.4 Methods and Process 
Data Sources 
Sample Size 
In 2006-2008, there were 633 companies with Greek interests
50
 in Bulgaria and 
FYROM (Table 7).  
Table 7: Sample of Business Research Population
51
 
 
Source: Greek Embassy in Bulgaria and FYROM and author's survey 
52 
 
This thesis is based on extensive field research; practical issues had a major effect on 
data acquisition and the research design. We searched first for a registry of Greek FDI 
companies in FYROM and Bulgaria, but there is no single entity responsible for 
compiling such a list, so a combination of sources was searched.  
We consulted the Economic and Commercial Consulates in the respective Greek 
embassies. We also used other data sources to ensure the quality and completeness of 
the data. These sources include annual reports of the Greek Ministry of the Economy 
                                                          
50
 This number involves companies with parent company in Greece (FDI) and simply Greek owned 
firms with no parent company in Greece, non FDI companies. 
51 Please, see at the appendix 5 (pp. 302-305) for further information and discussion on the sample of 
firms.  
52
 During this research considerable effort was put into contacting every one of the 633 Greek 
enterprises in the host markets of Bulgaria and FYROM. 
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and the Chambers of Commerce in Athens and Thessaloniki, the Inter-Balkan and 
Black Sea Entrepreneurial Centre and the Greek International Business Association 
(SEVE). 
The data were merged to obtain an updated list of 633 registered companies. 
However, we could not identify whether the firms involved were FDI (whether there 
was a parent company in Greece) or simply Greek owned but with no parent company 
in Greece.    
Company histories and profiles were searched for on web sites, but the information in 
most cases was incomplete. We searched for company email addresses, but many 
companies did not have one and among those we found, delivery failed in many cases. 
Finally, we tried direct phone contact with the firms. In many cases, the phone 
numbers were incorrect, so we tried to visit the firms but many addresses were 
incorrect. 
Alongside with some firm websites, phone calls proved the most effective at 
obtaining information, but there were costly and time consuming, and in most cases 
more than one phone call was required to identify who was the appropriate contact 
(the number of calls made amounted to over 500).  
Table 7 shows the effort involved in contacting all 633 Greek enterprises in Bulgaria 
and FYROM and confirming our data.
53
  
The Greek Embassy Company Indexes (Table 7) include all registered companies 
(FDI or not) in the host country, owned by Greek entrepreneurs; 452 were in Bulgaria 
and 181 in FYROM.  
                                                          
53
 Note that although resource heavy, the support and guidance of the Greek Embassy in Bulgaria and 
the Liaison office in FYROM and their General Secretariats of International Economic Relations and 
Development Cooperation were essential. 
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Table 7 shows that there are 80 non-FDI but Greek owned companies in Bulgaria and 
28 in FYROM. None of them was included in the business research population since 
they do not conform to the standard definition of FDI.  
Other companies excluded from the population after cross checking, were those that 
had closed down or been sold to locals, those double listed in catalogues, and 
companies for which the questionnaire was not-applicable such as casinos and private 
colleges. In addition, we excluded the garment industry because do not possess the 
attributes necessary for this research (i.e. they do not have at all or they do not have a 
fully operated parent company in the Greek market). From the 633 firms, only 201 
were the result of Greek FDI, the rest were companies with Greek owners, but not 
headquartered in Greece.  
A 41 page questionnaire was piloted in seven interviews in FYROM. The pilot study 
showed that the questionnaire was too complex and time consuming, so the number of 
questions was reduced although care was taken not to affect the completeness of the 
data collection. The final questionnaire included 16 pages and approximately 500 
questions and data points used in the research interviews. This refined version was 
more effective in terms of outcomes and less time consuming. 
The pilot stage showed that some interviewees were confused by questions that 
required them to rank their responses. To resolve this, they were shown a card with 
the ranking printed on it in figures and words. This was helpful and also saved time 
during the main survey.  
Table 7 presents the number of our business research population which is 201 firms.  
We took responses from 152 companies comprising 64.1% of the population in 
FYROM and 82.9% in Bulgaria; 22 companies that had invested in both markets were 
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excluded only from the country level analysis since their inclusion would have 
complicated the analysis.  
The survey uses closed questions to restrict bias, and restrict inferences from the 
interviewer, thus, ensuring greater accuracy of research outcomes. Statistical analysis 
of parametric & non-parametric tests and logistic regression were employed. Thus, 
the findings were cross-checked and seem to be accurate and unbiased.   
The questionnaire was administered by the researcher, which allowed direct contact 
with the business executives and a high level of rapport compared with other modes 
of questioning. The sample collected (82.9% in Bulgaria and 64.1% in FYROM) of 
total Greek FDIs was extensive which allows us to be confident about generalizing 
the results.  
Variables Used (Dependent & Independent) 
 
Logistic regression models were employed for each case.  More specifically in 
chapters 4, 5, 6 were employed logistic regression analysis models with dependent 
variables a) country, b) industry and c) firms (new typology)  to check whether push 
and pull factors are important for FDI and to explore which factors exert the biggest 
influence. In the absence of time series data, this is the only way to explore the 
determinants of OFDI. 
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Analytically the dependent variables for the country, the industry and the firm level 
perspective are: 
The Dependent Variables  
 
Logistic Regression (Country Perspective), chapter 4: 
Using firm-level data, we classify all firms by a country of investment, reflecting the 
investor’s decision to invest in FYROM or Bulgaria. If the investment is in Bulgaria, 
(large market, more developed, stronger competition) the dependent variable is 0 and 
for investment in FYROM, (small market, less developed, weak competition) it is 
1.The model should explain differences in the determinants of OFDI in these 
neighbouring countries of Greece. 
 
Logistic Regression (Industry Perspective), chapter 5: 
Using firm-level data, we classify all firms by industry, where a dependent variable 
operationalised as follows: if industry type=0, then the company belongs to the 
manufacturing or trade industry while if industry type=1, then the company belongs to 
the services or construction industry. We ran the logit model to clarify whether 
specific push and pull factors are significant for explaining the firm’s industry 
membership. If the results are significant they point to industry differences in the 
determinants of FDI. 
 
Logistic Regression (Firm Perspective), chapter 6 
In this section, we identify two pairwise sets of taxonomies: Crisis vs. Healthy, and 
Lead vs. Satellite. For the first group, the dependent variable is a binary variable, 
denoting Healthy (0) and Crisis investors (1) while for the next logistic model of new 
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firms’ taxonomy, the dependent variable stands for Lead (0) and Satellite investors 
(1). We test whether the determinants of FDI differ significantly between these two 
new firm taxonomies. 
 
Statistical Analysis Technique 
 
Our dependent variable takes the values 0-1, which reduces the range of possible 
regression techniques dramatically. We decided to use logistic regression analysis, a 
method that has been widely used in research on market entry and is similar to FDI 
entry, to predict the occurrence of the dependent variable (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 
1992; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Tatoglu and Glaister, 1998). 
Our model takes the following logistic regression form: 
p (dependent variable) =
 
            
  
In first case chapter 4, in the logistic regression offering a country perspective, p 
(country) is the probability of investing in FYROM or Bulgaria. In the second case, in 
chapter 5 for the dependent variable reflecting industry, p (industry) is the probability 
of firm’s industry belonging (Manufacturing & Trade Vs. Services & Construction). 
Finally, for the logistic regression models of new taxonomy of firms (Crisis vs. 
Healthy, and Lead vs. Satellite) p is the probability of firm’s new typology 
classification for each case.  
Independent variables:            is the matrix of all our independent variables. 
Tables 8 and 9 present the proposed push and pull factors and how the survey has 
operationalised. The survey includes 25 push factors and 40 pull factors. Table 10 
presents the control variables. 
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Table 8: Proxies for Push Factors 
 
Source: Author's Classification  
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Table 9: Proxies for Pull Factors 
*Note: Exports (or other modalities e.g. turnkey projects for services/construction industries) 
Source: Author's Classification  
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Table 10: Control Variables 
Source: Author's Classification 
Given the limitations of econometric analysis, not all factors are included in the 
models. Their selection was based on the following method. First, we conducted the 
appropriate statistical Mann-Whitney tests (for Likert Scale variables, 1-5) or Pearson 
chi square tests (for categorical data, Yes/No) to identify whether there are differences 
for each factor across the two countries. If we reject the hypothesis of no difference, 
then the push or pull factor can be used in the logistic regression model.  
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Chapter 4 Greek OFDI Country Perspective  
4.1 Introduction 
 
FDI is a crucial element of economic development, especially for developing 
countries. It occurs when a company from a country A (home market) establishes or 
acquires a firm in country B (host market) (OECD, 1996). This type of investment 
involves long-term capital transactions, both initial and subsequent, between the 
parent company and the foreign affiliate. It  also requires that the parent company has 
an effective voice (equity-based investment with the threshold defined as 10% or 
above) in the management of the foreign affiliate in the host market (IMF,  1977, 
cited in Ietto-Gillies , 2005, p.33). 
As a country's inward investment position improves, its outward position is expected 
also to improve. This proposition is a feature of IDP theory (Dunning and Narula, 
1996a), which describes a country's economic development in relationship to inward 
and outward FDI.
54
 It requires several years of inward FDI for a country to start to 
become competitive and progress towards engagement in outward FDI.  
The Greek case is peculiar in the sense that its inward position is poor while its 
outward position has been gradually improving. Greece is a relatively isolated 
location for inward FDI, but shows a rather high degree of outward FDI. Figure 20 
plots Greece’s inward and outward FDI performance index. 55  We use this index 
                                                          
54 In section 2.2.1 Investment Development Path (Macro and Regional Approaches), we discussed the IDP process 
and its limitations in the Greek context (pp.74-84).  
55 "The UNCTAD Inward FDI Performance Index is a measure of the extent to which host countries receive 
inward FDI. The Index ranks countries by the amount of FDI they receive relative to their economic size, 
calculated as the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP. A value greater than 
one indicates that the country attracts more FDI in proportion to its economic size, a value below one shows that it 
receives less (a negative value indicates that foreign investors disinvested in that period). Thus, a higher index 
implies success in the competition, explicit or implicit, to attract FDI " UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004, 
p.12 
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because it is based on a selected combination of factors and, thus, provide a full 
picture of a country's FDI position
56
 by capturing "ownership advantages" and 
"location advantages" which are helpful for the present analysis. The higher the value 
of the index, the more FDI a country has or invests as an outward investor. Figure 20 
shows that, in 1988-1999 Greece’s inward FDI was declining, and that after 1998 
outward FDI starts to increase.  
                                                          
56 Data are available only to 2007. 
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Figure 20 : Inward & Outward FDI Performance Index Greece (1988-2007) 
 
Source: Data Compilation (UNCTAD 1988-2007 Inward FDI Performance Index; UNCTAD 1988-2007 Outward FDI Performance Index)
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This paradoxical sharp decrease in inward FDI performance index up to 1999, 
followed by a gradual increase in outward FDI is discussed in analytical terms in this 
chapter.  
The most popular destination for Greek outward investment is South East Europe 
(SEE),
57
 whereas most experienced Western international investors are adopting a 
"wait and see attitude"
58
 to invest in these countries (Karagianni and Labrianidis, 
2001). Studies (Estrin and Uvalic, 2014) show that international investors tend to 
prefer Central East Europe (CEE) because of the small market size of the SEE 
countries, their geographical distance from prosperous western investors, and their 
many political and institutional issues and generally poor prospects of EU 
membership. Nevertheless, equally important is the ability of firms to innovate and to 
manage these institutional idiosyncrasies (Henisz, 2003). 
It is interesting that in these "non-prosperous" SEE (compared to CEE) markets, 
Greek investors that are new to outward FDI activity and lack conventional ownership 
advantages, have been investing continuously in the area because they perceive them 
to provide more and better opportunities than their home market.
59
 They can be 
considered successful investors in Bulgaria and FYROM.
60
 As Ramamurti (2012) 
argues, there is a need for further research into what makes an ownership advantage 
valuable and how the home market context shapes such advantage. 
 
                                                          
57
See Figure 14, Greek Outward FDI by Regions (2001-2012) (p.39). 
58
 See Figure 15, Inward FDI Stock in SEE Countries Vs. CEE Countries (p.41). 
59 See Appendix 6, Investment Opportunities for Greek investors in Host Market Compared to Home 
from our survey results (p.306). Also this supported from (Salavrakos and Petrochilos, 2003) 
60
 See Appendix 7, Business Returns and Investment Regrets of Greek investors in Bulgaria and 
FYROM  (p.307). 
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This chapter explores the paradox in Greek outward investment in Bulgaria and 
FYROM, two adjacent SEE countries that have experienced significant Greek FDI 
activity.
61
 The two countries are different: Bulgaria is large and competitive, and is a 
member of the EU, while FYROM is a small market and is not a member of the EU. 
In Chapter 2 we analysed how conventional theories (2.1 & 2.2), differences and 
similarities of EM MNCs (2.3) do not provide a clear explanatory framework for the 
behaviour of Greek outward investors in SEE. In section 2.4 we discuss the 
theoretical framework by summarizing the key elements of the traditional Ownership-
Location-Internalization (OLI) framework and emerging economies FDI theories, 
Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) and Comparative Ownership Advantage (COA), 
elaborating their strengths and weaknesses for explaining Greek FDI decisions. 
Chapter 3 describes key conceptual departures of the research and presents proposed 
conceptual framework that distinguishes FDI determinants into home market push and 
host market pull factors. Section 3.4 discusses the data collection process and 
econometric techniques used. Now, chapter 4 presents and discusses the findings from 
Greek OFDI at a country level.  
                                                          
61
 See Figure 16: Inward FDI in FYROM by Country of Origin (1997-2008) p.43 and Figure 17: 
Inward FDI in Bulgaria by Country of Origin, (1996-2013) p.44.  
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4.2 Results and Analysis of Greek OFDI at a Country Level 
Overview of the Survey Results 
The pie charts illustrate the characteristics of the companies in the survey. The first 
group of pie charts (Figures 21 to 25) and Table 11 refer to the characteristics of the 
parent company in terms of country of investment, industry affiliation, year of 
establishment, number of employees, regional origin and legal form
62
. 
Figure 21: Host Country  
 
Source: Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies) 
 
The sample includes a total of 152 Greek companies - 102 of which invested in 
Bulgaria and 50 in FYROM, and 22 which invested in both Bulgaria and FYROM. To 
enable adequate statistical analysis in this chapter, we dropped these 22 companies, 
leaving a sample of 91 companies that invested only in Bulgaria and 39 companies 
that invested only in FYROM. 
Of these 130 companies, 41.5% belong to the manufacturing industry, 25.4% to 
services, 22.3% to trade and 10.8% to construction (Figure 22). Our sample includes 
mainly companies established before 2000 (98%) (Figure 23) of diverse sizes (Figure 
24). Forty per cent of the sample companies come from the North of Greece and the 
                                                          
62
 Please, note that 22 companies that invest in both FYROM and Bulgaria are excluded from this part 
of the analysis in order to enable robust statistical results. 
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remaining 60% from the South (Figure 25). Table 11 shows that most of the 
companies from the South invested in Bulgaria and most from the North invested in 
FYROM.  
Table 11: Home Market Company Location (Headquarters) 
 
Source: Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies) 
 
126 
 
Figure 22: Parent Industries(4) Categories% Figure 23: Year of First Establishment % 
  
Figure 24: Number of Employees for Group of Company in% Figure 25:  Parent Company Geographical Origin in % 
  
Source: Figures 22, 23, 24, 25 Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies) 
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Trade industry companies constitute the largest part (41.5%) of foreign affiliates 
(Figure 26) in these host markets. However, many of them are trade affiliates of 
manufacturing parents. More specifically, 40.7% of parent manufacturing companies 
invest in trade activities in Bulgaria and FYROM,
63
 suggesting that Greek 
manufacturing companies use these trade companies as an export arm. Table 12 
shows that investments in FYROM are largely in manufacturing and trade and in 
Bulgaria are mostly trade and services. The foreign affiliate companies are small or 
medium sized enterprises (SME) with a maximum of 50 employees (Figure 27).  
Figure 26: Foreign Affiliate - Industry Type 4 Category in % 
 
Source: Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 See Appendix 8: Parent & Affiliate Industry Type of Investments (p. 307) 
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Table 12: Affiliates by Industry Type of Investment of Greek Parent Companies 
in Bulgaria & FYROM, (Percentages) 
 
Source: Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies) 
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Figure 27: Foreign Affiliate by Size of Employment in % 
 
Source: Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies) 
 
A majority of the companies achieved market entry through greenfield investment 
(71.5%), rather than M&A (19.2%) despite lacking prior internationalisation 
experience (Figure 28). The ownership of the companies (parent and affiliate) is 
primarily Greek, 71.5% (Figure 29) highlighting the intention of the Greek players to 
keep tight control of their companies. In fact, security and control of investment 
(especially for quality issues) is one of the reasons for direct investment 42.5% 
(Figure 30).  
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Figure 28: Company's Mode of Entry in the Host Market in %                  Figure 29: Ownership Structure Host Company in % 
 
  
Figure 30: Reasons for Direct Investment % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies)(Figure 28,29,30) 
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As we have already mentioned in our methodology we employed a logistic regression 
model for the country case.  The model should explain differences in the determinants 
of Greek OFDI in these neighbouring countries.
64
 We chose Bulgaria and FYROM 
because they are in the same geographical area, but have different features. Bulgaria 
is a fairly large market (almost 8 million people), is more developed and is a member 
of EU. It is more competitive and has a higher density of foreign investors compared 
to FYROM (almost 2 million people). Given their size and institutional differences 
this should allow a better understanding of OFDI determinants.  
This model represents the investor’s decision to invest in FYROM or in Bulgaria and 
to check whether push and pull factors are important for FDI and to explore which 
factors exert the biggest influence. Before our analysis we present an overview of 
summary statistics for the independent and control variables.  
Summary Statistics for the Independent and Control Variables 
 
Table 13 presents the push and pull factors identified as independent variables for the 
regression, along with their measurement metrics.
65
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 We ran logistic regressions using also OLI variables. However, the results are neither meaningful nor 
significant compared to those using the push pull variables reported. Please, see appendices 9 up to 9.3 
(pp.308-313) for the logistic regression results with dependent variable Country and OLI variables.  
 
65 Table 13: The responses of push and pull factors were measured on a 1-5 Likert scale with 1 the 
lowest and 5 the greatest value while 0 is the value for "not applied" (Ordinal Variables). The responses 
for the control variables were measured as follows: "Company Size" (Likert scale 1-6), "Company 
Age" (Likert Scale 1-7) (Ordinal Variables) while "Industry Type", "Year of Entry in the Host Market", 
"Headquarters" (Categorical Variables 0,1) and "Company Mode of Entry in the Host Market" 
(Categorical Variable 1,2,3). 
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Table 13: Proxies and Indicators of Push and Pull Factors and Their Metrics 
Used for Logistic Regression Country  
 
Source Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies)
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The correlation matrix
66
 of the model variables reveals that there are no problems of 
multicollinearity among the push factors, since none of the correlation coefficients 
exceeds 0.5. There are also no problems of multicollinearity between push and pull 
factors. However, there are collinearity problems among the pull factors. In particular, 
we observe high correlations between products/services new to the parent company 
and products/services new to the Greek market. These high correlations suggest that 
firm innovations are often new to the Greek market. For this reason, we decided to 
retain only the variable products/services new to the Greek market since this is 
conceptually more interesting
67
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66
 See Appendix 10 Correlation Matrix Using Push-Pull Framework of the Model Country (Greek 
OFDI in a Country level Analysis) ( p.314) 
67 We re-ran the model excluding the variable products/services new to the parent company due to high 
correlation with the variable products/services new to the Greek market; there are no essential 
differences at any level. This means that our model is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of this 
variable. 
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Results of Models Estimates 
 
Table 14: Logistic Regression Results for Country Perspective on the Push & 
Pull Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies
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Table 14 presents the results of our logistic regression. We ran four different 
specifications of the original model.  More analytical, in the first model, there are both 
push and pull factors that explain whether the company invested in Bulgaria or in 
FYROM. The N is 130 observations out of 152 because we exclude 22 companies 
that had invested in both markets (Bulgaria and FYROM). In that way we make our 
analysis less complex, more adequate and straightforward.  It includes 5 push factors, 
7 pull factors and 6 control variables. For push factors we include in the model Low 
Customer Purchasing Power in the Home Market (Adverse Demand Conditions 
Proxy), Input Costs in the Home Market (Increased Production Costs in the Home 
Market Proxy), Credit Time Payment between Supplier – Customer (Adverse 
Institutional Environment Proxy), Compensatory Investment for the Company's Home 
Market Share Reduction and Competitors' Use of New Technology in the Home 
Market (Increased Competitive Pressures Proxy). As far as it concerns pull factors we 
include Close Control Between Parent Company & the Foreign Affiliate 
(Geographical Proximity Proxy), Bilateral Agreements among Post-Communist 
Neighbours (Financial Motives provided by the Home Market & Regional Institutions 
Proxy), Presence of Other Greek Public/Private Companies in the Host Market and 
Following Parent Company's Customers in the Host Market (Linkages Proxy), Export 
Development into Other Markets (Positive Demand Conditions Proxy), New 
Products/Services for the Greek Market (Asset Acquisition Proxy) and finally 
Regional Integration via Country’s Position in Relation to EU Membership 
Institutional Specificities Proxy).  We used as control variables the Company Size and 
Age, Industry Type, Year of Entry in the Host Market, Headquarters base and the 
Company’s Mode of Entry in the Host Market.  In the first model (a) we obtain four  
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significant push-pull variables and one control, more specifically Low Customer 
Purchasing Power in the Home Market (0.014) as a push factor, and Close Control 
Between Parent Company & the Foreign Affiliate (0.087), Presence of Other Greek 
Public/Private Companies in the Host Market (0.017), Regional Integration via 
Country’s Position in Relation to EU Membership (0.088) as pull factors, with North 
or South Based Company (0.022) as a significant control variable. Thus, our logistic 
regression model shows that both push and pull factors are important for Greek OFDI 
and explain differences in the determinants of OFDI in neighbouring countries to 
Greece. Since it involves logit statistics, the model does not reject the null hypothesis 
of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (p-value greater than 0.05). Moreover, additional 
descriptive measures of goodness-of-fit such as Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke, which 
are R2 indices, are valid for our model and all other specifications. 
As already mentioned, the dependent variable, Country, represents the investor’s 
decision to invest in FYROM or in Bulgaria: if the investment is in Bulgaria, (large 
market, more developed, stronger competition) the dependent variable is 0 and is 1 for 
investment in FYROM, (small market, less developed, weak competition).   Our 
model revealed a positive coefficient (0.743) for Low Customer Purchasing Power in 
the Home Market and for Close Control Between Parent Company & the Foreign 
Affiliate (0.087) which is based in North part of Greece (1.783), thus those investors 
who considered these as major incentives tend to invest in FYROM. On the other 
hand, when Presence of Other Greek Public/Private Companies in the Host Market (-
0.644) and Regional Integration via Country’s Position in Relation to EU Membership 
(-0.553), exert more influence on the decision to invest, then these investors tend to 
invest in Bulgaria. The main finding from the above model is that both push factors 
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are useful determinants of the probability of a company to invest in Bulgaria or 
FYROM. We re-ran the models in order to obtain more robust results. 
In the second model (b), we excluded the variable with the highest p value - 
Following Parent Company's Customers in the Host Market. This model fits slightly 
better than the previous one, but with no essential differences in significance levels, 
coefficients or logit statistics. In the third model (c), we exclude the variable New 
Products/Services for the Greek Market which shows the highest p value compared to 
the model's push and pull factors. Again, in this case, there are no crucial differences 
with the previous models.    
In the last model (d), we exclude the variable with the highest p value - Input Costs in 
the Home Market. The results show that this is the best model in terms of efficiency 
since it has the smallest number of variables for a given level of observations, and the 
largest log likelihood. It also does not reject the null hypothesis in the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test (p-value greater than 0.05). We see also that, although the number of 
independent variables decreases significantly across the models, there is no major 
reduction in either the Cox and Snell or Nagelkerke R square, which indicates that the 
variables dropped were statistically insignificant.  
Starting with the push factors, the first significant result is for adverse demand 
conditions in the home market, proxied by the following question: "Was the low 
home market customer purchasing power a pressure for your company to go abroad?" 
The higher the score for this question the greater the pressure on the company. The 
model coefficient is positive and higher than zero (0.753), which means that as the 
pressure increases, so does the probability of investing in FYROM. The results in 
terms of sign and magnitude remain robust in all four specifications. 
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Adverse demand conditions in the home market are a disincentive for investment. 
However, based on the model, it could be argued that adverse demand conditions in 
the home market do not prevent Greek investors from investing abroad; they simply 
influence the direction of the FDI. In this case, we find that the worse the demand 
conditions in Greece for the company, the greater the probability of investment in 
FYROM. This might be explained by the country characteristics; FYROM is a 
smaller and less competitive market than Bulgaria. A smaller sized and less intensely 
competitive environment induces confidence that investors will be more successful in 
terms of firm survival and development of the parent company. 
The issue of geographical proximity was captured by the following question: "Was 
the ability to physically visit the company on a frequent basis important for you?" The 
coefficient is positive and higher than zero (0.467) which means that the greater the 
interest in being physically able to visit the company, the higher the probability of 
investing in FYROM. The results in terms of sign and magnitude remain robust in all 
four specifications. 
Based on the responses to a follow-up question, investors stated that the main reason 
for wanting to be able to visit the company, perhaps daily, was maintaining control 
since investors in FYROM were generally less experienced in internationalisation as 
shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15: Parent Company Foreign Affiliate Presence in Regions 
  
Source: Author’s Survey Results (based on 130 companies) 
 
Table 15 presents the results based on the responses to the question: "Did you have 
foreign affiliates in other countries besides Bulgaria and FYROM?. If yes, in which of 
the listed regions?" We see that there is a 10% difference between Greek investors in 
Bulgaria and Greek investors in FYROM; however, this difference is not statistically 
significant. There are differences for CEE, EU and other developed regions, with 
Greek investors in Bulgaria evidently having greater experience of 
internationalisation.  
It could be argued that the lack of experience, forces investors to choose FYROM, 
which is a smaller country and suggests that the FDI will be more easily managed. 
This is confirmed by significantly lower level of internationalisation recorded by 
Greek investors in FYROM compared to Greek Investors in Bulgaria (Table 15) 
especially in respect to more developed markets such as EU. 
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To measure linkages (Table 14), we used the responses to the following question: 
"Did the presence of other Greek companies in the host market influence your 
decision to invest?" The coefficient is negative (-0.642) which means that those 
investors who considered this a major incentive tend to invest in Bulgaria. Moreover, 
we see that the sign and magnitude of the results remain robust in all four 
specifications. The results suggest that the presence of other Greek companies in the 
market creates a more secure and friendly business environment for the new investor 
and acts as a pull factor. Alternatively, there might be a follow-the-leader effect in 
play whereby if a competitor invests in the foreign country other firms will follow 
(Knickerbocker, 1973). However, if the Greek companies are competitors, we might 
expect this to act as a disincentive for investment.  
Thus, to examine further the nature of linkages, the questionnaire asked: "Is the 
competition you face in the host market mainly from Greek companies?" In the case 
of Bulgaria, among firms facing competition in the host market (103 out of 130 of the 
observations, the remaining 27 firms in the sample did not face competition in the 
host market), 41.3% answered yes.
68
 Another question asked whether the presence of 
Greek public/private companies in the host market was a motive for investment; 
almost 60% of Greek companies in Bulgaria perceived this to be an incentive.
69
 This 
suggests that both the proposed explanations are valid. In the case of FYROM, we 
know from the responses to the above question that the aim was to find a less 
competitive environment and so the presence of Greek companies could discourage 
them. 
                                                          
68
 See Appendix 11: Foreign Affiliate Company, Competitors in the Host Market (p.315) 
69
 See Appendix 12: Foreign Affiliate Company, Presence of Greek Public/Private Companies (p.315) 
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Note that although linkages in this context seem similar to linkages in LLL theory, 
there are some differences. Linkages in LLL refer to mergers, in a global context, to 
acquire firm-specific ownership advantages. In our context, we have mainly 
greenfield investments (Figure 28), and linkages refer to the nature of the 
competition; on the one hand, they are established by firms keen to mimic 
competitors, and on the other they refer to firms unwilling to invest because of the 
extent of the competition. Another difference is that there is no indication that firms 
invest in these countries to acquire synergies as predicted by the LLL, but are more 
focused on a friendly and familiar environment. 
In terms of institutional specificities, we asked whether the level of EU integration 
influenced the choice of host country. The coefficient is negative (-0.574) which 
means that as the variable increases so does the probability of investing in Bulgaria. 
The sign and magnitude are robust in all four specifications, suggesting that EU 
membership significantly influences the choice to invest in Bulgaria.  
In relation to the control variables, only North/South distinction is important; this 
proxies for location of the host company’s headquarters and takes the value 1 if the 
headquarters are in Thessaloniki (North based investors) and 0 if in Athens (South 
based investors). The coefficient is positive, meaning that companies with 
headquarters in Thessaloniki tend to favour FYROM. A possible explanation for this 
is that investors from Thessaloniki (nearer the host markets, but a peripheral economy 
compared to Athens which is the capital city of Greece and is more developed) are 
less internationalised and, thus, invest in smaller and less developed economies. This 
is supported by the fact that among North based firms only 32% invest in Central East 
European (CEE) markets, and only 16% of North based investors also invest in EU 
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markets.
70
 We should note that across all models, push and pull factors explain 
whether the company prefers to invest in Bulgaria or in FYROM.  
4.3 Conclusions 
 
This chapter examined the paradox observed in the Greek FDI behaviour; Greece 
lacks inward (IFDI), but is a strong investor via OFDI in SEE countries. We focused 
on investments in Bulgaria and FYROM, countries with high levels of Greek OFDI 
activity. 
Drawing on the western based (OLI) and emerging economy (LLL, COA) literature, 
we tried to explain this paradox in the context of Greek firms’ lack of ownership 
advantages, which are a key pillar of these theories. From an OLI perspective 
ownership advantages originate in the home country; from an LLL perspective, they 
originate de facto in the CSA of the host economy; and in the COA framework they 
originate in the interactions between specific home and host country factors. Based on 
all three theories, it could be expected that negative home market conditions would 
impede FDI. To deal with the shortcomings of these theories in the case of Greek 
OFDI, we proposed an interpretive framework that distinguishes between home 
market and host market FDI determinants. In particular, we propose that FDI can be 
determined by four main groups of factors in the home market, which push the 
company to invest in another country in order to survive. These are adverse demand 
conditions, increased domestic production costs, adverse institutional environment, 
and increased competition. We proposed a second group of factors related to the host 
market, which pull the company to invest. We distinguished eight categories: 
                                                          
70 See Appendix 13: North (Thessaloniki) South (Athens) Based Greek Outward Investors and Their 
Internationalisation (p. 315). 
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geographical proximity, financial incentives provided by the host market, financial 
incentives provided by the home market and regional institutions, linkages, positive 
demand conditions, lack of competitive pressure, asset acquisition and institutional 
specificities. 
Using a unique database of 130 Greek OFDI companies in Bulgaria and FYROM, we 
tested the theoretical model and found that push and pull factors can explain the 
behaviour of Greek OFDI enterprises in the area. However, the majority of these 
factors are not the standard determinants of FDI predicted by OLI, LLL or COA 
theory. Instead, we show that explaining the direction of Greek FDI requires a 
different perspective to explain the phenomenon of "forced internationalisation" (i.e. 
OFDI affected also by negative home market conditions). In other words, Greek 
OFDI is not an expression of superior ownership advantages, but allows these 
companies to survive through internationalisation towards neighbouring markets. We 
found adverse demand conditions to be a significant push factor, and geographical 
proximity, linkages and institutional specificities to be significant pull factors. Greek 
investors are not pulled to invest abroad by low costs as might be expected, but rather 
by shrinking local markets for their products and services. They are also not attracted 
by lucrative financial opportunities or a desire to acquire assets. Instead, they are 
pulled by proximity, by close links with Greek partners that have moved abroad, and 
by the expectation of better conditions in the case of Bulgaria’s EU membership. 
Ultimately, none of these factors, on their own, is a mechanism to enhance ownership 
advantages of Greek outward FDI as predicted by OLI, LLL and COA. This is 
because none of these theories recognizes the phenomenon of "forced 
internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market conditions) 
which seems to best describe Greek outward investor activity.  
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Finally, our model suggests that headquarters location is an important determinant of 
host country choice. This is interesting because the difference in the distances 
between Thessaloniki and FYROM's capital city Skopje (approximately 235km) and 
Thessaloniki and Sofia, Bulgaria's capital city (approximately 300km) is small. 
Although the transport infrastructures of both countries are at a similar level
71
, an 
assessment of road quality 
72
 shows that FYROM scores slightly higher than Bulgaria. 
Thus, in addition to low levels of internationalisation and competition, this might be 
another reason why North investors prefer FYROM over Bulgaria. 
So according to our suggestion, a more comprehensive conceptual approach is to 
operate a framework that includes push and pull factors capable of explaining country 
OFDI in this case, which encapsulate differences and disparities in FDI factors. So for 
Greek investors in FYROM, push factors are stronger and can be classified as "escape 
FDI" while for Greek investors in Bulgaria pull factors are stronger and can be 
classified as "expansionary FDI". 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71
 Please, see appendix 14 (figure A) Assessment of Quality of Transport Infrastructure & Quality of 
Roads in Bulgaria & FYROM (p.316) 
72 Please, see appendix 14 (figure B) Assessment of Quality of Transport Infrastructure & Quality of 
Roads in Bulgaria & FYROM (p.316) 
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Chapter 5: Greek OFDI Examined at Industry Level 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Dunning’s OLI framework was originally developed for the manufacturing industry. 
It was based on empirical data from US direct investments in British manufacturing 
(Dunning 1979; 1980; 1988; 2000; 2001). It has become accepted as a general 
framework for understanding the process of FDI in international business, irrespective 
of the industry. However,  literature shows that its application to the service (Resmini, 
2000, p.683) and construction industries is less frequent. Despite the rise in services 
FDI, there is much less research on FDI using the OLI framework (Cole, Lee et al., 
2007). We use data on Greek OFDI in four industries (manufacturing, construction, 
services and trade) to explore differences in the determinants of Greek OFDI in these 
industries in the same region, in our case South East Europe (SEE) and particularly 
Bulgaria and FYROM. We explore the robustness of Dunning’s OLI framework in 
these four industries. In other words, we test whether the OLI is equally robust for 
explaining the behaviour of Greek outward investors in different industries.  
Dunning (1988) notes that industry specific factors need to be incorporated in the OLI 
framework. However, few empirical papers systematically discuss these industry 
differences in relation to the OLI framework. To our knowledge, there are no OLI 
framed comparative analyses among different industries in the same region. This may 
be due to the lack of consistent industry and sectoral level data on FDI (Resmini, 
2000) or difficulties related to defining, classifying, measuring, comparing and 
explaining services MNEs (Boddewyn, Halbrich et al., 1986). 
Some authors criticize OLI for its bias towards manufacturing firms and poor 
predictive validity for explaining the behaviour of FDI in services (Katrishen and 
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Scordis, 1998; Capar and Kotabe, 2003; Cole, Lee et al., 2007). There is a main 
difference in the tradability between the services and the manufacturing industries, 
which could affect each of three OLI components in different ways. A point of 
departure for our analysis is that Dunning’s OLI framework does not differentiate 
factors across different industries. 
For example, Cole, Lee et al., (2007) test the OLI in the US reinsurance market, and 
identify industry specific factors that are not included in the traditional OLI 
framework. They argue that the traditional OLI framework is not as comprehensive in 
the cases of the services industry. Some of its traditional factors are shown to be 
significant (e.g. host market size, etc.), but there are important industry specific 
factors such as leverage or reinsurers liquidity in the host market, which have a 
significant impact on FDI decision, which are not part of OLI heuristics. 
Similarly, a study by Capar and Kotabe, (2003) on German service firms provides 
empirical evidence that the factors determining the relationships between 
internationalisation (international diversification) and performance are not the same 
for services and manufacturing firms. In particular, there is no direct relationship 
between firm size and performance for service firms, which contrasts with 
manufacturing firms. Firm size is often used to proxy for ownership advantages but 
does not seem relevant for services.  
Differences between manufacturing and services are discussed by O'Farrell, Wood et 
al., (1998) who argue that the eclectic paradigm does not provide a satisfactory 
explanation for the development of foreign markets by services firms. Thus, any 
framework that discusses internationalisation should take account of the differences 
between industries. 
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If OLI is less relevant for services might it still be useful as general framework for 
understanding FDI in international business, or do we need a more differentiated OLI 
framework with lower generality and more relevance? In being very general, the OLI 
framework risks irrelevance since it can encompass almost every FDI process. We 
agree with Narula (2010)  who argues that the OLI has become tautological and risks 
loss of explanatory power. One of our aims is to explore the extent to which the OLI 
can be generalized across different economic activities, i.e. four industries. 
However, our attempts to "translate" or "convert" generic OLI categories and 
subcategories into the specific international business context of Greek OFDI, showed 
that this is not a trivial task; some OLI categories are easily convertible into or 
operationalised as variables. However, other categories need expansion beyond their 
original narrow understanding. Finally, in a few cases, we were forced to introduce 
new sub-categories which go beyond Dunning’s list of OLI sub-categories.    
This chapter starts from this very broad and extended (amended) list of determinants 
of FDI and explores which of these factors can explain Greek OFDI. The need to start 
from a very broad and extended (amended) list of determinants of FDI stems from an 
important feature of Greek OFDI which is "forced internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI 
affected also by negative home market conditions). Based on this extended and 
amended list of OLI factors we aim to make two contributions. First, we identify 
which OLI factors are generic or country (Greek) specific, and which are specific to 
only one or several industries. In this way, we aim to assess the robustness of OLI to 
capture the determinants of FDI in different industries. Second, we test 
econometrically for the determinants of FDI in different industries. We find that  
variables that explain industry differences are better interpreted within the "push and 
pull" rather than the OLI framework. This alternative framework stems from the 
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"forced internationalisation'" feature (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home 
market conditions) of Greek OFDI which differs from the traditional OLI framework. 
Namely, Greek OFDI is not only an expression of ownership advantages and, thus, is 
not only "pulled" abroad by market opportunities but also "pushed" abroad by 
stronger competitive pressure at home. In this respect such investments are different 
from EM MNCs (from China, India etc.) investments, which although having no 
strong ownership advantages are still pulled by opportunities to compensate for lack 
of ownership advantages by going abroad. In chapter 3 we discussed conceptually 
push and pull factors; here we explore inter-industry differences and similarities in 
these factors. 
This chapter is structured as follows; Section 5.2 explains how we operationalise the 
traditional OLI framework and its subcategories, and its extension through the 
addition of new variables. Section 5.3 provides an overview of the characteristics of 
the industries in our sample and section 5.4-5.7 explores how these vary across the 
four industries. Section 5.8 econometrically tests our revised framework and its 
explanatory power for explaining OFDI across different industries. Section 5.9 
concludes. 
5.2 Revising the OLI Framework 
 
The original OLI framework has been continuously revised and updated over 50 
years. In an attempt to present OLI as the general heuristics of FDI, Dunning (1988) 
created a list of variables that could be used to proxy for major OLI elements. To 
counter some of the problems related to this original list of variables, we use the more 
elaborate list proposed by Dunning and Lundan (2008, pp.101-102). We discuss each 
of these elements in turn. 
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The major ownership advantage categories (Table 16) are: 1) property rights and/or 
intangible asset advantages (ownership asset advantages, Oa), 2i & 2ii) advantages of 
common governance (ownership transactional advantages, Ot), and 3) institutional 
assets (institutional advantages, Oi). 
5.2.1 Ownership Advantages 
We start our analysis by illustrating the ownership advantages that Dunning proposed 
Table 16: Ownership Specific Advantages Dunning's List  
 
Source: (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p.101) 
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Property rights and/or intangible asset advantages (Oa) encompass various firm 
intangible advantages, e.g. innovatory ownership advantage which enables the firm to 
innovate and generate product innovations, superior marketing or finance capabilities, 
or ability to reduce costs. Advantages of common governance (Ot transactional) refer 
to advantages that a firm might possess because of complementarities between the 
parent company and its subsidiaries and those advantages due to the firm’s 
multinationality. Examples of advantages  include exclusive access to resources, 
ability to obtain inputs on favourable terms, and similar advantages due to the firm 
size. Advantages due to the firm’s multinationality are related to the firm’s exposure 
to diverse cultures and environments which might have allowed it to develop a 
diverse knowledge base and ability to diversify effectively.  
The third group of ownership advantages institutional assets (institutional advantages 
Oi) - is a broad category that includes a wide spectrum of resources ranging from 
corporate culture, to the company’s leadership style, and code of conduct. 
Based on Dunning's conceptualization, we attempted to operationalise these 
categories for the empirical analysis. However, we were forced also to  expand them 
by proposing new variables and new sub-types of ownership advantages (categories). 
Each of these steps is described in this section. 
Our operationalisation was driven by the need to undertake empirical research within 
the OLI conceptual framework. We address each of Dunning’s three ownership 
specific advantages categories (1) property/ intangible advantages, (2i&2ii) 
governance advantages and (3) institutional advantages, which required their 
reframing within 23 new sub-categories (it includes 13 expanded variables and 8 new 
variables). Table 17.1 (3 parts) presents how we operationalised each of these 
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advantages. We added some new variables that cannot be considered 
"operationalisations" but rather "expansions".
73
 We are aware that this distinction is 
somewhat unclear at this point, but it is based on the qualitatively different nature of 
the business environment of SEE which is explained later in this chapter.  
It is important to mention that the original questionnaire that was used in our pilot 
study had more than 1,000 questions and data points, which covered most of the 
points in Dunning’s list. After the pilot, we retained the most representative questions, 
which amounted to around 500 questions and data points, still a large number which 
required two or three hours of a company CEO’s time. In the succeeding tables in this 
chapter we include the OLI operationalisations, expansions and new variables that 
best describe the Greek case. In order to focus only on the essential part of this 
research we retained only the variables verified by Pearson's Chi-Square, Mann–
Whitney U test or Kruskal Wallis tests. 
 
  
                                                          
73
 See Table 17.1: (3 parts) Disaggregating (operationalizing and expanding) ownership advantages 
sub-categories, column expansion (pp.152-154) 
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Table 17.1: (1) 
74
Disaggregating (Operationalising and Expanding) Ownership 
Advantages Sub- Categories Separated in Three Parts 17.1 (1), 17.1 (2), 17.1 (3)75 : 
 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning & Lundan (2008) , columns 2-3 author's operationalisations and 
expansions. 
 
                                                          
74
Note: Operationalisation and expansion categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. 
75 For further information on the push-pull framework and operationalisation of the OLI paradigm in 
Tables 17-24, see appendix 15, (pp. 317-325) 
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Table 17.1: (2) Disaggregating (Operationalising and Expanding) Ownership 
Advantages Sub-Categories  
 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning & Lundan (2008) , columns 2-3 author's operationalisations and 
expansions. 
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Table 17.1: (3) Disaggregating (Operationalising and Expanding) Ownership 
Advantages Sub-Categories  
 
 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning & Lundan (2008) , columns 2-3 author's operationalisations and 
expansions. 
 
We start our discussion with Table 17.1 which covers "property rights and/or 
intangible assets". More specifically, we operationalise the resources structure of the 
firm, (Row 1A), by asking managers about their "capacity to deal effectively with the 
quality of their production, company internal reorganization and employee training in 
the foreign affiliate", employees' skills, and strength of the company’s brand in the 
host market. We extended this by adding strength of company’s trade credibility. 
For product innovation, (Row 1B) we asked companies about their R&D activities 
abroad, the quality of their products, and their know-how with respect to competitors 
(foreign and local)
76
 in the host market. To complement this, we asked about their 
product differentiation strategy and the extent to which they use it to compete in the 
                                                          
76 In this survey, we include and combine variables examining the competitive advantages of Greek 
investors’ vs. Local and Greek investors’ vs. Foreign competitors in the host markets (Bulgaria and 
FYROM). See appendix 21, Questions used to Identify Ownership Advantages. (p.338, sections 5 and 
6, Column Other Parameters).     
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home market. For the broader category of innovation capacity (Row 1E), we tried to 
understand the extent to which the company possessed the ability to use specific 
technology and innovate in the home market.  
To capture the firm’s production management advantage (Row 1C), we tried to 
examine how effectively the home market manages the host company with respect to 
competitors. To complement this, we also examined the extent to which the 
company’s products are adapted to local market conditions, and if there is 
product/service variety/diversity in the host market. Similarly, organizational and 
marketing systems (Row 1D), were captured by asking managers whether their 
capabilities were better than those of their competitors in the host market. 
To measure the more generic category of non-codified knowledge (Row 1F),  we 
asked managers about their capacity to acquire business information while we 
expanded and specified the definition by arguing that what matters is the company’s 
capacity to acquire broad market, product, industry and business know-how 
knowledge about the host market. 
For the last two categories, we used the capacity to develop business plans to proxy 
for the company’s accumulated experience and product/service know-how in the host 
market (Row 1G). The firm’s ability to deal with cost reductions (Row 1H), is 
captured by the extent of low operational costs and low product/service prices in the 
host market. In addition, we examined the role of proximity between markets which 
could provide them with flexibility in production/services thus further cost advantages 
compared to local and/or foreign competitors in the host market. We also investigated 
how the company deals with competition in the home market by imports, trade in 
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intermediate or final products and/or lower costs than competitors in the home 
market.  
The second group of ownership advantages that Dunning refers to, i.e. governance 
advantages are illustrated in Table 17.1. (part 2); we posed the following  questions. 
The first two (Column 2i, Row B) referred to M&A by the parent company and 
affiliate, and the third referred to the extent of financial support from the parent 
company (Column 2i, Row E). We included the M&A question to find the advantages 
of company size. In the internalization part we examined this in more depth. The 
question about the extent of parent company financial support was aimed at 
understanding the extent to which the parent company supports the subsidiary. In the 
Greek example, many managers argued that there was very strong commitment to 
supporting the affiliate because of its importance for the parent company’s survival. 
To capture governance advantages that arise because of multinationality (see Table 
17.1.(2) in column 2ii and onwards we use proxies that capture the company’s 
presence in other countries (Column 2ii, Row A). For a more complete picture, we 
tried to understand FDI experience in different countries, including the EU, CEE, 
other developed and/or underdeveloped markets, and whether the firm had a presence 
(via exports for manufacturing/trade industries or other modalities e.g. turnkey 
projects for services/construction industries) prior to the decision to their FDI 
investment. We considered the firm’s ability to create barriers to entry (Column 2ii, 
Row D) in order to diversify or reduce risks and increase its market power to become 
an important firm asset.   
Finally, for institutional advantages (Oi), as shown in Table 17.1 (3), among the main 
categories operationalised are Codes of Conduct, Norms and Corporate Culture 
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(Column 3, Row B), where we test the host market firm’s capacity to deal effectively  
with potentially untrustworthy business partners, and its capacity to operate in 
different cultures.   
Apart from operationalizing and extending Dunning’s property/ intangible 
advantages, governance advantages and institutional advantages categories, we 
included new categories, listed in Table 18.  
Table 18: New Ownership Advantage Categories 
 
Source: Author's conceptualization 
The first major additional category is market knowledge. We consider this to be an 
important element of the ownership advantages of Greek outward investors who are 
"forced internationalisers" to a certain extent. While the traditional view of ownership 
advantages is largely confined to supply side factors we consider knowledge of local 
markets especially in the case of "forced internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also 
by negative home market conditions), an important new sub-category of (Oa) 
ownership advantages. 
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The second category is management competence and specifically management 
implementation in the foreign affiliate. As already mentioned, problems related to 
poor institutional development, and political and economic instability, are perceived 
as obstacles to FDI companies in SEE (Estrin and Uvalic, 2014). However, Henisz 
(2003) notes that the ability to manage institutional idiosyncrasies is as important as 
innovation. Thus, we examine whether Greek investors possess these kinds of 
competences. 
The third category examines the role of business relationships with the host market 
and more specifically the contracts between firms and markets compared to 
competitors (local & foreign).   
We add links (linkages) (Ohl) with home market suppliers as an important new sub-
category of ownership advantages, which is overlooked in the OLI. Links with home 
country suppliers are not simple synergies and, thus, are not included in governance 
advantages (common governance Ot). In the context of Greek OFDI they are strong 
factors of ownership advantage and governance advantages. Greek investors forge 
links because individually they may not have ownership advantages, but collectively 
they do.  
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5.2.2 Locational Advantages 
 
In relation to locational advantages, Table 19 lists Dunning’s locational advantages: 
Table 19: Locational Advantages Dunning's List  
 
 
Sources: (Dunning and Lundan, 2008 p.101-102) 
These advantages refer mainly to the benefits the company obtains from investing in a 
particular country, and arise because of the host country’s unique circumstances. We 
classified Dunning’s advantages into two categories of locational advantages: cost 
related, and institutional. Cost related advantages include variables that capture cost 
differences between the host and home markets, internal or external to the firm. These 
include various cost proxies such as input prices, transport costs, and external factors 
such as agglomeration economies, spillovers and artificial barriers. The country’s 
natural resources and infrastructure might also give rise to various advantages for the 
investing company. 
The second category of factors is related to institutional differences between the two 
locations that might generate advantages. These include ideological, cultural and 
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business issues, but also  various financial and government incentives that might give 
the foreign investor an advantage. Lastly, the overall economic, legal/regulatory 
system and the broader government framework are considered within locational 
advantages. 
The variables we used to operationalise locational advantages and how we expanded 
them are presented in Table 20.1, 20.2 as cost related and institutional advantages. 
Table 20.1 Disaggregating (Operationalising and Expanding): Locational 
Advantages Sub-Categories, Separated in Two Parts: 20. (1), 20. (2)  
 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning & Lundan (2008) , columns 2-3 author's operationalisations and 
expansions. 
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Table 20.2: Disaggregating (Operationalising and Expanding): Locational 
Advantages (Institutional Related)  
 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning & Lundan (2008) , columns 2-3 author's operationalisations and 
expansions. 
 
Starting with the variables in Table 20.1 in order to operationalise input prices, quality 
and productivity (Row 1A), we asked questions about the costs of labour and other 
production factors.  
To understand the role of transport and communication costs (Row 1B), we asked 
companies about their transport costs. We expanded this category with questions 
related to the mobility of factors of production/services between parent and foreign 
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affiliate. The location advantage for a company is greater if it is easier to transfer 
services and raw materials from parent to subsidiary.   
Another important factor is the spatial distribution of natural and created resource 
endowments and markets (Row 1C). To operationalise this we looked at the 
opportunity to export for manufacturing and trade companies or at other investment 
activities for service and construction companies in neighbouring markets. 
For economies of agglomeration and spillovers (Row 1D) we included questions 
about the extent to which other foreign and local companies cooperated with the 
subsidiary in the host market; the closer the cooperation the greater the advantages the 
company enjoys. This factor is not included in governance advantages since 
cooperating partners do not have previous business links with the investing company. 
Hence, these are location specific factors. In relation to artificial barriers (Row 1E), 
we asked companies about the extent of their capacity to deal effectively with trade 
obstacles such as high tariff costs.  
For infrastructure provision (Row 1F), we asked about the quality of the overall 
infrastructure (roads, etc.) and about the host market technology infrastructure e.g. 
obsolete telecommunication system, etc., which might negatively affect the everyday 
operations of firms. In terms of education infrastructure we asked about the 
difficulties related to finding local managers.  
For the institutional advantages of location presented in Table 20.2 we used various 
proxies to measure the cultural, political, business and other country differences (Row 
2A). For example, we asked about the similarities in the mentality and culture of the 
host market with respect to the home market, if the effects of presence or absence of 
geopolitical/historical links with the host country were noticeable, and if generally 
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there are problems related to Greece as a result of name disputes or historical conflicts 
in the area. We assume that a similar culture, on its own, is not sufficient to generate 
location advantages, which is why we expanded this indicator by asking how easy it 
was to rely on cultural proximity in order to acquire knowledge about the host market. 
We include in this category host market knowledge, business know-how in the host 
country and capacity to deal effectively with difficulties in acquiring market 
knowledge (in the host market). 
To capture (dis)advantages of different legal and regulatory system (Row 2B), we 
asked about the frequency of changes to the legal system, about the delays of the 
bureaucracy and the rigidity of the labour market. The more rigid the labour market, 
the less the locational advantage of the host country. In addition, other elements of the 
regulatory system, such as taxes, and property rights were proxied in order to 
operationalise these location advantages. Property rights are country specific and, 
thus, are location specific advantages and can influence the choice between one 
country and another.  
For the category of investment incentives and disincentives (Row 2C) we used a wide 
range of indicators. In addition to formal incentives, we expanded the framework with 
the addition of several informal institutional factors that de facto operate as 
investment (dis)incentives. To operationalise Dunning’s category of investment 
(dis)incentives, we use gaining market share in the host market, large customer base 
and potential for market growth. We looked at asset acquisition investment (e.g. 
machinery, land) and variables for financial support measures (or/and trade 
agreements) provided by the home or host government and other non-government 
institutions. We used risk investment factor as incentives for diversification via FDI. 
We also checked FDI incentives such as entry in host technology, lack of production 
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factors in Greece, raw material access & security, lack of business partner and 
investments in order to create new products/services for the parent company & the 
Greek market.  We also examined capacity to deal with disincentives such as the 
country’s macroeconomic, currency and political instability, crime, grey market, 
export credit lines and banking system quality.  
To expand this, we included some less conventional location specific advantages 
(Row 2C, column Expansion). For example, capacity to deal with issues such as 
insecure business environment (host market vs. home market), comparatively high 
investment risk (in Bulgaria and FYROM and other SEE countries), risk of poor 
customer payments and low customer purchasing power in the host market, corruption 
in low and high levels of administration, political will to assist with FDI and 
difficulties due to host markets slow transitional process. 
We also asked managers whether their investment decision was influenced by 
political or/and business contacts in the host market favourable SEE regional business 
agreements or/and by low levels of competition in the host market or the presence of 
their competitors in these markets was an incentive for them.   Moreover, we have 
examined the role of higher entrepreneurial opportunities and host investment profit 
compared to the home one under the context of "forced internationalisation".  
Wherever was appropriate we asked them if the old technology/machinery transfer in 
countries with low scale production was an incentive for them.   
Also, we expanded this category by looking at the proximity between the parent 
company and the affiliate.  Last we expanded the economic system and government 
strategies categories (Row 2D), by including a proxy of Regional integration via 
country’s position in relation to EU membership. All these are the unconventional 
incentives which we took into consideration.  
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The context of "forced internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home 
market conditions), has led to the introduction of several new variables for location 
advantages (see Table 21). 
Table 21: New Location Advantages Sub-Categories 
 
Source: Author's conceptualization 
The most important addition to the location advantage categories is not from the 
perspective of host market locational advantages but from a home market perspective. 
More specifically, we examine home market pressures, which try to capture the 
significance of industry competition and market share reduction in the home market 
pushing the company to invest abroad. This home market locational disadvantage 
pushes the firm to invest in another country with lower levels of  pressures, which can 
be seen indirectly as a location specific advantage.  
Another new location specific factor is the potential to create linkages with other 
Greek companies in the host market. A host country with a large presence of Greek 
companies can be perceived as providing a location advantage due to potential 
spillovers among Greek investors. A closely related location advantage is if investors 
go abroad in order to follow their clients, as in the case of satellite and lead investors 
analysed in Chapter 6.  
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5.2.3 Internalization Advantages 
 
The last group of advantages are internalization advantages. In general, these refer to 
why firms enter a foreign market by establishing their own company rather than 
merging with an existing firm, or by exporting or use some other mode of entry 
(subcontracting, franchising, etc.). 
Table 22: Internalization Advantages, Dunning's List  
 
Source: (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p.102) 
Internalization advantages are much less differentiated and include 12 stand-alone 
categories (Table 22). These include reduced transaction costs (negotiation, moral 
hazard, litigation and uncertainty), better control over technological knowledge, and 
better control of market outlets, among others. 
We operationalised the four internalization variables and added one new category to 
augment Dunning’s internalization advantages list, which refers to a pattern specific 
to the Greek context based on our pilot study (Table 23
77
 and Table 24).
                                                          
77
 In contrast to the previous cases, there are some overlaps among the various variables, i.e. the same 
variables can be used to proxy for several different categories. 
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Table 23: Disaggregating (Operationalising): Internalization Advantages  
 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning & Lundan (2008) , columns 2-3 author's operationalisations and expansions. 
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More analytically, to capture internalization advantages, Dunning and Lundan (2008) 
propose a list of 12 categories, three of which we operationalised. The first deals with 
negotiating and searching costs, where firms internalize in order to avoid them. To 
capture this, we looked at the company's mode of entry to the host market (wholly-
majority acquisition, local-foreign joint venture, greenfield). In addition, we examined 
the advantages arising from firms that had some previous trade relationships with the 
host country. Previous investment links with the host market prior to the current FDI 
allow them to avoid search and negotiating costs due to their potentially better 
understanding of the market. 
The second source of internalization advantages is related to the potential to avoid 
moral hazard and adverse selection, and the ability to protect the reputation of the 
internalizing firm. To capture this, we asked questions aimed at identifying why the 
firm engaged in FDI rather than some other indirect investment. Possible responses 
were related to investment security, control and quality, direct customer contact, 
avoidance of opportunism, and lack of skilled personnel. For example, it could be 
argued that lack of skilled personnel can affect the firm’s reputation and, thus, might 
be an incentive for the firm to internalize rather than cooperate with a local firm. 
Also, we argue that some firms might prefer to have direct customer contact in order 
to maintain their brand and improve their marketing. For this reason, they might 
prefer to invest directly in the host market rather than simply to trade or use other 
investment modalities e.g. subcontracting. 
We investigated other motives, such as avoiding bounded rationality, avoiding loss of 
internal business information, avoiding use of company internal technology with 
others, avoiding poor communication and misunderstandings, lack of bilateral 
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agreements to avoid double taxation, lack of export credit lines. In our pilot study we 
found that these factors were not important; for this reason, we incorpoorated them 
into the category "Other". 
Lastly, another source of internalization advantages is the firm’s incentive to control 
supplies and conditions of sale for inputs (including technology). To capture this, we 
investigated how the foreign affiliate merged with the parent company (vertical 
forward, vertical backward, horizontal, diversified), since each different type of 
merger yields different types of advantages. 
We added a new internalization advantage (revealed by the pilot study) which refers 
to a pattern specific to Greek enterprises. They embody a new form of FDI 
internalization advantage which is establishment of a foreign affiliate in the host 
market with no financial or legal links with the parent company. They do this in order 
to protect both companies - in the home and host markets - in case of adverse home or 
host market conditions. This is likely a characteristic of the new pattern of "forced 
internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market conditions). 
Table 24: New Internalization Advantages Sub-Categories 
 
Source: Author's conceptualization 
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5.2.4 Conclusion 
 
The research required us to operationalise and expand Dunning’s OLI categories, 
which are highly generic and abstract, and are strength but also weaknesses of the 
OLI framework. On the positive side, this enabled us to generate a large number of 
variables to proxy for OLI factors. However, the features of Greek "forced 
internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market conditions) led 
us to introduce several new categories for ownership, location and internalization 
advantages which were required to better capture specific features of Greek outward 
FDI. 
Among ownership advantages, we highlighted the importance of demand side factors 
or knowledge of the host market, and the importance of linkages with home market 
firms. Why are these categories not captured by the traditional OLI framework? OLI 
is based on the logic of superior ownership advantages of foreign investors which 
does not reflect the situation of Greek investors which do not possess strong 
ownership advantages, but still are forced to go abroad. This puts ownership 
advantages based on knowledge of host markets in a primary position, compared to its 
secondary ranking in the traditional OLI framework, and links with home market 
firms as a way to compensate for lacking individual firm level ownership advantages. 
Among locational advantages, we included the new categories of home market 
pressures and linkages with home market firms. Similar to the additions to ownership 
advantages, these also reflect the specific Greek context of "forced 
internationalisation"(i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market conditions). In 
the traditional OLI framework, firm internationalisation is an expression of ownership 
advantages in the home market. In fact, firms go abroad because they have redundant 
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capacity and advantages that they can exploit abroad where, by definition, they 
possess superior ownership advantages compared to local firms. Also, ownership 
advantages are firm specific unlike in the Greek case where links with home market 
firms in the host market are essential for the ownership advantages of individual 
firms. 
Dunning’s internalization advantage categories are mostly adequate to capture and to 
accommodate the factors which are assumed to be relevant to Greek investors, with 
the exception of autonomous investors, which we discuss in Table 24 under new 
internalization advantages. Overall, Dunning’s framework uses more economic and 
standard business related factors to explain FDI, which reflects the assumption of 
superior advantages of FDI. Our additions primarily tackle ownership advantages and 
location advantages; however, the addition of a new variable for internalization (new 
pattern of home host company, the autonomous one) is interesting and promising for 
further research. Expansions of the OLI in terms of new variables are related largely 
to property rights and/or intangible asset advantages (Oa), locational (institutional 
(dis) advantages), and are primarily related to informal (dis) incentives for investment 
and partly to transition economy features of the two host economies. There are new 
categories in ownership, locational and internalization advantages which are mostly 
related to the features of "forced internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by 
negative home market conditions) of Greek FDI. They reflect the fact that Greek 
outward investors do not necessarily possess conventional advantages compared to 
other global firms. 
Next, we explore the relevance of the variables and categories considered for the four 
industries. We expect to make two contributions. First, we test the relevance of our 
operationalised, extended and amended OLI framework in the context of four 
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industries. We are interested in testing which variables have the most general 
explanatory power in relation to Greek OFDI. Second, we explore inter-industry 
differences which we hope will test the robustness of the OLI framework and provide 
a better understanding of whether the drivers of Greek OFDI are general, industry 
specific or overlapping. 
5.3 The Characteristics of the Outward FDI in Four Industries 
 
Before analysing OLI specific differences, it is necessary to understand the main  
features of each industry in our sample.
78
 We also discuss some similarities across the 
industries.   
The discussion is presented in four subsections: the first presents the main industry 
characteristics, the second discusses the similarities across various industry groups, 
the third presents common features of three of the analysed industries, and the fourth 
section presents common characteristics for all four industries. 
In each subsection, discussion of main characteristics and similarities is based on the 
following 11 criteria: 
1. General Company Characteristics in the Home Market 
2. Internationalisation Characteristics 
3. Push Factors 
4. Behaviour in the Host Market 
5. Pull Factors 
6. Company Problems in the Host Market 
7. Competitive Advantage in the Host Market  
8. Risks 
9. Cooperation 
10. Targets 
11. Returns. 
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For a list of the characteristics that were found to be significantly different across industries using 
Pearson parametric test or Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test, see Appendix 16 which is in four parts 
16(1), 16(2), 16(3) and 16(4) (pp.326-329). 
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5.3.1 Main Characteristics of Outward FDI in Four Industries 
 
Table 25: Main Characteristics of OFDI by Industry: Manufacturing  
 
Source: Author's survey, For a list of the characteristics that were verified across four industries using 
the appropriate Kruskal-Wallis or Pearson chi-square statistical tests, see Appendix 16 (pp.326-329) 
which is in four parts 16(1), 16(2), 16(3), 16(4) last column. 
The first main characteristic of manufacturing companies is that they are the oldest 
among the four industries with most companies founded before 1969 (61.7%). Over 
half (54.1%) of manufacturing companies are listed on the stock exchange, which 
suggests that they have better liquidity as they can raise capital for investments 
through the stock exchange market and, thus, have a more robust profile. Also, they 
do not consider change in home market share as a major cause of their investment 
decision (33.9%). 
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There are two components to companies’ internationalisation: FDI and exports. This 
industry has exclusive export related features compared to its counterparts. More 
specifically, it uses export as a method of internationalisation before FDI (88.5%) and 
half of these companies are mainly export-oriented (45.9%). Among manufacturers  
almost all had at least one export experience with the EU, and/or other developed 
countries (91.8%). Also, most exported to Bulgaria or/and FYROM prior to the FDI 
activity (70%). This industry is the most internationalised based on exporting records.  
The push factor that is main feature in this industry is the adverse institutional 
environment and, specifically, the credit time payment between supplier and 
customer,
79
 which is a major problem for these firms in the home market. This 
situation has been exacerbated by adverse demand conditions such as low customer 
purchasing power and increased production costs in the home market. In terms of pull 
factors, geographical proximity facilitates close control, export development, rapid 
raw materials supply and services provision from the parent company which is 
considered as important motives for the manufacturing industry. 
The host country subsidiaries established by manufacturing companies are either in 
manufacturing (57.4%) or trade (37.7%). Many of these manufacturing companies 
have established a trade company in the host market as an export-arm, something that 
is main to this industry. Manufacturing also has the smallest percentage of companies 
that have invested in the host country’s capital city (62.3%). Manufacturing 
companies likely prefer lower cost areas because they usually operate as  wholesalers 
rather than retailers. Those that have invested in the capital city have done so mostly 
in the form of trading companies with the aim of expanding sales locally. Their aim is 
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 As we have already mentioned, the credit time between supplier and customer is the time of 
product/service payment between the parties. 
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to achieve further expansion in both the domestic market (via increased intra-trade 
between parent and host company) and in other SEE markets via their foreign 
affiliate. In other words, they are interested in increasing the turnover between parent 
and affiliate.   
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Table 26: Main Characteristics of OFDI by Industry: Trade  
 
 
Source: Author's survey, For a list of the characteristics that were verified across four industries using 
the appropriate Kruskal-Wallis or Pearson chi-square statistical tests, see Appendix 16 (pp.326-329)  
which is in four parts 16(1), 16(2), 16(3), 16(4) last column. 
Half of the trading companies were founded before 1979 (53.4%), and have 
experience of some M&A activity (40%). The parent companies have no major 
technology advantages, but do have some internationalisation experience via exports. 
In particular, prior to the establishment of the foreign affiliate, half of the companies 
177 
 
(53.3%) had some exporting experience, and 43.3% had experience of exporting at 
least once, to the EU or/and other developed countries. In other words, these 
companies have no technology advantages and limited internationalisation experience 
through exports and minor FDI activity. 
In terms of push/pull factors, what is main in this industry is that the companies were 
pressed by push factors such as increased competition due to increase in new foreign 
competitor firms (58.3%) in the home market and adverse institutional environment. 
Lack of competitive pressures in the host market and geographical proximity between 
company and foreign affiliate constitute main pull factors for this industry.  However, 
it is interesting that there are no distinctive pull factors related to this industry which 
might point to the key role of push factors and forced internationalisation.  
Virtually all the companies invest in trade (93.5%), and more than half chose the 
autonomous mode of entry (64.5%). As already explained, autonomous companies are 
de facto foreign affiliates without legal or financial links with the parent company. 
Notably, their choice of an autonomous relationship between parent company and 
foreign affiliate and industry shrinkage in the home market, could be indicators of 
"forced internationalisation".  
Trading companies invest in these countries to increase the security of and control 
over their investment, and to maintain quality (57.1%). They face particular 
difficulties with respect to the institutional environment, especially those related to the 
grey economy. Almost half of trade companies faced difficulties in developing 
business plans (48.4%). Also, these companies are not interested in expanding to 
other post-communist countries probably due to the fact that this FDI was not 
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"expansionary, but rather "escape" FDI based on the negative home market conditions 
(industry competition-push factors). 
Table 27: Main Characteristics of OFDI by Industry: Services  
 
Source: Author's survey, For a list of the characteristics that were verified across four industries using 
the appropriate Kruskal-Wallis or Pearson chi-square statistical tests, see Appendix 16 (pp.326-329)  
which is in four parts 16(1), 16(2), 16(3), 16(4) last column. 
In this industry, main feature of OFDI is that more than half of the companies had 
FDI experience in CEE (64.1%). The parent companies have technological 
advantages only in diversified technology know-how (28.9%), which is at a really low 
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level especially in the services industry. However, this lack of technological 
superiority did not prevent them from investing in the CEE.  
In the context of the push-pull framework, these companies differ in not experiencing 
problems related to an adverse home institutional environment when investing abroad. 
In relation to competition, this push drive has increased due to growth of other home 
market firms (64%).  
In terms of pull factors, lack of competitive pressure and presence of other Greek 
public/private companies in the host market were moderate incentives while following 
the parent company’s customers and low cost of factors of production were small 
incentives. 
As expected, almost all service companies invest in the services industry in the host 
market; some engaged in mergers and buy-outs after their establishment (21.4%). 
They decided to enter via FDI to ensure direct customer contact (33.3%). Also, these 
companies transfer their business know-how from the parent company without 
adjustments (72.5%). In this industry, they cooperate mainly with Greek companies 
(32.5%), and very few experience delays in investment returns (15.4%). After the 
establishment of the affiliates, the companies faced no institutional problems related 
to corruption or capital risk, which is distinctively different from the companies in the 
other three industries.  
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Table 28: Main Characteristics of OFDI by Industry: Construction  
 
Source: Author's survey, For a list of the characteristics that were verified across four industries using 
the appropriate Kruskal-Wallis or Pearson chi-square statistical tests, see Appendix 16 (pp.326-329) 
which is in four parts 16(1), 16(2), 16(3), 16(4) last column. 
Most construction companies experienced declining market share in the home market, 
which was a major cause of their investment abroad (76.5%). In contrast to the other 
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industries, construction is not widely internationalised, with only 23.5% of firms with 
other investment activity in the EU or other developed countries.  
Construction companies are the most push driven of the four industries analysed. 
They faced greatly increased competitive pressures in the home market, fuelled by 
industry shrinkage (64.7%) and this was the main factor in their internationalisation 
(63.6%). In addition, in order to survive and cut costs, half (53%) pursued M&As. 
This M&A tactic created increased competition due to existing home market firms’ 
growth (43.8%). Thus, these firms simultaneously faced industry shrinkage and 
increased competition in the home market.  
Also, construction is the only industry that significantly invests in order to 
compensate for loss of market share and strong competition in the home market. In 
terms of pull factors, host market geographical proximity with other markets is a very 
small incentive as prospect for further investment activity. However, lack of 
competitive pressures and linkages are significant pull factors.  
Just over half (55.6%) of the companies had an autonomous relationship with the de 
facto parent company. As already mentioned, this was to avoid legal and formal 
financial links between them as a way to protect both companies in case of a failure. 
Furthermore, unlike in the home market, they faced no problems of adverse demand 
in the host market. In the host market, in everyday operations there were no serious 
institutional host market problems such as political instability or nationality. Thus, 
inexperience in FDI activities did not create obstacles to their operations.   
Construction firms know-how advantages over local firms are the main source of their 
competitive advantage. Also, around half of the companies (44.4%) cooperate mainly 
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with Greek companies in the host markets, while 27.8% expanded this cooperation 
mainly with other Greek firms in SEE. This suggests that linkages and cooperation 
with the other Greek firms that are operating in the area are sources of competitive 
advantage. This mechanism works as follows: assume that company A operates in the 
home market where it cooperates with company B. Also, assume that company B 
develops products/services tailored to company A. Hence, when company A invests 
in a foreign market it seeks to cooperate with company B, which increases the 
efficiency of company A, thus strengthening its competitive advantage over local 
companies. 
Despite the various pressures they face in the home market and some low level risks 
in the host market, almost all construction firms (95%) have received expected returns 
on their investments. Finally, the parent companies aim to continue investing in other 
post-communist countries despite their lack of internationalisation experience. All the 
above implies that although the construction industry is mainly pushed abroad it 
operates successfully in the host market. 
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Table 29: Key Findings for Each of the Industries Across the Four Main Categories 
 
Source: Author's survey, For a list of the characteristics that were verified across four industries using the appropriate Kruskal-Wallis or Pearson chi-square statistical tests, 
see Appendix 16 (pp.326-329) which is in four parts 16(1), 16(2), 16(3), 16(4) last column. 
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The manufacturing industry is the oldest industry and its internationalisation is based 
mainly on exports. It is the only industry that can invest in two sectors such as 
manufacturing and trade. It uses trade foreign affiliates  as an export arm in these 
markets.  There are main push and pull factors for this industry.  
 
Trade is an industry with many weaknesses, but still engages in FDI. Trade firms have 
no ownership advantages due to multinationality because of the low level of 
internationalisation. In addition, they face pressures in the home market as a result of 
industry competitive pressures and adverse institutional environment. Due to their 
lack of experience of internationalisation and difficulties in the home market they do 
not want financial and legal links with the foreign affiliate. Thus, they establish 
autonomous companies in the host market which protects both parent and foreign 
affiliates from further financial problems. Although they created this protective net, 
they face institutional host market problems at least initially. Push factors cover 
adverse institutional environment and increased competitive pressures while this 
offsets by pull factors such as lack of host market competitive pressures and 
geographical proximity issues. 
 
The services industry is an interesting case because, despite having no technological 
ownership advantages, its firms have a high level of regional internationalisation in 
CEE via FDI. This internationalisation, although at regional level, gives them the 
advantage to expand in the host market without fear of capital risk. There are main 
push and pull factors for service firms. 
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The construction industry, as already mentioned, is the most push driven industry. It is 
a perfect example of "escape" FDI. A major problem for this industry (and also 
services) is that internationalisation cannot be achieved via exports, but must be via 
other investment activities (e.g. turnkey projects). Construction firms do not have 
conventional ownership advantages, at least as a result of multinationality, but they 
create these advantages via cooperation mainly with other Greek firms in the host 
market, which gives them competitive advantage in product service know-how in the 
host market. Hence, an industry that is very pressed in the home market "escapes" 
these negative home market conditions, and creates advantages by exploiting past or 
creating new links with other Greek companies, which are servicing the host market 
with customized products and services familiar to the construction companies from 
previous business relationships in the home market. Thus, they acquire advantage in 
the foreign market. This is a case of escape FDI, which is also successful in the sense 
that these companies target further FDI investments in post-communist countries. 
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5.3.2 Similarities between Industries 
 
Table 30: Common Characteristics of Manufacturing & Trade Industries 
Source: Author based on a survey data and verified by the appropriate test (Mann–Whitney U test or 
Pearson's chi-squared test) for each variable of the industry group Manufacturing & Trade.  
The first similarity across the two industries of manufacturing and trade in terms of 
push factors is credit time payment as a major problem for both the manufacturing 
and trade industries. In addition, both manufacturing (56%) and trade (58.3%) faced 
increased competitive pressures due to the presence of foreign competitors in the 
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home market. As far as other push factors
80
 are concerned, they are minor for the 
companies in these two industries.  
In relation to pull factors, the close control between parent company and foreign 
affiliate facilitated by geographical proximity is the most important factor for both 
industries. However, linkages, such as the presence of other Greek public/private 
companies in the host market, are not a pull factor for either of these industries. At the 
same time, they are not interested in cooperating with other Greek firms in the host 
market. So, for this pair of industries, company control is important via everyday 
monitoring which help to operationalise company production and trade in the market. 
However, these industries are not affected by business relationships and linkages 
developed in the home market.  
In terms of the similarities between the manufacturing and trade industries and their 
behaviour in the host market, they have similar patterns of investment. Both tend to 
use the foreign affiliates as export arms (via supplier-customer policy between parent 
company and foreign affiliate); 73.8% of manufacturing companies and 67.7% of 
trade firms.  
As already mentioned, investment control is an important factor, and almost half of 
the companies in both industries invest via FDI and not via other modes of market 
entry e.g. exports, licensing, increasing security, control and quality of their products. 
The subsidiaries of these two industries had some common problems in the host 
markets. Initially, the most important problem was related to institutions especially 
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 Such as: Increased competition and industry shrinkage as the main factors for internationalisation, 
increased competition due to existing home market firms’ growth and compensatory investment due to 
company's reduced home market share. 
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the grey economy and tariff costs. However, only the grey economy remains a 
problem, but on a lower scale. 
As far as management competences are concerned, neither manufacturing (77.7%) nor 
trade (71.4%) consider superiority with respect to management implementation in 
their foreign affiliate compared to their competitors is an advantage in the host 
market. However, they believe that they81 have the relevant business know-how for 
the host market. Both these industries aim to expand their range of products and 
services in the host market. Although they have achieved some return on investment, 
a significant percentage (40%) of firms face delays in investment return compared to 
estimated yield.
82
 
To summarize, both push and pull factors affect these older companies. An adverse 
institutional business environment via long payment term periods creates money 
liquidity problems for both industries, and their home market business environment is 
pressed further by the presence of foreign competitors. To offset these pressures, they 
establish companies in adjacent countries and use these affiliates as export arms in 
these markets. Although they do not recognize management implementation in their 
foreign affiliate as a competitive ownership advantage, they think that they have the 
necessary business know-how for these investments and these environments, and have 
expanded their FDI. For these industries, the determining factors for investment are 
company control and investment security, which are facilitated by the geographical 
proximity of these markets. An interesting finding is that a friendly host market 
environment created by the presence of other Greek investors in the area (linkages) 
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 Management competences: lack of business know-how in the host market: manufacturing (5.1%), 
trade (12.9%). 
82
 Manufacturing (38.3%), trade (38.7%). 
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and cooperation established and developed in the home market, are not considered 
competitive advantage in host markets for these industries. 
Table 31: Common Characteristics of Trade & Construction Industries 
 
Source: Author based on a survey data verified by the appropriate test (Mann–Whitney U test or 
Pearson's chi-squared test,) for each variable of the industry group Trade & Construction.  
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Both trade and construction are dominated by companies with up to 250 employees, 
with a small presence on the stock exchange and M&A activity. Moreover, their 
headquarters are spread between the South and North of Greece. The companies in 
this group internationalise less via FDI in CEE, the EU, underdeveloped (except SEE 
and CEE), and other developed (except EU) countries. They create affiliates via 
autonomous relationships between parent and host market companies (trade 64.5%, 
construction 55.6%). 
In relation to push factors, manufacturing and services industries are not facing 
industry shrinkage while trade and construction do suffer from industry shrinkage 
(trade 40% and construction 64.7%). This is a "weak" and less internationalised group 
of companies, and their main pull factor is lack of competitive pressure and, more 
specifically, weak competition in the host market. However, firms in both these 
industries believe they possess competitive advantages in the host market over their 
local competitors and specifically in product/service know-how. 
After establishing their foreign affiliates, they encountered some institutional 
problems, especially corruption in national and local levels of administration, and this 
problem has persisted. Finally, although they lack multinational experience, these 
companies do not face serious difficulties related to developing business plans (trade 
29% and construction 33.3%). 
To summarize, both push and pull factors characterize this industry group. Most firms 
are not part of the stock exchange market. They lack ownership advantages due to low 
levels of multinationality and they are pushed more by industry shrinkage which is 
also a main push factor for their internationalisation, especially for construction firms. 
However, all these disadvantages, combined with pressures from the home market, do 
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not represent obstacles to FDI. They expand abroad carefully, adopting a protective 
autonomous relationship between parent company and foreign affiliate. Their FDI 
activity is related to "escape" from the home market to invest in markets where there 
are low levels of competition due to the absence of strong local competitors in the 
market. They are aware of the superiority of their product and service know-how. 
Although they do not possess conventional ownership advantages before their FDI, 
they resort to "escape" FDI.  
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Table 32: Common Characteristics of Manufacturing & Services Industries 
 
Source: Author based on a survey data verified the appropriate test (Mann–Whitney U test or Pearson's 
chi-squared test) for each variable of the industry group Manufacturing & Services.  
Companies in manufacturing and services are characterized by large size 
(manufacturing 55.9% and services, 51.5%), and they have high levels of M&A 
activity (manufacturing 77%, services 74.4%), and significant stock exchange 
membership (manufacturing 54.1%, services 42.1%). In other words, this group of 
companies has a robust profile. 
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Despite the low levels of internationalisation in all four industries, manufacturing and 
services are the most internationalised. Almost half of them have investments in CEE, 
EU and underdeveloped countries. The lack of competitiveness in this "more 
internationalised group" is confirmed by their weak presence in other developed 
(except EU) countries (manufacturing 27.9%, services 17.9%).  
In terms of the push/pull framework, there is no obvious push factors apart from some 
minor problems related to industry shrinkage. There are also no pull factors that are 
distinctively different for this group compared to others. 
Manufacturing and services firms prefer to establish classical subsidiaries not 
"autonomous" companies in the host market: 73.8% of manufacturing companies and 
64.3% of services firms. They do not experience problems related to corruption, 
which is an average sized problem for the previous group. An adverse host market 
demand condition such as low customer purchasing power is minor problem for this 
group.  
Half the companies in this group consider they possess competitive advantage in the 
host market over local firms (manufacturing 55.6% and services 47.8%) and they do 
not have problems in terms of management competence in the host market (such as 
difficulties in developing business plans initial and currently, are minor issues). 
Lastly, both industries aim to invest in other post-communist countries. 
To summarize, we note that there are no unique push-pull factors for this group of 
industries. The companies in this group have the most robust profile among the four 
industries, and are also the most internationalised. They go abroad by establishing 
traditional robust subsidiaries rather than weak autonomous companies. Also,  they 
view their investment as a stepping-stone for FDI in other post-communist countries. 
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Therefore, this pair of industries, despite their relative weaknesses compared to the 
global market, is successful at the regional level. 
Table 33: Common Characteristics of Manufacturing & Construction Industries 
 
*Note:  Internationalisation here means mode of transaction via exports for manufacturing/ trade industries or 
other modalities e.g. turnkey projects for services/construction industries. 
Source: Author based on a survey data verified by the appropriate test (Mann–Whitney U test or 
Pearson's chi-squared test) for each variable of the industry group Manufacturing & Construction.  
The characteristics common to manufacturing and construction companies are parent 
company technology advantages and especially diversification of technology know-
how (manufacturing 47.5%, construction 41.2%). On entry to the host market, they 
did not face any serious difficulties related to their management competences. So, 
although their technological advantages are limited to technology diversification, 
management competence is not a constraint.  
Manufacturing and construction companies have important differences related to push 
factors.
83
 They seem to have only one common push factor: increased production 
costs in the home market. For both industries, this is a medium sized problem. In 
                                                          
83 See Appendix 16 (1), 16 (2), 16 (3) and 16 (4) Results Industries verified by parametric & non 
parametric tests (pp.326-329). 
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relation to common pull factors, geographical proximity in other neighbouring 
markets than those involved in their FDI, creates prospects for further development 
via exports (or other investment activities in the case of construction).  
Push and pull dynamics exist, since firms are pressed by increased home market 
production costs and pulled by further internationalisation opportunities in 
neighbouring countries.  
Table 34: Common Characteristics of Services & Construction Industries 
 
*Note:  Internationalisation here means mode of transaction via exports for manufacturing/ trade industries or 
other modalities e.g. turnkey projects for services/construction industries. 
Source: Author based on a survey data verified the appropriate test (Mann–Whitney U test or Pearson's 
chi-squared test,) for each variable of the industry group Services & Construction.  
Services and construction industries had low levels of exports/other investment 
activities in the host market, prior to the establishment of a foreign affiliate (35.9% 
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services, construction 29.4%) compared to their manufacturing and trade counterparts. 
This means that firms in services and construction industries do not internationalise 
gradually ("learning" about the host market step by step) like the other two industries.  
In relation to the supplier-customer policy (between parent company and foreign 
affiliate), we see that only a very small proportion of this group follows it (services 
26.2% and construction 38.9%) compared to manufacturing and trade. This could be 
seen as logical due to the "nature" of these industries.  
In terms of the push/pull framework, the construction industry is the most "pushed" 
and has the largest number of push factors.
84
 However, here we are interested only in 
common push and pull factors. The common push factor is increase in new foreign 
competitor firms in the home market, albeit still a low share of firms (services 35.3% 
and construction 18.8%).  
A distinctive feature of this group is that pull factors, such as geography and linkages, 
play an important role. Geographic location is important because it facilitates a close 
relationship and, thus, better control between the parent and foreign affiliate; in some 
cases, executives can visit the foreign affiliate daily.  
Also, linkages seem to be a significant pull factor for services and construction firms. 
Cooperation among companies in the home market is replicated and expanding in the 
host market. Thus, the presence of other Greek public/private companies creates a 
secure business environment for this group which is pulled to the host market. The 
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See e.g. Appendix 16(1): Industry Shrinkage, Industry Shrinkage as a Main Factor for 
Internationalisation, Compensatory Investment Due to Increase of Home Market Industry Competition 
or/ and Company's Home Market Share Reduction which is really high for Construction Industry 
(p.326). 
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firms in both these industries cooperate closely with numerous other Greek firms in 
both these industries  in the host market (services 75%, trade 72.2%). 
It is interesting that these industries are the most profitable among the four analysed. 
Although one is low push driven (services) and the other is high push driven 
(construction), they enjoy the highest investment returns (services 89.7% and 
construction 94.4%). They also do not face problems in the host country, while 
manufacturing and trade face numerous problems. In addition, construction and 
services recognize their superiority over other foreign affiliates in the host market in 
relation to management implementation (services 60.9% and construction 71.4%). 
Finally, as already mentioned
85
, service firms face competition from growth of 
competitors in the home market while construction faces declining demand (industry 
shrinkage). This might explain why both of these industries see very high investment 
opportunities in the host market compared to the home market. 
To summarize, the firms in this group are characterized by both push and pull factors. 
Their most distinctive industry feature in pull factors is the key role of linkages and 
cooperation's with other Greek firms in the foreign market, which translates into 
strong ownership advantages. This results in secure investment returns and a friendly 
business environment, which encourages exploitation of further investment 
opportunities in the host market. This group can be described as creating ownership 
competitive advantages through old home market business relationships and effective 
and successful operations in a new foreign environment and market. 
 
                                                          
85
 See Appendix 16(1) Results Industries, Column Services & Construction section, Increased 
Competitive Pressures (p.326). 
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Table 35: Common Characteristics of Trade & Services Industries 
 
*Note:  Internationalisation here means mode of transaction via exports for manufacturing industry or other 
modalities e.g. turnkey projects for services/construction industries. 
Source: Author based on a survey data verified by the appropriate test (Mann–Whitney U test or 
Pearson's chi-squared test,) for each variable of the industry group Trade & Services.  
 
The differences in this group in their home market company characteristics are 
numerous. However, as already mentioned, here we focus on common industry pair 
features. The main differences are discussed in the section on industry features 
(Section 5.3.1) 
The most important common finding is that market share change in the home market 
is a major driver of the investment decision for half of the pair of industries (51.7 % 
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trade and 52.6 % services firms). This change stems from different sources for each 
industry: for example, 40% of trade firms faced industry shrinkage while services 
industry faced increased competition due to home market firms’ growth (64%).86 
Thus, the trade industry faced increased pressure at home due to declining demand 
while services were under pressure from increased competition.  
Trade and services are not involved in technological innovations, and previous 
internationalisation is in the form of exporting/turnkey projects. Also, both industries 
initially faced adverse host market demand conditions due to low customer 
purchasing power and lack of business information flow. 
The most significant finding for this group is the change in home market share, which 
was a major driver of their FDI. However, this change stemmed from different causes 
for each industry. 
 
 
  
                                                          
86 See Appendix 16 (1) Results Industries verified by Pearson Chi-Square Test (p.326). 
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Table 36: Summarizing the Most Interesting Common Characteristics for the Groups of Industries 
 
*Note:  Internationalisation here means mode of transaction via exports for manufacturing/trade industry or other modalities e.g. turnkey projects for services/construction industries. 
Source: Author based on a survey data verified by the appropriate test (Mann–Whitney U test or Pearson's chi-squared test,) for each variable of each industry group.  
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Table 36 summarizes the most interesting similarities across each of the pairs 
discussed.  
Manufacturing and trade have a combination of push and pull factors; in particular 
adverse home market institutional environment and geographical proximity which 
facilitates close control between parent company and the foreign affiliate. 
Manufacturing and services are large companies and they are the most 
internationalised; they follow the classical subsidiary relationship between parent and 
foreign company. In this pair of companies, there are almost no common push and 
pull factors. In manufacturing and construction, technology advantages are based on 
diversification. Also, both industries faced the push of increased production costs in 
the home market and were motivated by geographical proximity, which facilitated 
further development into other markets.  
Trade and construction firms with up to 250 employees and weak internationalisation 
are spread evenly between the north and south of Greece. Although they do not 
perceive the new foreign environment as insecure, they have established companies 
with no financial or legal links (autonomous) in the foreign market in order to protect 
both parent and affiliate firms. This is probably because they experienced both push 
and pull factors during their internationalisation. More specifically, both faced 
problems due to industry shrinkage, and both see lack of competitive pressure as a 
major motivation for investment in the host market.  
A common characteristic of services and construction industries is that they are not 
involved in export or other types of investment activities as methods of 
internationalisation. They are involved in straightforward FDI; in many cases, e.g. 
telecommunications (services), this seems to be the best route to internationalisation 
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due to national regulations. The construction industry does not favour turnkey projects 
and prefers FDI as a mode of entry to foreign markets where they will have a major 
presence and more opportunities to undertake projects. In the push/pull framework, 
we see that both faced increased competitive pressures although at a low level, and 
they value the business friendly environment due to the presence of other Greek 
companies in the host market, and facilitation of affiliate company's close control, as 
pull factors for their investments. An interesting finding for these industries is the key 
roles of linkages and cooperation in the host market. Finally, both industries have 
experienced high returns on their investment.  
Trade companies have the weakest profile, and services one of the strongest in our 
sample; thus any similarities are interesting. They both view the change in their home 
market share as a serious motivation for investment, but for trade this was due to 
industry shrinkage and for services it was due to market growth. They both face 
adverse host market demand conditions stemming from low customer purchasing 
power.  In terms of pull factors, neither is interested in export development into other 
markets. 
The push and pull framework characterizes all pairings of industries except 
manufacturing and services, and trade and services. The larger and more 
internationalised manufacturing and services groups prefer the classic subsidiary 
relationship between parent and foreign company, while trade and construction, which 
are less internationalised, prefer the new and more protective autonomous 
relationships. In addition, linkages and cooperation with other Greek firms in the host 
market are an advantage and a feature of the services and construction pair. In trade 
and services, change in home market share (shrinkage in one case and growth in the 
other) played an important role in their investment decision. Finally, geographical 
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aspects (referring to close company control) are important for FDI in the 
manufacturing and trade pairing and the services and construction pairing because 
they facilitate daily control by the parent company over the foreign affiliate. 
Table 37: Characteristics Common to Three or More Industries 
 
*Note:  Internationalisation means via exports for manufacturing/trade industries or other modalities 
e.g. turnkey projects for construction /services industries.  Some numbers have been rounded up 
Source: Author based on a survey data verified Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test 
 
The trade, services and construction industries were not internationalised prior to their 
FDI (through export or other investment activities). Companies with previous 
investment links learn more quickly about host markets, establish business 
relationships, create markets and acquire better business knowhow about potential 
FDI markets. In our case, this applies only to the manufacturing industries.  
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Low customer purchasing power (adverse home market demand conditions) is a 
common push factor for the manufacturing, trade and construction industries, 
although it did not affect services firms. This might reflect the changing structure of 
demand in which services plays an increasingly important role. 
The manufacturing, trade and construction industries tend to an extent to adapt their 
products/services to the host market. For example, a good that is produced according 
to specific standards e.g. an ice-cream weighing 500 grams in the home market will 
be produced in the host market, but in a 100 gram weight. The manufacturing, trade 
and construction industries try to be flexible in the host markets to ensure sales; there 
is no need for such changes in the service industry.  
In relation to pull factors, acquisition of market share in the host country is a high 
motive factor for manufacturing, trade and services. The reason it does not apply to 
the construction industry is perhaps because this industry struggles to survive; its 
internationalisation is to compensate for reduction in its home market share. 
Geographical proximity to the host market and its effect on fast raw materials supply 
and services has a positive effect for all industries except services. In addition, low 
labour costs and other factors of production are important for manufacturing, trade 
and construction, but not services.  
The manufacturing, trade and services industries face no institutional problems in the 
host markets which contrasts with the findings in the literature (Estrin and Uvalic, 
2014). The construction industry faces some of these problems due to its involvement 
in government projects such as bridges, roads and other infrastructure. Thus, 
institutional issues, such as political instability and the nationality of the company, 
can affect construction industry. 
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For the manufacturing, services and construction industries, financial and adverse host 
market demand conditions are not a constraint. Only trade firms are affected 
negatively and at a low level. This could be explained by the macroeconomic 
difficulties that initially affect the consumption of products and only later affect other 
industries. Also trade encompasses all types of consumers with the result that poor 
purchasing power could be a problem.  
The risk to the home parent company is a problem only for the construction industry. 
As already mentioned, this industry is the most push driven thus these companies 
likely feel insecure in the home market. Increased trade between parent and host 
companies affects the manufacturing industry because it is an industry feature related 
to tangible products. Manufacturing firms produce in the home or host market and use 
intra-firm trade channels to source their markets. In the case of a manufacturing 
company that establishes a trade company in the host market as an export arm, 
expansion of sales via intra trade or other SEE markets is a significant motive for FDI.   
The other three industries are not aiming at expanded sales in SEE via the foreign 
affiliate, which means that the parent companies have the primary role in these 
investment issues. The manufacturing, services and construction industries are 
considering the possibility of introducing new products and services in the host 
market, which means they are adopting a long term perspective towards the host 
market. 
The trade, services and construction industries do not follow the pattern of 
manufacturing FDI, which involves previous exporting experience to acquire 
knowledge of the host market. These three industries invest directly in the foreign 
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market. The push
87
 and pull framework describes the common characteristics of  
manufacturing, trade and construction industries. Adverse demand conditions in the 
home market are a pressure for these industries, whereas financial motives and 
geographical proximity to these foreign markets is a determinant of investment. 
Geographical proximity enables fast raw materials and services supply between parent 
company and foreign affiliate, which is important in the context of tangible products. 
Table 38: Country-Common Outward FDI Characteristics 
Source: Author based on a survey data 
For a list of the characteristics that were found to be significantly different across industries using 
Pearson parametric test or Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test, see Appendix 16 (pp.326-329) which is 
in four parts 16(1), 16(2), 16(3) and 16(4). 
                                                          
87
 Please, note that push pull factors affect also services industry but in this part of the analysis we 
focus on common ones among industries.  
207 
 
To sum up, the common country OFDI characteristics related to Greek industries 
provide further support for what was discussed in chapter 4 (Country level analysis). 
The most interesting and, simultaneously, surprising characteristic is that all industries 
achieve good returns on investments and recognize good investment opportunities in 
neighbouring countries rather than in more developed countries. 
These industries are aiming at achieving a long-term presence in the host market, and 
are not interested in sell outs or mergers. These industries are profitable, are not 
opportunists and care about company longevity and control in these markets. 
However, they are regional players, because their advantages in these markets cannot 
be successfully replicated in other developed markets. So, their advantages are 
regional rather than global. 
The literature (Estrin and Uvalic, 2014) refers to institutional and political problems 
to explain the low level of FDI in SEE; in our case, institutional and financial 
difficulties, either initially or continuing, are not obstacles to their investments. This 
supports the argument that the ability to manage institutional idiosyncrasies in post-
communist countries can be defined as innovation (Henisz, 2003). 
Incentives, such as foreign company cooperation, company participation in host 
country privatization plans, bilateral agreements among post-communist countries and 
SEE regional business agreement initiatives, do not play a role for OFDI by Greek 
investors. These initiatives do not have even a low level effect on the decision to 
invest in these countries. They are not the primary reason for FDI.  
Although firms’ investments are horizontal, they are interested in supplying products 
from the home to the host market, not vice versa, thus, new products/services to 
supply the parent company or home country are not the reason for investment. This 
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might indicate that production in the host markets would not meet the parent 
company's standards despite costing less. These firms’ FDI are not just cost based; 
they represent a more complex strategy. 
To sum up, the industries analysed are regional players, seeking long term positions in 
the host markets. The paradox is their good returns on investment, lack of institutional 
and financial problems in the host market, and ability to recognize further 
entrepreneurial opportunities, while investors from western markets tend to adopt a 
"wait and see" approach (Karagianni and Labrianidis, 2001). It seems that 
institutional issues in SEE are not the burden for Greek investors that they are for 
other western investors. 
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5.4 Does OLI Vary Across Industries? 
 
In this section we explore industry specific determinants of FDI and whether and how 
the OLI categories and variables vary across industries. In our sample, we have 61 
(40.1%) companies in manufacturing, 42 (27.6%) in services, 31 (20.4%) in trade and 
18 (11.8%) in construction (see Figure 31).  
Figure 31: Parent Industries - 4 Categories in %  
 
Source: Author’s Survey Results (based on 152 companies) 
 
This section is structured as follows: We address OLI advantages in three subsections 
which include separate analyses of advantages that are industry specific, group 
shared, or common. Each OLI advantage is presented in a table that shows the 
variables that are significantly different across the four industries, based on Kruskal –
Wallis test.
88
 The letters in the 9
th
 column (before the last one) of each row indicate 
                                                          
88 Note that in this section the number of variables is smaller than in the previous sections. This is 
because we retained and explain only the variables related to the OLI framework. Additionally to 
Kruskal-Wallis tests, we have run Pearson Chi-Square tests to increase the validity and robustness of 
our results.  
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which of these proxies/variables is used to operationalise the traditional framework 
(O), which represents its expansions (E) and which are new (N). The last column also 
indicates which variables is industry specific (I), are common to two or more 
industries (Group), or are common to all four industries (Common). 
The tables show the percentage of firms in our sample that indicated that they possess 
the respective Ownership, Location and Internalization advantage. We assume that an 
industry has a competitive advantage if approximately half of the companies in the 
industry have the respective advantage.
89
  
 
 
                                                          
89
For practical reasons, the threshold value used is 44%. A level of 50% would result in a very small 
number of advantages.  
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5.4.1 Ownership Advantages in the Four Industries  
 
Table 39. 1: Ownership Advantages in the Four Industries (Separated in Four Parts: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3 and 39.4) 
It covers Ownership Advantages in the Four industries, (Operationalisation, Expansion, New advantages) (Industry, Common and Group 
Characteristics). X indicates either that the variable is not statistically significant, based on non-parametric tests or, in a few cases, that there is 
no variable that describes this category. 
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by non-parametric tests 
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Table 39.2: Ownership Advantages in the Four Industries 
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by non-parametric tests 
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Table 39.3: Ownership Advantages in the Four Industries 
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by non-parametric tests 
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Table 39.4: Ownership Advantages in the Four Industries 
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by non-parametric tests 
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We see first that the manufacturing companies have the greatest number of ownership 
advantages (7), followed by the services (6), construction (5), and trade (3), which 
indicates that manufacturing firms better fit the description proposed by the OLI 
framework. In addition, new ownership advantages fit better with construction and 
services firms. 
Among the 13 significant variables, 9 are from the traditional OLI framework, 1 is 
expansion, and 3 are new.  
Industry Specific Ownership Advantages  
 
In manufacturing (Row 1E), we see that half of the firms have competitive 
technological advantages in the home market. In the construction industry (Row 1 G), 
we see that companies benefit from better knowledge of the host market than local 
and foreign competitors. Also, construction is the only industry with industry specific 
advantage in links (Row 3C) with home market suppliers (Ohl) and which mostly 
cooperate with other Greek companies in the host market. Thus, they exploit linkages 
in the host market, which are important since they reduce uncertainty. They exploit 
linkages and connections in the home market, in order to strengthen their position in 
the host market. For example, they have well-developed networks of contacts in the 
home market and, when deciding to invest in the host market, they use this network to 
facilitate the conduct of business and strengthen their competitive position in the new 
market. This advantage outweighs weaknesses such as low internationalisation levels 
(Row 2iiA). Among all these variables for industry specific ownership advantages, 
which are presented in the last two columns of Tables 39.1-39.4, the results reveal 
only one operationalised (O) for the manufacturing industry (Row 1E) whereas one 
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expansion (E) (Row 1G) and one new variable (N) (Row 3C) applies to construction 
industry. The other two industries do not show any industry specific advantages. 
Group Ownership Advantages 
 
The results reveal six ownership advantages which are 5 operationalisations (O) of 
Dunning's original list and 1 new (N) variable. More specifically, advantages of 
common governance and, especially, those resulting mainly from size (Row 2iB) due 
to parent company M&A activity in the home market, apply to the majority of 
manufacturing, service and construction firms.  
In terms of ownership advantages that arise due to multinationality, which enhances 
operational flexibility by offering greater opportunities for arbitraging, production 
shifting and global sourcing of inputs (Row 2iiA) these are an advantage for 
manufacturing and services. This group of industries has FDI activities in the EU, 
CEE, and underdeveloped markets, which gives them further ownership advantages. 
In the same category of ownership advantages is the advantage from previous 
exporting links with the host market before establishment of the affiliate, and refers to 
the manufacturing and trade group. Moreover, trade, services and construction group 
of industries exploit collectively ownership advantages arising from cooperative links 
among Greek companies operating in the host market (Row 3C).   
Common Ownership Advantages 
 
In relation to common advantages, we see that all the firms are able to compete in the 
home market via product and service differentiation, which implies that they all have 
some ownership advantages in product innovation (Row 1B). This allows them to 
increase the value added of their products, thus, strengthening their competitive 
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advantage. They do not have common governance advantages through M&As in the 
host market (Row 2iB). All the firms present low degree of multinationality in other 
developed markets (except EU) (Row 2iiA). They seem not to have enhanced 
operational flexibility which, as OLI advocates, provides wider opportunities for 
arbitraging, production shifting and sourcing of inputs. This supports the hypothesis 
of the weak competitive position of these industries at the global level. 
5.4.2 Location Advantages in the Four Industries  
 
Table 40 present the results for location advantages (3 parts/pages, 40.1, 40.2, 40.3). 
At the end of each row we present the extent to which the variable is new, traditional 
or an expansion, and the percentages are the number of firms that possess these 
advantages. The final column in Table 40 shows whether the advantages are industry 
specific, common to all industries, or relevant to one group.  
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Table 40.1: Location Advantages in the Four Industries (Separated in Three Parts: 40.1, 40.2 and 40.3) 
 (3 parts/pages): Location Advantages in the 4 Industries, (Operationalisation, Expansion, New advantages) (Industry, Common, Group 
Characteristics). An x in the table means that it was not a statistically significant variable, based on non-parametric Tests, or in a very few cases 
there is no a variable which describes this category. 
 
Note:  Internationalisation here means mode of transaction via exports for manufacturing/ trade industries or other modalities e.g. turnkey projects for services/construction industries. 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by non-parametric tests 
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Table 40.2: Location Advantages in the Four Industries 
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by non-parametric tests 
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Table 40.3: Location Advantages in the Four Industries 
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by non-parametric tests 
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Among the 21 indicators for location advantages (see column Variable name) found 
to be significantly different across the industries, 7 are from the traditional OLI, 10 
are expansions and 4 are new. Two of the indicators are industry specific advantages, 
6 are group advantages and 13 are common advantages. Thus, the OLI is particularly 
weak for explaining the differences in locational advantages across industries. 
Industry Specific Locational Advantages  
 
There are only two industry specific location advantages: both of them are new (N) 
location variables. 
A new location advantage emerges for construction industry: compensatory 
investment for the company's home market share reduction (Row 3A). We also 
identified a new location advantage which is part of Linkages: following 
customers/clients to the host market (Row 3B). This is crucial for the services 
industry and shows firms’ ability to follow their customers from the home market 
which develops further their location advantages. 
Overall, there are new variables for characteristics of the construction and services 
industries, which are new part of the original eclectic paradigm. Also, the OLI 
framework overlooks adverse home market pressures that can shape locational 
(dis)incentives and the advantages that can arise from linkages with home market 
firms in the host market (Row 3A & B). 
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Group Locational Advantages 
 
There are two cost, two institutional related and two new location advantages for our 
industry groups, only one of which is operationalised in the OLI. The other three are 
expansion (E) of the framework and two new (N) location advantages. 
In relation to Dunning’s categories and location advantages, only spatial distribution 
of natural and created resource endowments and markets and more specifically 
export/or other activity opportunities and prospects in neighbourhood markets are an 
advantage for manufacturing, trade and construction (Row 1C). 
To extend the OLI framework, we add prompt raw materials supply and services 
provision from the parent company, which are advantages for the same group 
(manufacturing, trade and construction) of companies (Row 1B). All these cost related 
advantages are explained in part by production of tangible goods compared to 
intangible ones from the services industry.   
The other two expanded OLI categories for group advantages are part of institutional 
related advantages and are in the category of investment incentives and disincentives 
(Row 2C). As already discussed, level of competitiveness is important for these 
industries. Hence, the degree of competition as a location advantage is an issue, and 
the low level of competition in the host market is an advantage for trade and services 
and construction
90
. Demand conditions in the host market and lack of difficulties, 
such as capacity to deal effectively with low customer purchasing power, are 
incentives for manufacturing, services and construction.  
                                                          
90
 Note, that this advantage could be considered a common advantage, for manufacturing the real figure 
is 42.6% which is 1.4% lower than our threshold level of 44%. 
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Finally, there are two new location advantages which can be considered group 
advantages. As already mentioned, we developed a category called home market 
pressures (location disadvantages). In this new OLI category, compensatory 
investment due to increased home market industry competition is an advantage shared 
by the trade and construction firms (Row 3A). This group of industries perceives FDI 
as a form of compensatory investment in the host market. The second advantage is 
linkages with home market firms, which is a source of advantage for services and 
construction (Row 3B). We have discussed the significance of presence of other 
Greek public/private companies in the host market. These new categories affect 
groups of companies and are not part of the OLI framework.  
Note that only one variable from the classical OLI framework is operationalised (O), 
the rest are expansions (E) and new (N) locational advantages. 
Common Locational Industry Advantages 
 
Location advantages include 13 common industry advantages, 6 operationalisations 
(O) of the original Dunning category and 7 expansions (E).  
We start by discussing the variables that are operationalised (O) in the OLI 
framework. Locational advantages from economies of agglomeration and spillovers 
and, particularly, the potential for foreign company cooperation (Row 1D), and issues 
related to lay off regulations based on legal and regulatory systems (Row 2B), are not 
relevant for Greek investors. They also do not consider differences/similarities in 
culture and history are a hindrance to their FDI (Row 2A).  
In the case of investment incentives and disincentives (Row 2C), the OLI category 
includes successfully operationalised variables that describe demand conditions, 
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especially the opportunity for market growth and the opportunity to gain market share. 
Finally, all firms do not consider the opportunity for asset acquisition as a location 
advantage. 
In relation to the extended OLI for the investment incentives and disincentives (Row 2 
C) category and, particularly, favourable trade agreements and SEE regional business 
agreements are unimportant for all of them. None of our industries is hindered by 
institutional issues (corruption) or/and financial disincentives (Row 2 C). In addition, 
all of them possess the capacity to deal effectively with insecure business 
environment.  
The most important finding is that in this category there is the highest number of 
operationalised variables from the original Dunning locational categories. Although 
there are no new location variables that apply to all our industries, there are seven 
expansions which reveal further common industry characteristics. 
 
5.4.3 Internalization Advantages in the Four Industries  
 
Table 41 present the results for internalization advantages. At the end of each row we 
present which variable is new, traditional (operationalisations) or an expansion, and 
the percentages are the number of firms that possess these advantages. The final 
column in Table 41 shows whether the advantages are industry specific, common to 
all industries, or relevant to one group.  
 
 
225 
 
Table 41: Internalization Advantages in the Four Industries 
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by non-parametric tests 
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Industry Specific Internalization Advantages 
 
Internalization advantages that arise from previous investment relationships with the 
host country apply only to manufacturing (Row 1A) and are due to the industry’s 
"tangible nature". In other words, they are an advantage for this industry because they 
allow learning from the market and avoid search and negotiating costs before their 
FDI, which is a high cost activity. They have internalized the market by going on to 
invest after exporting to the host country. 
Group Internalization Advantages 
 
Another operationalisation of Dunning's categories involves the avoidance of moral 
hazard and adverse selection costs, and protecting the reputation of the internalizing 
firm (Row 1B), which applies to the manufacturing and trade industries. They see FDI 
as an investment that will provide them with the appropriate investment security, 
control and quality over their product/services. So why do the other two industries not 
value security control and quality as highly? In the case of services, the primary 
reason for FDI is direct customer contact, while for construction industry the reasons 
are not specified.91  
Another interesting result for internalization advantages is the new advantage (Row 1) 
which emerges for the case of autonomous companies. As already explained, 
autonomous companies are a new type of FDI where the parent company, due to 
negative home market conditions or due to uncertainty in the host market, proceeds to 
an FDI, but with no financial or legal links between the parent company and the 
                                                          
91 See Appendix 16 (2) Results Industries verified by parametric and non-parametric tests (p.327) 
 
 
227 
 
foreign affiliate, which protects both companies. This new type of internalization 
advantage is enjoyed mainly by the trade and construction industries. 
Common Internalization Advantages 
 
There is one common internalization advantage that arises from the desire to control 
supplies and conditions of sale of inputs (Row 1L). We operationalise Dunning's 
advantage by asking about foreign affiliate merger type with the parent company 
(vertical forward, backward, horizontal and diversified). Our results show that all 
industries have engaged in horizontal integration which allows them to increase the 
scale of their production and lower their production costs. However, in the Greek 
case, it should be noted that the home market share has been declining, so increasing 
sales in the host market does not necessarily imply increased scale of production, but 
rather an attempt to maintain it at the same level, by compensating for lost share in the 
home market. 
5.5 Summary Findings for OLI Across Industries 
 
Overall, the empirical findings show that the traditional OLI cannot be used 
interchangeably to describe the behaviour of all industries. Rather, we have 
demonstrated that there are industry specific advantages, advantages common to all 
industries, and advantages for selected groups. We have demonstrated also that there 
is a need for operationalisation, expansion and addition of new sub-categories to the 
original OLI framework.  
If we scrutinize the findings in more detail, in relation to ownership advantages, we 
see that 13 variables (industry, group common advantages) are significant for 
industries; of these, 9 are from the traditional OLI framework, 1 is an expansion, and 
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3 are new. Across the four industries, we see that manufacturing companies have the 
greatest number of ownership advantages (7), followed by the services (6), 
construction (5), and finally trade (3), which indicates that manufacturing firms show 
a better fit with the description proposed by the OLI framework. The new ownership 
advantages fit the trade, construction and services industries better. 
In relation to locational advantages, we see that among the 21 indicators found to be 
significantly different across the industries, 7 are from the traditional OLI, 10 are 
expansions and 4 are new. In addition, 2 are industry specific advantages, 6 group 
advantages and 13 are common advantages. Therefore, we can say that the OLI shows 
weaknesses in relation to explaining the differences across industries for location 
advantages. 
In relation to internalization, we found one operationalisation variable that was 
significant for each grouping, i.e., one at the industry level, one for a pair of 
industries, and 1 that is common to all four industries. The new internalization 
advantage which refers to autonomous companies is a group advantage. This means 
that this significant outcome covers features of more than one industry not included in 
traditional OLI. However, this part of OLI is relatively underdeveloped and shows 
that these factors are not strong determinants of OFDI.  
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5.6 Explaining Industry Differences Using the Amended OLI and 
the Push and Pull Framework 
 
In this section we organize the OLI framework variables that are statistically 
significant into the push and pull framework
92
. This is based on the empirical novelty 
of Greek OFDI, which shows that OFDI is not only an expression of ownership 
advantages. We argue that Greek OFDI is also pushed abroad by stronger competitive 
pressure at home. This means that Greece differs from emerging market MNCs 
(China, India, etc.), which, though lacking strong ownership advantages and receive 
high IFDI, are pulled by opportunities to compensate for lacking types of ownership 
advantages by going abroad. We do not see these compensatory mechanisms in 
operation in the case of Greek outward investors. 
To try to get a clearer picture of the impact and significance of each of the push and 
pull factors, we run a logistic regression model.
93
 We created a four-level categorical 
variable, with each level representing a given industry. The ideal model is a 
multinomial regression; however, our sample does not allow multinomial regression 
analysis, because of the small number of construction firms. We decided to construct 
a new category that combines manufacturing and trade, primarily because of overlaps 
between the manufacturing and trade industries discussed in the previous sections.     
Trade companies can be considered export arms of the manufacturing industry; e.g., 
companies that produce building materials, pharmaceutical products or agricultural 
products such as fertilizers in the Greek market, use the host market as a distribution 
channel for their products. We group construction and services together because of 
                                                          
92
 We ran logistic regressions using OLI variables. However, the results are neither meaningful nor 
significant compared to those using the push pull variables reported. Please, see appendices 18 up to 
18.3 (p.331-334) for the logistic regression results with dependent variable Industry and OLI variables. 
93
 See Appendix 19 for Correlation Matrix of the Model Greek OFDI in Industry Level (p. 335) 
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their similarities. We group construction and services together because of their 
similarities.  Although the key feature of the construction industry is generation of 
physical assets its economic ‘product’ is de facto a service, i.e. construction services, 
which like other services are non-tradable. The construction industry assembles the 
good produced by other economic sectors and, therefore, is categorized as a ‘service’ 
industry.
94
 Note that, according to the North American Industry Classification System 
of the US Census Bureau (Fernández-Solís, 2009) the construction industry belongs is 
categorized as a service sector. Also, the World Trade Organization (2015) includes 
construction and other  engineering services in its services database. 
We conduct a new operationalisation of the data by creating a dependent binary 
variable: industry type which is coded as follows: 
 if industry type=0, then the company belongs to the manufacturing or trade 
industry; 
 if industry type=1, then the company belongs to the services or 
construction industry. 
We created a logit model to explain whether specific push and pull factors are 
significant for explaining the firm’s industry membership. If the results are significant 
they point to industry differences in the determinants of FDI. 
The results of our model are illustrated in Table 42. 
 
 
                                                          
94
 See, Ofori, G. (1990, p.21). The Construction Industry: Aspects of Its Economics and Management, 
Singapore University Press, for a further discussion, 
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Table 42: Logistic Regressions - Industry  
 
Source: Author's Survey, 
Table 42 presents the results for three different specifications of our theoretical 
model. Across all specifications, we see that there are push and pull factors that might 
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explain whether the company is from the manufacturing/trade or services/construction 
industries. Overall, the above models are all significant based on the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test, and the various other specification tests we conducted. There are no 
major differences in the results of our models, which points to the robustness of our 
findings. 
The most efficient model is model (C) since it has the smallest number of variables 
for a given level of observations, and the largest log likelihood, and also does not 
reject the null hypothesis of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (see Table 42, p-value greater 
than 0.05). We observe that, although the number of independent variables decreases 
significantly across the models, there is no major reduction in either the Cox & Snell 
or the Nagelkerke R squared, which indicates that the variables dropped were 
statistically insignificant. 
Starting with push factors, we see that increased production costs in the home market, 
and adverse demand conditions and institutional environment, are significant in our 
analysis. In particular, as fixed costs increase in the home market, the probability that 
the investor is in the manufacturing or trade industries increases. Therefore, we see 
that increases in costs influence manufacturing and trade companies more than 
services and construction firms. The same interpretation applies to credit time 
payment; investors in the manufacturing and trade industries face significantly bigger 
problems related to credit time payment in the home market, which pushes them to 
invest in a foreign market. Finally, de-industrialization in the home market affects this 
group of industries, so an increase in de-industrialization in the home market pushes 
manufacturing and trade industries to invest in the host market, more than the services 
and construction group.  
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In terms of pull factors, we observe that geographical proximity, linkages, asset 
acquisition and the various financial motives provided by the host market are all 
significant for explaining industry differences.  
As geographical proximity increases, so does the probability that the firm belongs to 
the manufacturing or trade sector. This can be explained by the fact that prompt 
delivery of raw materials and support trade services from the home market company 
are crucial for business. The typical strategy of Greek investors from these industries 
is to minimize inventory costs by maintaining low stocks of their products in the 
subsidiary in the host market, and then, based on demand fluctuations, to supply the 
required materials. In order to achieve this in the most cost effective way, investors 
aim to locate the subsidiary as close as possible to the parent firm. The nature of their 
business shows that this factor is more important for manufacturing and trade 
companies. 
In terms of linkages, we see that the presence of Greek companies in the host market 
increases the probability that the company belongs to the services or construction 
sector. This is explained by linkages that are more easily exploited by services and 
construction firms, due to the nature of their business. For example, many Greek 
banks ask their software system providers to support them in the host market - 
generally for software security reasons. Also, many legal and construction companies 
are driven abroad by the presence of other Greek public/private companies in the host 
market and their linkages in the home market. 
Also, linkages are not generally a motive for manufacturing and trade firms, but are 
considered an average motive for the services and construction industries.  
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Bilateral agreements refer to particular legislation implemented in FYROM and the 
other ex-Yugoslav countries in order to keep the tariffs at a low level of around 1%-
3%. This is a particularly strong incentive for manufacturing and trade companies, 
because they can maximize the benefits from these agreements.  
Lastly, asset acquisitions are important for manufacturing and trade firms and 
particularly manufacturing companies that aim primarily at acquiring factories in the 
host countries. For example, in interview, a Greek firm owner explained that he 
wanted to invest in these companies in order to acquire their high tech and relatively 
new machinery at lower than the market price in other more developed areas. 
For the control variables, we see that the younger the company, the more likely it will 
be in the services or construction industry.  
Overall, push and pull framework operates efficiently to classify industry 
membership. Industry specific push factors include cost pressures, deindustrialization, 
and liquidity problems. Pull factors include presence of Greek companies in the host 
market, fast raw materials provision from the parent company, bilateral agreements 
with post-communist neighbours, and asset acquisition investment.  
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to understand whether the OLI operates differently in the 
context of "forced internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home 
market conditions). The main conceptual contribution we make is to consider that 
firms that decide to internationalise do not necessarily have strong ownership 
advantages. While this argument is in line with the literature on emerging market 
MNCs (Mathews 2002; 2006b) the novelty of our approach is that Greek outward 
investors are not pulled only by opportunities abroad to develop their ownership 
advantages, they are also pushed abroad and do not necessarily significantly improve 
their ownership advantages. In these respects, Greek outward investments are 
examples of "forced internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home 
market conditions) rather than examples of opportunity driven internationalisation, as 
demonstrated in the case of emerging market MNCs. 
This chapter explored industry differences and the industry relevance of the OLI 
framework. Our aim was to understand if the OLI varies across industries. To achieve 
this, we operationalised the original OLI framework with specific variables. We 
enriched the traditional framework through the inclusion of new categories and 
additional variables for the conceptual categories proposed by Dunning. This was 
done to obtain a better proxy in the specific context of Greek OFDI. The new 
variables were not envisaged in Dunning’s original OLI framework. Our new 
variables and categories mostly relate to ownership and location advantages. We 
should mention that in our pilot study many internalization advantages could not be 
applied to Greek OFDI. Hence, we incorporate new internalization advantage which 
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refers to subsidiary or autonomous relationship between parent and host company is a 
significant outcome.   
Our operationalisation was driven by the need to undertake empirical research within 
the OLI conceptual framework. However, faced with the generic and abstract nature 
of the OLI categories this was not a straightforward task. We had to operationalise 
Dunning’s categories and expand them by proposing new variables and new sub-types 
of ownership advantages (categories). In particular, in O categories, property/ 
intangible advantages, governance advantages and institutional advantages, we 
created 23 new sub-categories (it includes 13 expanded variables and 8 new 
variables).  
In relation to new categories, we added the category of market knowledge. While the 
traditional view of ownership advantages is largely confined to supply side factors, 
we consider knowledge of local markets as an important element, especially in the 
case of "forced internationalisation"(i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market 
conditions), an important new sub-category of ownership advantages. We added links 
(linkages) with home market suppliers as a new sub-category of ownership 
advantages which is largely overlooked in the OLI. Links with home country 
suppliers are not simple synergies and, thus, are not part of governance advantages. 
In terms of locational advantages, we created two categories: costs and institutions. 
Within costs, we operationalised and expanded Dunning's list. For institutions, we 
added several indicators,  to try to capture the rules of the game, which can generate 
cost differences. As new location categories, we added home market pressures; this 
proxy tries to capture the significance of the competition in the home market that 
pushes the company to invest abroad. We also added a location specific factor - the 
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potential to create linkages with other Greek companies in the host market. A country 
with a sizeable presence of Greek companies can be perceived as offering locational 
advantage due to potential spillovers among Greek investors.  
Lastly, internalization advantages are much less differentiated and include 12 stand-
alone categories. In this case, we operationalised Dunning’s variables and added one 
new variable which emerged from the pilot study, which showed that most of the 
internalization variables did not apply to the Greek context.  
The next step is to test which of these operationalisations, expansions and novelties 
are empirically proven by the data. To achieve this, we conducted a statistical analysis 
for each industry in order to understand which OLI factors are main to them. We 
examined which factors are common to more than one industry and to all four 
industries (i.e. at country level). Overall, we found that the OLI varies significantly 
across the four industries, and across all pairs of industries; therefore, it can be argued 
that it is an "eclectic" framework since parts of it can be used selectively to explain 
various differences. 
After identifying the variability in the Operationalisation of the OLI, we applied a 
logistic regression with the OLI variables. However, the results were neither 
meaningful nor significant.  Thus we use our proposed framework to understand the 
FDI behaviour of firms in different industries. We created two groups of industries 
which are quite similar - manufacturing and trade, and construction and services. Our 
results show that both push and pull factors are significant for explaining the FDI 
behaviour of these industries, and provides further evidence of "forced 
internationalisation"(i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market conditions). 
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Chapter 6: Greek OFDI Examined at Firm Level  
 
FDI is considered a crucial element of economic growth and has been well 
researched. Currently, there are conventional theories explaining international 
production, and one key theoretical framework. These are new trade theories (Dixit 
and Stiglitz 1977, Krugman 1979, Ethier 1982, Helpman 1984, Krugman 1985, 
Krugman 1991, Dunning 1995, Krugman 1995, Markusen 1995, Markusen and 
Venables 1998, Ietto-Gillies 2000, 2007, 2012, 2014), the market power approach 
based on Hymer (1976); the product life cycle theory developed by Vernon (1966; 
1979); internalization or transaction cost theory derived from Coase (1937); the 
internationalisation process model based on Penrose (1995) and developed by the 
Uppsala School (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 
1990; 2009); the investment development path proposed and developed by Dunning 
and Narula (1996); and the eclectic paradigm or OLI framework proposed by 
Dunning (1979; 1980; 1988; 1995; 2000; 2001), which encompasses the main 
theoretical contributions.  
The breadth of the OLI framework means it has undergone many revisions and 
extensions, one of which was proposed by Mathews (2002; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c) and 
labelled the LLL, and accounts for how emerging market MNCs are able to 
compensate for missing advantages. In both the OLI and LLL frameworks, FDI is 
perceived as an expression of the competitive power of the investing firm. However, 
neither of these work well in situations where investors go abroad without having 
advantages, or situations described as "forced internationalisation"(i.e. OFDI affected 
also by negative home market conditions). This applies to Greek FDI in the Balkans, 
 
239 
 
where Greek firms had "pervasive disadvantages" according to the advantages 
described in the literature. 
In an attempt to improve the OLI framework, in Chapter 4 we provided a country 
level (i.e. investors investing in Bulgaria and investors in FYROM) analysis and in 
chapter 5 an industry level (i.e. Investors from Manufacturing, Trade, Services and 
Construction industries) analysis of the importance of pull factors and home market 
push factors that force companies to internationalise.  
In this chapter, we explore the operationalisation of the OLI framework in the context 
of "forced internationalisation" (i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home market 
conditions) by differentiating among different types of firms. We propose two firm 
typologies and explore the relevance of push and pull factors, established at the 
aggregate level, for Greek FDI. We hypothesize that aggregate push and pull factors 
may operate differently for different types of firms. Some push and pull factors may 
be general, i.e. valid for all firms, while others may be firm specific and, thus, 
differentiated.  
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6.1 Applying the OLI to Greek FDI 
 
The main framework used to determine the decision to invest abroad is OLI. We 
apply the OLI to the case of Greek FDI in the SEE region to identify the main 
ownership, location and internalization advantages accruing to Greek investors that 
decide to invest in Bulgaria and FYROM. 
Our survey includes a specific set of questions to identify firms’ OLI advantages. The 
list of questions and their relation to OLI advantages is provided in Appendices 20-25. 
Table 43 summarizes firms’ OLI advantages based on the survey.
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Table 43: Summary of the OLI Advantages Based on Our Survey
95
  
Note:  Internationalisation means via exports for manufacturing/trade industries or other modalities e.g. turnkey projects for construction /services industries.   
Source: Authors Survey Results (based on 152 companies)             
  
 
                                                          
95
 A complete list of the sub-questions used to construct the table is provided in Appendix 21-23 (pp.338-340). An analytical example of proxy "management competencies" 
is provided in Appendix 24 (p.341) and an analytical example of proxy "geographical proximity" is provided in Appendix 25 (p.342).  
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Ownership Advantages 
Table 43 column 1
96
 lists the potential ownership advantages of the companies in the 
home and host markets. We observe that roughly 76% of the companies in our sample 
declare that having some kind of ownership advantage emanating from their 
management competencies. To proxy for management competencies, we asked 
questions about the firm’s day to day operations (11 questions for 1 proxy, related to 
initial and current problems).
97
 We asked firm managers whether they experienced 
initial difficulties in acquiring local market knowledge on establishing a company in 
the host market, and if they currently faced problems. Four possible scenarios were 
identified: 
1. A negative response to both questions indicated the presence of ownership 
advantages. 
2. Indication of initial problems which resolved later on suggests the presence of 
ownership advantages.  
3. If they had no problems when they entered, but experienced problems in the host 
market, they had no ownership advantage.  
4. A positive response to both questions indicates the absence of ownership 
advantages. 
The second most frequently cited ownership advantage is internationalisation, which 
refers to exporting or other investment activities (e.g. for services industry, turnkey 
                                                          
96
 For a full list of the variables used to construct ownership advantages, see Appendix 21 (p.338) 
97
See Appendix 24 (p.341) for the 11 questions used to construct the proxy for management 
competencies in Table 43.  
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projects) prior to the initial FDI. In our sample, 61% had previous experience, thus, 
we assume that they have some ownership advantages. 
With the exception of exports, we assume that the extent of ownership advantages 
varies according to foreign affiliate establishment (FDI) and especially the host 
country; a company with FDI activities in an EU15 country (i.e. developed and 
competitive market) should have stronger advantages than one that invests in a SEE 
country. We asked in which countries they have investment experience, and found 
that only 28% had invested in a developed market, and roughly 43% had investments 
in CEE and SEE markets. We found no other categories of ownership advantages that 
were shared by a significantly large number of the firms in our sample.  
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Location Advantages  
Based on the OLI framework, the second major groups of advantages are related to 
location (Table 43).
98
 Almost all of our companies (97%) perceived entrepreneurial 
opportunities in the host market compared with the home market. Moreover, host 
market incentive advantages (68%), were related to a large customer base, potential 
for market growth or expectation of potential returns on their investment.  
In addition, these firms declare capacity to deal effectively with problems in the host 
market (e.g. financial/political, institutional, human capital lack & infrastructure, 
other more general problems and risk issues) 
The next most frequently cited location advantage was geographical proximity (50%). 
To capture this, we included classic factors, such as similar culture and outlook as in 
the home market, and others such as ability to have a daily physical presence in the 
host market allowing better control over the new investment, and presence of other 
Greek companies in the host market which facilitates the creation of a familiar 
environment.
99
 
 
Internalization Advantages 
Among internalization advantages (Table 43),
100
 a first group of variables examines 
the company’s mode of entry. We found that most companies enter the market via 
greenfield (70%), i.e. they establish an entirely new company in the host market. Only 
34% of the sample had previous trade relationships (imports or/and exports) with the 
                                                          
98
 See Appendix 22 (p.339) for a full list of the variables used to construct location advantages.  
99
 See Appendix 25 (p.342) for the questions used to construct the geographic indicator. 
100
See Appendix 23 (p.340) for a full list of the variables used to construct internalization advantages. 
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host market before their outward FDI. Both these findings contradict the theories 
elaborated in Chapter 2.  
The third group of questions aimed at understanding what causes the firm to enter a 
host market through FDI rather than franchising or licensing. Most firm managers 
replied that the main motivation was to increase their control over the company, 
improve the quality of the product, and increase the security of their investment 
(39%).  
In terms of prior M&A activity, we observed that more than half of the parent 
companies had some previous experience of M&As (66%), which implies that they 
had some knowledge of the process and, thus, some potential internalization 
advantages. 
Also, 83% of Greek parent companies are horizontally integrated with the foreign 
affiliate, which is advantageous for selling their products in the new markets, but 
disadvantageous for creating value added in the production process.  
Overall, we can conclude that the Greek companies that invest in FYROM and 
Bulgaria had no superior ownership advantages when they decided to invest in the 
market, and did so simply because they perceived some entrepreneurial opportunities 
in these countries compared to the home market, which pulled them to invest there. 
This, combined with pressures in the home market, suggests that these companies 
were "forced to internationalise". 
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6.2 A New Typology of Firms: Crisis, Healthy, Lead, Satellite 
 
Based on our statistical results, we demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence of the 
weakness of OLI to explain the ''forced internationalisation'' (i.e. OFDI affected also 
by negative home market conditions) of Greek FDI activities in FYROM and 
Bulgaria. Before rejecting the OLI framework, we repeat the analysis based on a new 
typology of firms
101
; by testing the relevance of OLI for different types of companies 
we hope to demonstrate its limited relevance for explaining the determinants of Greek 
FDI. Following the pilot study, we observed significant differences in the 
entrepreneurial behaviours of the various investors. Some were leaders in the Greek 
market others were Greek outward investors that had problems in the home market. 
We observed that some companies invested in FYROM/Bulgaria simply because they 
wanted to follow their primary customers. To capture some of these differences we 
propose a new typology of firms: Crisis vs. Healthy, and Lead vs. Satellite. 
Before testing the OLI framework with these new classifications, we need to 
understand the characteristics of these types of companies. To maximize efficiency, 
reliability and replicability in our analysis we adopted the following method:  
1. We conducted Mann-Whitney or Pearson Chi-square tests on the responses to all 
the questions in the survey (almost 500), to check for statistical differences 
between the responses of the two groups of companies.
102
 
                                                          
101 Additionally to our current methodology we have run factor analysis for our sample. The results 
from factor analysis are inconclusive (please see appendix 26 pp.343-365).  However, this increased 
the validity and robustness of our employed methodology.  
 
102
For a full list of Crisis vs. Healthy, and Lead vs. Satellite descriptive results verified by Mann 
Whitney, or Pearson chi square tests, see Appendix 27(1), 27(2), 27(3), 27(4) (pp.366-369). 
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2. The statistical differences identified were distributed across the following 
categories: 
a. Parent company characteristics and behaviour in the home market 
(including problems in the home market, and internationalisation 
experience);  
b. Foreign affiliate characteristics and behaviour in the host market 
(which includes FDI motives, problems and prospects in the host 
country). 
3. To complement the analysis and provide a better understanding of each new 
typology, we conducted a small case study of one company from each new 
firm type (a crisis, a healthy, a lead and a satellite company), that 
encompassed most of the different characteristics identified.   
6.3 Crisis vs. Healthy Investors 
 
Crisis investors are companies that invested in FYROM or/and Bulgaria in order to 
compensate
103
 for losses in the home market. To identify them, we asked the 
following questions:
104
 
Which of the following factors were the main incentives for your investment? 
 A ''market counter-balance/off-set'' investment due to increased competition in 
the home market;  
                                                          
103
 By "market counter-balance investment" (or "market compensation investment") we mean the 
company’s investment in the host market in order to make up (to compensate) for home market losses.  
 
104
 To increase the validity of our classification, we asked companies if they also faced increasing 
pressure in the home market since 2004, such as industry shrinkage or/and competition, and if these 
pressures were the main reason for investing in new markets.         
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 A ''market counter-balance/off-set'' investment due to the reduction in home 
market share. 
 
A positive answer to both questions indicated a crisis firm, since the investment was 
driven primarily by the need to survive. The remaining firms are regarded as healthy, 
since there is no indication that these companies faced a crisis in the home market 
which means FDI was their strategic option. This resulted in 75 (49.34%) of 
companies classified as Crisis and 77 (50.66%) categorized as Healthy.  
Characteristics of Crisis Investors 
Parent Company Characteristics (Crisis Investors) and Behaviour in the Home 
Market 105 
These companies come from all four industries (Manufacturing, Trade, Services and 
Construction) with very small presence in the Greek stock market. Almost equally 
invest in FYROM and in Bulgaria.  
Most crisis companies faced increased competition
106
 in the home market, mainly 
from Greek counterparts (75%).
107
 They are mostly not worried by foreign 
competition (35%) in the Greek market.
108
 This might be due to the market segments 
in which crisis companies operate, which involve low profit margin products which 
are of little interest to foreign competitors. To cope with the competition, crisis 
                                                          
105For list of the descriptive data discussed in this section and verified by Mann Whitney and Pearson’s 
chi-square tests see appendix 27 (1) column Crisis Investors (p.366). 
106 (Which is a factor for their internationalisation 79%) and they see their FDI as a compensatory 
investment from this adverse home market conditions, see appendix 27 (1) column Crisis Investors 
(p.366). 
107
 See, Appendix 27 (1) (p.366) Crisis ''Behaviour in the Home Market Column Crisis Investors''. 
108
 See, Appendix 27 (1) (p.366) Crisis ''Behaviour in the Home Market Column Crisis Investors''. 
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companies tend to lower the prices of their products (or services) (45%).
109
 They face 
pressures from high wage costs, credit payment time 
110
 and poor customer purchasing 
power in the home market.
111
 The deindustrialization of the Greek economy is not a 
pressure for these crisis companies.
112
It may be that for individual companies the 
effects of deindustrialization are long-term and structural rather than a short-term 
market phenomenon.  
Looking at their internationalisation experience, we can see that the vast majority of 
crisis investors do not have any significant experience in internationalisation except in 
exporting  55.7%
113
.  
Foreign Affiliate Characteristics (Crisis Investors) and their Behaviour in the Host 
Market114   
The companies in our sample invest mostly in trade in the host market. The main 
factors that attract crisis companies to the host market are weak competition in the 
host market, large customer base, and potential for high market growth of 
products/services. They are motivated also by geographical proximity, which 
facilitates tight control and close contact between the home and the host company. 
Geographical proximity allows investors to have a continuous physical presence 
before and after the FDI. It facilitates learning about market processes in the host 
market, especially if companies have no experience of foreign investment. The 
                                                          
109
 See Appendix 27 (1) (p.366) Crisis ''Behaviour in the Home Market'' Column Crisis Investors. 
110
 By credit payment time we mean the time from sale of the product/service to receipt of payment. 
The standard time in Greece is 60-90 days; anything over 100 days is considered problematic.  
111
 See Appendix 27(1) (p.366) Crisis ''Behaviour in the Home Market'' Column Crisis Investors. 
112
 See Appendix 27(1) (p.366) Crisis ''Behaviour in the Home Market ''Column Crisis Investors. 
113
 *Exports for manufacturing and trade industries or *other modalities e.g. turnkey projects for 
services and construction industries. See Appendix 27 (1) (p.366) Crisis ''Behaviour in the Home 
Market'' Column Crisis Investors.  
114
For a full list of the descriptive data discussed in this section and verified by Mann Whitney and 
Pearson’s chi-square tests see Appendix 27 (2) (p.367) ''Behaviour in the Host Market'' Column Crisis 
Investors. 
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interviewees made it clear that the struggle to survive in the Greek market, in a rather 
unstable financial environment, had equipped them with the abilities to manage 
institutional idiosyncrasies in foreign markets effectively. So despite having no 
internationalisation experience, experience ''under pressure'' conditions at home had 
led to the accumulation of entrepreneurial business capabilities which were a major 
incentive for investment. 
Another characteristic of crisis investors is the autonomy given to the foreign affiliate. 
The conventional view suggests that companies establish affiliates in host markets and 
have ownership rights, but that real control varies depending on the degree of 
autonomy given to the subsidiary. However, our research shows that half the crisis 
companies were autonomous entities over which they had absolute management 
control, but no formal legal and financial rights. This allows the entrepreneur to 
protect both the parent and foreign affiliate from financial and legal risks, so that a 
business failure of either (parent or affiliate firm) leaves the other unaffected. 
In relation to problems in the host market, the only issue reported (as an initial 
problem related to their investment) was untrustworthy business partners. A few 
(24%) cited problems related to lack of business information and difficulty to make 
accurate business plan forecasts.
115
 They do not see adverse institutional, supply or 
demand home market conditions (initially or currently) as problems for efficient 
company operation. Thus, we can say that crisis investors do not face any major 
problems in their host market operations. 
                                                          
115
See Appendix 27 (3) (p.368) Crisis ''Behaviour in the Host Market ''Column Crisis Investors. 
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Although crisis investors are pushed to invest in a foreign market, this does not 
necessarily imply failure in the host market. The data
116
 show that most of these 
investors were on track in relation to their investment plans, and enjoyed positive 
returns  and prospects on their investments; they detected more investment 
opportunities in the host than in the home market and envisaged continuing business 
success in the host market. Thus, despite being forced to internationalise, crisis 
investors have successfully exploited this opportunity.  
A Typical Crisis Investor 
The company was founded in Southern Greece pre-1950, and is involved in the 
manufacturing industry and, particularly, production of mechanical parts for industry. 
It is 100% Greek owned, and has experience of M&A. In terms of its international 
market focus, the company has been exporting to SEE, the Arab area, and some EU 
countries. Since 2001, the company has been investing abroad, focusing exclusively 
on SEE, particularly Bulgaria, Romania and Albania.  
In the home market, the company has been facing increased competition from newly 
established Greek companies, and imports of cheaper Chinese products. The newly 
established companies engage in price competition by charging prices below costs, 
which brings down the prices in the market. Profit margins become even more 
squeezed, which creates more market distortion since profits do not necessarily reflect 
real costs and profitability. 
The company cannot compete on costs or prices, only on product and service 
differentiation. Thus, it invests in R&D, but still faces unstable home market 
conditions.  
                                                          
116
 See Appendix 27 (4) Crisis (p.369) ''Behaviour in the Host Market'' Column Crisis Investors. 
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The Greek market for manufactured goods has experienced significant shrinkage, 
which has further increased the pressures the company faces. Also, the Greek 
environment is becoming increasingly less favourable for firms, in particular due to 
the wave of deindustrialization of the Greek economy, and the reduction in domestic 
consumers’ purchasing power. At the same time, the credit payment time between 
customer and producer has increased, which is creating liquidity problems for the 
company, which have spread to its suppliers. As a response to the liquidity problems, 
the company has begun identifying customers based primarily on their ability to meet 
their financial obligations. This has caused a further reduction in the company’s client 
base and constitutes an extra hindrance to its operations. Finally, both operating costs 
and taxes have increased. 
Given all this, in 1998 the company decided that in order to survive it would have to 
expand abroad; it believed that a successful foreign investment might compensate for 
some loss of profit in the Greek market. After 30 months of careful strategic planning, 
it took a low risk approach and invested in Bulgaria.  
It sees Bulgaria as the ideal destination since it has prior trade relations, and the 
region where the factory is located has a relevant knowledge base. The firm was 
attracted by the large customer base, low level of competition and market growth 
potential. It considers Bulgaria a business friendly environment, since it is able to 
cooperate with other Greek companies there.  
It decided on greenfield investment rather than licensing or franchising, in order to 
have better quality and control over its investment, and avoid problems related to 
opportunism. The new subsidiary is vertically integrated backward, and the new 
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factory produces some mechanical parts that were not previously produced in Greece, 
but are used by the Greek plant to produce the mechanical systems.  
However, the investment was not without problems. There were problems with the 
banking sector, the grey market, and customs. Over time, these problems have been 
displaced by others related to the labour laws, and poor customer repayment. 
Bureaucracy and the poor customer purchasing power have been on-going problems. 
Nevertheless, the new subsidiary has been more profitable than expected with very 
positive business forecasts. However, the Bulgarian market has become more 
competitive, but this is not a sufficient problem for the firm to exit the market, and the 
investment is considered a longer term one. The company’s executives feel that this 
investment has improved their management competencies and further strengthened 
the firm’s competitive advantages, in both the home and host markets.  
Characteristics of Healthy Investors 
Parent Company Characteristics (Healthy Investors) and Behaviour in the Home 
Market117  
Healthy investors are mostly involved in manufacturing (51.9%) and services 
(33.8%). Most of the companies employ large numbers and half are listed on the 
Athens stock exchange. Most are based in the South of Greece (Athens) (76.6%), 
which is more industrial and more developed economically. The companies in this 
more developed home market area prefer to invest in other developed and competitive 
areas, such as Bulgaria (81.8%), rather than FYROM. 
More than half of the companies face competition due to an increase in the number of 
Greek or/and foreign competitors in the home market. In terms of the home market 
                                                          
117
For all these percentages, see Appendix 27 (1) (p.366) Column Healthy Investors.  
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environment, most of these enterprises are dominant players, with R&D departments, 
M&A experienced and increasing market share (68.9%).  
Healthy companies have wide internationalisation experience; they operate 
subsidiaries in Central East Europe (CEE), and nearly half also have foreign affiliates 
in the EU, and in underdeveloped markets. Their internationalisation experience is 
evident in their export activities, which involved the EU and/or other developed and 
underdeveloped markets prior to their first foreign affiliate establishment.  
Foreign Affiliate Characteristics and Behaviour in the Host Market118   
The main incentive for Healthy investors to invest in the host market is the potential 
for market growth of their products. Weak competition in the host market is less of an 
incentive than for Crisis firms, which might be attributable to the fact that this group 
has already internationalised in other more competitive markets such as the EU and 
CEE. Unlike Crisis investors they are not squeezed in local market and, thus, strong 
competition is not a major driver, but is primarily a market opportunity.  
Healthy companies prefer the typical subsidiary relationship (which means legal and 
financial links with the parent company) between the home and host market 
companies. They do not experience major problems in the host market.  
A Typical Healthy Investor 
The company belongs to the service industry, was founded in Athens and employs 
around 400. It is exclusively Greek owned, and has some M&A experience, 
particularly acquisitions. It has its own R&D department which acquires, creates and 
differentiates its own technology.  
                                                          
118
For all these percentages, see Appendix 27 (2) (p.367) Column Healthy Investors. 
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In the home market, it faces increased competitive pressures from new Greek firms 
and foreign firms. It is also worried by high taxes.  
In response to competition, the company aims to differentiate its products rather than 
engage in price competition, since it believes it possess competitive advantage in 
provision of high quality services.  
The main reason for internationalisation is that the company perceives its local market 
to be saturated, and sees no scope for expansion in Greece. This differs from crisis 
investors which feel the market to be squeezed rather than saturated.  
After 1992, the company embarked on an internationalisation process aimed primarily 
at the CEE and SEE countries. The company was active in Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, 
Albania, Kosovo, FYROM, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, Moldova, and 
Ukraine. In terms of its EU market, it is present only in Cyprus and is not allowed to 
enter other Western markets according to a regional agreement with its suppliers. 
In 1992, after six months of intensive research, and using exclusively Greek capital, it 
established its first subsidiary in Bulgaria. This company was the parent company’s 
first internationalisation attempt. The mode of entry was through greenfield 
investment, primarily because it wanted good control over the services provided. 
The affiliated company employs around 60 people, and is horizontally integrated with 
the parent company. Instead of selling a limited range of products and services, the 
subsidiary provides the full range of the parent company’s output. It has a typical 
subsidiary relationship with the parent company. Initially, the products were supplied 
by the Greek parent company; however, over time, the subsidiary changed its 
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suppliers and moved towards emerging markets. In terms of company performance, 
the company has remained profitable, and continues to reinvest in the host market.  
The choice of the Bulgarian market was driven primarily by the host market’s growth, 
and an attempt to establish barriers to entry for potential future competitors. Another 
important motive was the regional agreements between the company and suppliers 
with respect to potential expansion to some markets. The choice of Bulgaria was 
driven also by geographical proximity to the home market which facilitates learning, 
and by Bulgaria’s low cost labour supply.  
The company’s entry to the host market was accompanied by various problems 
including lack of infrastructure, bureaucracy, frequent changes to investment law, 
political unwillingness to solve investor problems, currency instability, crime, lack of 
specialized human capital, and high investment risk compared to the other SEE 
countries. Most of these problems except finding high quality labour have been 
resolved.  
The company is facing increased competition in the home market from both foreign 
and other Greek companies; as a response to these pressures it is trying to exploit its 
leadership status. In order to be successful in the market, it believes that key factors 
are management and technological competences.  
It faces low capital risks and the overall the business environment has stabilized. 
Were the subsidiary to collapse, this would have little impact on the parent company. 
In terms of prospects, there is no possibility of moving the company’s headquarters to 
Bulgaria, and the company is expecting to increase its profitability and potentially 
make the subsidiary even more profitable than the home market company. Both the 
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headquarters and the subsidiary are considering expansion into other countries in the 
area. Finally, the company’s commitment to the Bulgarian market is demonstrated by 
the fact that it wants to invest in the development of human capital and infrastructure, 
especially an R&D department and new products and services. 
Testing the OLI for Healthy and Crisis investors 
Before rejecting the OLI framework, we examine whether there are differences 
between crisis and healthy companies in terms of OLI advantages based on  Pearson’s  
chi-square tests Table 44 summarizes the results.
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Table 44: Crisis and Healthy Investors in the Context of OLI   
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by parametric tests
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We ran chi-square tests to understand whether there are statistical differences between 
crisis and healthy investors. Table 44 presents only the results for those factors where 
significance tests differ between the two types of investors. Overall, we found no 
major differences between crisis and healthy investors in terms of OLI advantages, 
since among the 122 variables tested only 20 were found to be significantly different. 
As expected, healthy investors tend to have better ownership advantages than crisis 
firms, with the exception of particular variables which we also discuss below and 
which, in our view, explain the essence of the story.  
The ownership advantage that was more developed for crisis investors compared to 
healthy firms was cost advantage in the home market. In other words, crisis investors 
are better at cutting costs than healthy firms, which indicates that these companies 
base their competitive advantage on low cost rather than product differentiation. 
In relation to management competencies, 61% of crisis investors had the capacity to 
deal effectively with issues such as lower productivity in the host market compared to 
their home market company. A similar percentage of healthy firms (76%) did not face 
such problems. Similarly, 72% of crisis and 88% of healthy investors faced no 
problems with business information flow in the host market; In addition, had the 
capacity to deal effectively with quality and productivity issues in the foreign affiliate.  
(in case of a company acquirement) 80% of crisis and 94% of the healthy. 
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In relation to location advantages,  the first groups of variables of interest are those 
that define the groups, i.e. the sources of the compensatory investment. We see that 
more crisis investors than healthy ones are driven to these markets because they face 
difficulties in the home market. The difference is dramatic in terms of reduction in 
home market share, where we see that almost no healthy firms regarded that as an 
incentive to invest in FYROM and Bulgaria. However, we would point out that this 
negative home market pressures which operates as L-advantage/motivation is our 
expansion of the OLI framework to better capture the behaviour of these firms in the 
context of "forced internationalisation"(i.e. OFDI affected also by negative home 
market conditions).   In addition, we find that crisis investors need to have better 
control over their affiliate companies. Executives argued that the closer the host 
market to the home market, the more likely FDI will be successful. We hypothesized 
that companies would prefer to invest closer to the home location to enable better 
control of the foreign affiliate  due to easier commuting. What we observe is that 
crisis companies are more interested in this location advantage, most likely because of 
their lack of internationalisation experience. 
Another interesting result for location advantages is that crisis investors tend to have 
better business know-how on the host market compared to healthy investors. The 
interviews show that healthy companies were not keen to enter a chaotic business 
environment, which they saw as less than optimal. In contrast, crisis investors who are 
driven primarily by the need to survive, have no choice but to expand into such 
markets; therefore, they develop the necessary know-how and they manage the time 
consuming institutional idiosyncrasies of the host market, which allows them to 
survive there. 
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We see also that neither healthy investors nor crisis firms face financial or political 
problems in the host market. In relation to negative location advantages, crisis 
investors are affected more than healthy ones. Also, more healthy investors have the 
capacity to deal with risk factors in the host business environment. 
It seems that more healthy investors are internalizing their advantages in the home 
market via M&As, compared to crisis firms. 
We observe that crisis investors are "forced to internationalise" and possess weaker 
conventional ownership advantages, such as internationalisation advantages, than 
their healthy counterparts. They compensate for these problems through close day–to-
day contact between the parent company and the affiliate, which, in combination with 
their survival in the home market, makes them keener to be successful in the host 
environment and manage its idiosyncrasies. Finally, it could be argued that crisis 
investors, despite their weak performance in the home market, still make profits in the 
host market and have prospects for further expansion in other transition countries e.g. 
CEEs
119
. 
Although OLI is not able fully to explain the behaviour of Greek investors, we 
decided to employ a logistic regression to analyse the new typology of firms and their 
OLI determinants. The results were not significant
120
. 
So, in order to compensate for the OLI’s weakness in explaining the behaviour of 
Greek investors, we decided to test the push-pull framework developed also in 
previous chapters. The rationale of this framework is that the FDI decision can be 
                                                          
119
 See Appendix 27 (1) (p.366) & 27 (4) (p.369) Crisis ''Behaviour in the Home Market'' Column 
Crisis Investors. 
120
 See Appendix 28 Logistic Regression Model, New Typologies of Firms: Healthy Vs. Crisis and the 
use of OLI variables (pp.370-373).  
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explained by integrating in the analysis the problems the company faces in the home 
market which push it to internationalise (push factors) and the favourable host market 
conditions that attract the company to that particular market (pull factors). 
To test our framework we ran a logistic regression of the determinants of FDI, where 
the dependent variable is 0 for healthy and 1 for crisis investors. We test whether the 
determinants of FDI differ significantly between healthy and crisis investors. 
The results of the various model specifications are presented in Table 45. 
Table 45
121
: Logistic Regression Crisis Vs. Healthy Investors 
 
Source: Author based on a survey 
                                                          
121
 See Appendix 29 (p.374) Correlation Matrix of the Model Variables Crisis Vs. Healthy (Greek 
OFDI in a Firm Level Analysis). 
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The three alternative models of the push/pull factors are presented in Table 45. For 
each model, we include also the results of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test. In all of the 
models, the p-value of the significance test is higher than 0.05, which implies that all 
three specifications are valid. We see also that, although the number of independent 
variables decreases significantly across the models, there is no major reduction in 
either the Cox and Snell or Nagelkerke R squared, which indicates that the dropped 
variables were statistically insignificant. The best model in terms of efficiency is 
model C, which has the smallest number of variables for a given level of observations 
and the largest log likelihood. Lastly, in all the specifications we use robust standard 
errors to account for the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
The main finding from the above model is that both push and pull factors are useful 
determinants of the probability of our company being crisis or healthy. In particular, 
we find that the more severe the demand conditions in the home market, the more 
likely the company will be a crisis investor. More specifically, as the 
deindustrialization process increases, so does the probability of being a crisis investor. 
Both of these results confirm the previous analysis on the importance of push factors 
as key determinants of the behaviour of crisis investors. Another important factor for 
explaining the behaviour of this typology is input costs; the higher the input costs the 
higher the probability that the company is in crisis. This is in line with our initial 
suggestions that crisis investors are primarily driven by cost considerations.  
Among pull factors, we see that positive demand conditions in the host market are 
more likely to attract crisis than healthy investors. In particular, when we asked 
executives whether the market growth of the parent company’s products/services was 
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a motive for the investment, those who answered highly motivated were more often 
crisis investors. 
Lastly, among the control variables we see industry type and country of investment 
are all important for determining type of investor. Firstly, healthy investors tend to be 
active in manufacturing and trade. Similar to our previous findings, healthy investors 
tend to be more active in Bulgaria. Overall, the results confirm the relevance of the 
distinction between healthy and crisis investors which are driven by different 
determinants to go abroad. Finally, it seems that crisis investors which have stronger 
push factors than healthy ones are escape investors, while the latter type of firms are 
more expansion investors.  
6.4 Satellites vs. Lead Investors 
 
The pilot study showed that many Greek enterprises based in Bulgaria and FYROM, 
invited home business collaborators to follow and support them in these new markets. 
In interviews, ''follower firms'' tended to argue that their business partners pushed 
them to invest into these markets. Examples of such partnerships are:  
 Entrepreneurs inviting legal or advertising consultants; 
 Telecommunication companies inviting hardware and software support system 
companies;  
 Greek bankers inviting automation companies to support their banking 
systems or courier companies to support their internal mail systems.  
 
A similar concept is proposed in the literature by Resmini (2000, p.671) "their 
presence in foreign markets is not the consequence of an independent choice, but the 
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result of a follow-the-customer strategy". Also, O'Farrell Wood et al. (1998, p.46) 
argue that: ''Evidence that some firms were pulled abroad by clients internationalising 
offers some support for network approaches". Therefore, we propose a new 
classification of satellite and lead companies based on the responses to the following 
question: 
Which of the following factors were the main incentives to your investment? 
 Following your Home Market Customers in the Host Market122 
Satellites are companies that said that following their home market customers to the 
host market was a large or high incentive for investing in FYROM or Bulgaria. The 
remaining investors are classified as lead companies because they are pioneer 
investors in the host market not followers. This result in 26 satellites and 126 lead 
companies. Of course, not all lead companies were followed by satellite companies. 
However, we classify them as lead companies since they are neither followers nor 
satellites.  
Characteristics of Satellite Investors 
123
 
Satellites belong mainly to the services industry (42.3%), and most were established 
after 1970. The majority originates from Southern Greece and is rarely listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange market.  
                                                          
122
Possible Answers: 1=No incentive, 2=Low incentive, 3=Moderate incentive, 4=Great incentive,      
5= The highest incentive. 
123
For percentages, see Appendix 27 (1) (p.366) ''General Company Characteristics'', Column Satellite 
Investors. 
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Parent Company Characteristics and Behaviour in the Home Market124  
More than half of the companies have been involved in takeovers, but have faced 
increased competition from newly established Greek firms. Also, they perceive that 
the quality of competing products has increased, which puts pressure on their 
performance. 
Foreign Affiliate Characteristics and Behaviour in the Host Market125   
Their decision to invest was based primarily on the information provided by their 
business partners (85%). The strongest motive for investment was the presence of 
other Greek companies in the host market, and the potential for growth in the host 
market. Most of these companies used greenfield entry to the host market (92.3%). 
Almost none of satellite companies (4%) used loans for their start up investment. 
Unlike lead investors, satellite firms believe that they possess various competitive 
advantages in the host market with regard to their foreign competitors. In particular, 
they think that they have better business know-how, high skilled personnel with the 
ability to create and adapt new technologies/products/services, and better management 
competences.
126
 Satellite companies cooperate mainly with other Greek enterprises in 
the host market.
127
 Also, although satellite investors were pulled by their business 
partners, they consider expansion to other markets a strategic opportunity to expand, 
building on their extensive business contacts and networks with the rest of SEE.
128
 
Lastly, they believe that the host company’s main competence factors in a transition 
                                                          
124
For percentages,  see  Appendix  27(1)  (p.366) ''Behaviour in the Home Market'', Column Satellite. 
125
For percentages,  see  Appendix  27(2)  (p.367) ''Behaviour in the Host Market'', Column Satellite. 
126
For percentages, see Appendix 27(3) (p.368) ''Competitive Advantages in the Host Market over 
Foreign'', Column Satellite. 
127
For percentages, see Appendix 27 (4) (p.369) ''Cooperation'': Column Satellite. 
128
For percentages, see Appendix 27 (4) (p.369) ''Prospects'': Column Satellite. 
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economy are management and technology expertise.
129
 Like other groups, satellites do 
not face major problems when operating in the host market.
130
  
A Typical Satellite Company 
The company was founded in 1991 in Southern Greece, and employs around 35 
people. It is wholly Greek owned, and belongs to the services sector. It specializes in 
telecommunications. It is not listed on the Greek Stock Exchange. It has some 
experience of joint venturing. It has an in house R&D department, and is focused on 
developing its skills. 
In the home market, it faced increased levels of competition primarily from new 
Greek enterprises. Larger firms were expanding rapidly, increasing the pressures on 
the company. In response, it engaged in price competition, attempting to minimize its 
labour costs and diversify its products.  
The high levels of competition led to decreased market share, which was the 
motivation for seeking new markets in foreign countries. At the same time, its lead 
customers were starting to expand internationally, and were asking for the company’s 
support in these foreign markets. As the volume of business abroad started increasing 
the satellite company realized that it would be better to follow its lead customers 
abroad and to establish a new company in a foreign market. Thus, it decided to 
engage in FDI activity. 
Its first internationalisation experience was in 2000, when the company expanded to 
SEE. The choice of markets was primarily driven by its lead customers whom were 
operating in these markets. Because of this, it devoted very few resources to 
                                                          
129
For percentages, see Appendix 27 (4) (p.369) ''Management Competences'': Column Satellite. 
130
See Appendix 27 (3) (p.368), ''Problems in the Host Country Initial & Present''. 
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researching the market (less than 3 months) and faced generally much lower 
establishment costs relative to other companies which were not pulled by customers.  
In 2003, the satellite company established a subsidiary in FYROM, a market in which 
it had no previous experience. However, FYROM had some attractive features, 
including the presence of other public enterprises, low levels of competition and 
ability to create barriers to entry that would prevent potential future entry by 
competitors.  
It decided on greenfield investment, primarily to avoid any appropriation of its 
technologies. The affiliate employs around 30 people and is focused mainly on 
construction and support for telecommunication projects. The company works only 
with Greek suppliers, and follows and invests in the same market as the leader.  
In general, the company faces no major problems in FYROM and has met its initial 
return targets. However, interviewees complained about problems related to finding 
skilled labour in the local market, the bureaucracy and the political environment. It 
referred also to competition in the host market from other Greek companies operating 
in FYROM. 
It seems that the satellite firm was pulled by following its lead customers. However, 
this was not the only driver of its FDI; due to its strong presence in the host market, it 
felt able to expand to new markets, particularly transition markets. 
Characteristics of Lead Investors 
These companies are mainly in the manufacturing industry (45.2%) and almost half 
are listed on the Athens stock exchange (40.8%).131 
                                                          
131
For Percentages, see Appendix 27(1) (p.366) ''Behaviour in the Home Market'' Column Lead. 
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Parent Company Characteristics and Behaviour in the Home Market132  
They have been very active in takeovers, and are facing increased competition from 
newly established Greek firms. 
Foreign Affiliate Characteristics and Behaviour in the Host Market 133   
Lead companies, mainly in manufacturing, invest in trade (41.3%), and view these 
foreign affiliates’ as export arms. Most of these companies were established via 
greenfield investment (65.1%).134  
Lead companies invest mainly in these markets because they believe in the potential 
for continuous market growth expansion and a large customer base. Lead companies 
also invest in the host market in order to expand their market share. Moreover, the 
low cost of labour and other factors of production seem to be an incentive for these 
enterprises to invest in the host market. 
Lead investors view potential advantages in the geographical proximity of these 
markets. In particular, they believe that by investing in a nearby country they will 
have a better understanding of the local market conditions, which they can convert 
into business know-how. These firms believe also that geographical proximity 
facilitates control by the parent of the foreign affiliate.  
The majority of these investors 135  do not believe that they have a competitive 
advantage over foreign host market investors in product/service adaptability, know-
how, management competencies and skilled personnel. They do not believe they have 
                                                          
132
For Percentages, see Appendix 27 (1) (p.366) ''Behaviour in the Home Market'' Column Lead. 
133
For Percentages and Likert scale results, please, see Appendix 27 (2) (p.367), ''Behaviour in the Host 
Market'' Column Lead. 
134
For Percentages, see Appendix 27 (4) (p.369), ''Cooperation'', and Column Lead. 
135
For percentages, see Appendix 27 (3) (p.368)''Competitive Advantage in the Host Market Over 
Foreign'', Column Lead.  
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competitive advantage in ability to create new technologies, products and services in 
the host market. 
In general lead investors have faced no major obstacles to their operations in the host 
market except low customer purchasing power. Satellite investors do not face this 
problem because they have their own customers and established relationships whereas 
lead investors have to forge new customer relationships in the host market. 
A Typical Lead Investor 
The company was founded in Southern Greece before 1950, and is in the telecoms 
sector. It is listed on the Athens Stock Exchange, is 100% Greek owned and has solid 
experience of M&As. It is prestigious in the Greek market and enjoys a large market 
share. Like satellite investors, it has an in house R&D department, acquires 
technology which it then modifies, and focuses on developing high margin knowledge 
intensive products. It was facing increased competition from new Greek and foreign 
enterprises, mostly on prices. The lead firm responded by cutting costs and 
differentiating its product, but still faces an unstable market and a continuing trend of 
reduced market share.  
As a result of these pressures in the home market, the company decided to invest 
abroad. Its investment activities include various projects in SEE countries and 
emerging CEE markets. It sees these markets as favourable and offering growth 
potential, large customer bases, and almost no competition. These relatively 
unsaturated markets are considered an opportunity to exploit first mover advantages 
and establish some barriers to entry. 
In 2001, it established a subsidiary in FYROM through greenfield investment in order 
to avoid loss of proprietary technology. After some delay due to licensing issues, the 
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company became operational in 2003, and quickly met its profit targets. The small 
geographic distance between Greece and FYROM facilitated transfer of technology 
and business know-how between the companies and also, at that time, tax conditions 
in FYROM were favourable. 
Although the company was soon making a profit, it experienced problems with its 
operations related in particular to bureaucracy, poor purchasing power of customers, 
and delays in payments from customers. Nevertheless, the company aims at a lengthy 
presence in the market, and plans to expand to other SEE markets based on 
confidence in their growth potential.  
Testing the OLI for Lead and Satellites 
We next examine whether there are major differences in OLI advantages between lead 
and satellite investors. Table 46 presents the number of companies in each category of 
OLI advantages, based on Pearson’s chi-square and Mann Whitney tests.136  
Table 46: Lead and Satellite Investors in the Context of OLI 
 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by parametric tests   
                                                          
136
 14 out of 122 variables verified by parametric tests.  
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Starting with ownership advantages, we see that for satellites, cooperating with Greek 
companies in the host market is of vital importance. Lead investors also cooperate 
with some Greek companies in the host market, but almost none (5.7%) cooperates 
mainly with Greek companies in the host market. This finding supports our lead and 
satellite classifications, showing that satellites, which we define as firms following 
their business partners, also mainly cooperate with Greek companies in the host 
market. This behaviour is likely due to satellites’ lack of other ownership advantages. 
For satellites to invest, it is crucial that the host market is a familiar environment in 
order that they can replicate and exploit their already established linkages.  
In terms of location advantages, our argument about the importance of familiarity of 
the environment for satellite investors is further supported; 80% of them consider the 
presence of other Greek companies in the host market as an incentive to invest in the 
country. We see that low cost labour in the host market and the potential for close 
foreign affiliate control is more important for lead investors, than for satellites. This 
can be explained by the fact that lead companies are interested in exploring new 
markets, while satellites, which are followers, aim to support their home market 
customers through their expansion. The entrepreneurs in the satellite category 
explained that, the "costs" of not supporting their customers also in the host market 
creates more problems for their long-run market share in the home market e.g. 
eventually, some other company will be able to support lead companies in both 
markets. In relation to other location advantages, we observe that, as expected, 
satellites have better business contacts than lead firms in the host market, since their 
primary way of creating competitive advantage is through linkages, and networking 
activities. The last location advantage for 100% of satellites and just 6.3% of lead 
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investors is following the parent company’s customers, which again confirms our 
lead-satellite taxonomy.  
For internalization advantages, we see that almost all the satellite companies enter the 
market through greenfield investment. 
This comparative statistical analysis shows that the OLI has limited power to explain 
the behaviour of companies classified in this way
137
. We next test our proposed 
framework of push and pull factors in the context of lead and satellite investors 
through logistic regression where the dependent variable is 0 if the company is a lead 
firm and 1 if it is a satellite. The results are presented in Table 47. 
 
 
  
                                                          
137
 Likewise in previous chapters, in order to proceed further our analysis, we test this new firm 
typology with OLI variables although the results are inconclusive. Please see appendix 30 (pp.375-378) 
for discussion.   
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Table 47:
138
 Logistic Regression Lead Vs. Satellite Investors 
 
Source: Author's Survey 
We estimated two different model specifications for push/pull factors. In each 
specification, we included the results of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test. In all of the 
models, the p-value of significance is higher than 0.05, which implies that all  
specifications are valid. Also, although the number of independent variables decreases 
significantly across the models, there is no major reduction in both the Cox and Snell 
or the Nagelkerke R squared, which indicates that the variables dropped are 
statistically insignificant. The best model in terms of efficiency is model B, which has 
the smallest number of variables for a given level of observations, and the largest log 
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 See Appendix 31 (p.379) Correlation Matrix of the Model Variables Satellite Vs. Lead investors 
(Greek OFDI in a Firm Level Analysis). 
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likelihood. Lastly, all the specifications use robust standard errors to account for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Our results show that there are no push factors that explain the behaviour of this 
group. This finding is as expected since the satellites are defined as being pulled not 
pushed. The model aims at showing which pull factors explain the behaviour of 
satellites rather than testing whether the push/pull model works.  
Among pull factors, linkages are important, and have a positive impact on the 
probability of being a satellite investor. In other words, the greater the importance for 
these firms of Greek companies, the greater the probability of being a satellite 
investor, as confirmed by the previous analysis. We found also that financial 
incentives provided by the host market in the form of low cost labour are more 
important for lead than for satellite investors.  
Two controls are significant: company age, and location of the parent company. We 
see that older companies are more likely to be lead investors because they have had 
more time to develop competitive advantage. For headquarters location, we see that 
companies from the South of Greece are more likely to be lead companies, perhaps 
reflecting the superiority of Southern firms generally and the weaker capabilities of 
satellite companies. However, the fact that only pull factors determine both groups 
suggests that these investments are not escape investments.  
  
 
276 
 
6.5 OLI in the Context of Push – Pull Approach 
 
Starting from our initial categorization of OLI advantages for Greek investors, we 
concluded that they had no major ownership advantages other than management 
competencies and some advantages related to internationalisation. Also, we observed 
that they seem to have no technology advantages and some new negative ownership 
advantages. However, this changes when we examine the OLI framework in the 
context of our new typology. Tables 48 and 49 summarize the results for the OLI 
using the new typology.  
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Table 48: Crisis and Healthy Investors in the Context of OLI – Differences 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by parametric tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
278 
 
Table 49: Lead and Satellite Investors in the Context of OLI – Differences 
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by parametric tests 
Starting with the similarities across the new typology of investors we see that the only 
common advantage is geographical proximity. This implies that all investors are keen 
to have a physical presence in the foreign affiliate in order to maintain better control 
over their investments. This is perhaps due to the uncertainty related to such 
investments based on weak formal institutions in the business environment and 
investors’ lack of internationalisation experience.  
In terms of differences, we see that the composition of ownership, location and 
internalization advantages varies across typologies. For satellites, ownership and 
location advantages stem from their links with Greek companies in the host market, 
while for the crisis/healthy firms differences in management competencies 
internationalisation and cost advantages matter most. Another major difference 
between these two categories of investors is that crisis investors have negative home 
market pressures which operate as L-advantage/motivation, which the OLI framework 
cannot explain, but which is explained by the concept of "forced internationalisation".  
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We propose the push-pull framework as a modification to the OLI framework, to examine similarities and differences between these two 
typologies (see Tables 50 and 51). 
Table 50: Push/ Pull Framework to Examine Similarities and Differences between These Two Typologies - Proxies Push 
            
Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by parametric & non-parametric tests 
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Table 51: Push/ Pull Framework to Examine Similarities and Differences between These Two Typologies - Proxies Pull 
 
 Source: Author based on a survey, data verified by parametric & non-parametric tests 
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As far as it concerns push factors (which, by definition are not included in OLI), 
increased competitive pressures deriving from new Greek competitor firms in the 
home market apply to all categories.  Geographical proximity and positive demand 
conditions are important for all types of firms, captured by location advantages in the 
OLI which confirms its empirical validity. We can see that satellite/lead firms are 
primarily pulled to the host market, since they show many more significant proxies 
than crisis/healthy. Also, crisis companies had significant pressures in the home 
market (a lot of push factors), but they also faced numerous pull factors or 
opportunities in the host market.  
Overall, the push-pull framework can be considered an alternative to OLI theory. Pull 
factors extend Dunning’s list of OLI characteristics. Push factors can be understood as 
negative ownership advantages in the context of OLI, which, by definition, are not 
included in that framework. Thus, we would argue that push factors complement the 
LLL framework, which argues that even if firms do not have ownership advantages, 
they might decide to invest abroad in the expectation of being able to exploit linkages 
and learning. We argue that the novelty of our proposed framework is that although 
Greek firms may have limited OLI advantages (pull factors), the decision to invest 
abroad is guided also by negative home market conditions (push factors). 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter set out to explain the diversity of Greek investors in FYROM and 
Bulgaria by applying the OLI framework. The particularity of Greek FDI is "forced 
internationalisation", in which home market pressures push companies to 
internationalise. We found that the OLI framework did not completely explain the 
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behaviour of these firms, which we show have no major ownership, location or 
internalization advantages. In this chapter we proposed a new typology of firms, and 
tested the OLI framework to see if it could accommodate the variety of Greek firms’ 
strategic behaviours. We differentiated among four main groups of Greek investors: 
crisis, healthy, satellite and lead firms. Crisis investors faced survival issues in the 
home market and had to expand to new markets to survive. So we consider that these 
companies were "pushed" to go abroad rather than "pulled" by the new market 
opportunities. Healthy investors are mostly successful in the home market. These 
companies are driven by the opportunities abroad rather than by the need to survive. 
Satellite companies followed their home market customers to other countries abroad, 
while lead firms were keen to expand their activities. OLI theory does not include 
push factors although pull factors are represented by ownership, location and 
internalization advantages. Thus, as Mathews (2006b) highlights, OLI requires some 
modification which we think is accomplished by our proposed typology.  
We shed new light on the determinants of FDI by showing that push factors are 
relevant to all four types of firms. All four types saw increased competition in the 
home market as a major push factor, something that is not considered in Dunning’s 
OLI framework. Also, pull factors were important for all four categories, which 
confirm the relevance of Dunning’s locational advantages. Positive demand 
conditions in the host market, and geographical proximity, are the most relevant 
location advantages factors for all of them.  
The advantage of our typology is that it shows the highly differentiated nature of push 
and pull factors across different types of firms. In particular, we see that push factors 
drive the decision to go abroad in quite different ways for the four types of firms. For 
crisis investors, adverse institutional environment and increased competition in the 
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home market were key to their internationalisation, while healthy investors were not 
"forced to internationalise". Like crisis firms, satellite investors were driven by 
increased competition, but also the desire to follow their home market customers into 
the host market. Lead firms, like healthy investors did not react heavily to major push 
factors to internationalise, but rather wanted to expand in the host market. 
In relation to pull factors, they were more important for crisis investors than healthy 
firms, probably because internationalisation is key to the home company’s survival. 
For satellites, the main pull factors were linkages, while for lead investors they were 
the positive demand conditions and asset acquisition in the host market.  
This research suggests the need of an alternative OFDI framework which uses push 
(negative home market conditions) and pulls factors. Our proposed framework 
considers the highly differentiated nature of firm determinants of FDI which 
Dunning’s OLI and Mathews’ LLL frameworks ignore.  
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Brief Summary of the Research  
 
The thesis explored the dynamics and determinants of Greek OFDI in SEE, especially 
Bulgaria and FYROM. This represents a contribution to research since these 
investments are quite different from developed country investments in less developed 
economies. The "paradox" of Greek FDI is that Greece lacks inward FDI, but is a 
dynamic outward investor in SEE countries. In addition, Greek MNCs do not possess 
strong ownership advantages. They face adverse home market conditions and suffer 
from reduced competitiveness, but are internationalised via FDI activity in 
neighbouring areas where traditional MNCs have been adopting a ''wait and see" 
attitude. Mainstream FDI theories (e.g. OLI which is generally agreed to be the 
theoretical framework that best encapsulates FDI from developed countries) primarily 
interpret FDI patterns in developed or/and less developed economies as 
"expansionary" FDI due to prior possession of robust ownership advantages (e.g. 
innovation). However, as already mentioned this contrasts with the Greek case and 
does not explain the pattern of Greek OFDI.  
We reviewed the similarities between emerging and developed market firms and their 
FDI, and their (in) compatibilities with the Greek case. EM MNCs seek ownership 
advantages globally though they also initially or in parallel spread into neighbouring 
countries. For established MNCs, the possession of ownership advantages is a 
prerequisite for internationalisation, but in the case of emerging MNCs (similar to 
Greek MNEs), ownership advantages are not strong. 
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Although there are important similarities between emerging markets' investment 
patterns and Greek OFDI (e.g. weak ownership advantages, investments in adjacent 
countries), there are differences in the initial economic conditions of the firms and the 
economies. As discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis, the dynamic presence 
of EMs OFDI is accompanied by the receipt of large inward FDIs. Also, investors 
from EM generally export to the foreign markets prior to investing. They tend to 
prefer M&As or joint ventures, which enhance their knowledge of foreign markets, 
improve the competitive advantage through access to foreign technologies and 
knowledge, and reduce "the liability of foreignness". All of these aspects contrast with 
the Greek case: Greece has been losing competitiveness, has low levels of inward 
FDI, and is far from being an export oriented economy with good economic 
performance despite significant OFDI. In addition, Greek investors prefer greenfield 
investments as their mode of entry to a foreign market. In a nutshell, we cannot 
clearly identify Greece within the perspectives of either developed or emerging 
MNCs, which would suggest that Greece's negative home market conditions would 
impede OFDI.   
We considered the conditions of developed countries with well-established MNCs and 
FDI and those of EM MNCs. WEF (2015) points out that: "The current economic 
hierarchy, which places emerging nations at the periphery and developed markets at 
the core of world affairs, no longer accurately (reflects reality) ".
139
 Accordingly, the 
underlying theory which identifies two types of FDI as long-established MNCs, and 
EM MNCs, is inadequate to explain Greek OFDI.  
                                                          
139
 https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/08/why-emerging-markets-is-an-outdated-
definition/?utm_content=buffer110b2&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campai
gn=buffer 
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This thesis proposed a generic framework based on push and pull factors, which was 
tested extensively at country, industry and firm levels. This framework reflects key 
features of the Greek case, but is also relevant more broadly since, from conventional 
perspectives, it resolves the contradictory interpretations of developed and EM FDI. 
Push factors are defined as all those negative pressures in the home market which 
weaken the ownership advantages of firms, and "push" (force) the firm to 
internationalise in order to survive. The strength of these push factors is determined 
by four main groups of influences operating in the home market: adverse demand 
conditions; increased costs of domestic production; adverse institutional environment; 
and increased competition. Pull factors are related to the host market and work by 
"pulling" (attracting) the firm's investment. Here, we distinguished eight categories: 
geographical proximity; financial incentives from the host country government; 
financial incentives from the home country government; linkages with other Greek 
OFDI companies; favourable demand conditions; weaker competitive pressure; 
favourable asset acquisition opportunities; and institutional specificities, all of which 
"pull" the foreign company to invest abroad. The proposed push-pull framework helps 
to explain the OFDI behaviour of firms, industries and countries and encapsulates the 
continuous positive and/or negative home market changes in developed or emerging 
countries. The push-pull framework also indicates when FDI at the country, industry 
or firm level, is expansionary or escapist, that is, whether the push factors lead to 
escape FDI "forced internationalisation", or the pull factors lead to expansionary FDI. 
Greek OFDI provided an excellent case for applying the push-pull framework because 
it integrates interpretations and characteristics of FDI from both developed and 
emerging economies, within a holistic conceptualization of OFDI.  
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At the country level, we find that besides significant pull factors, adverse demand 
conditions represent a significant push factor. More specifically, Greek investors are 
not, as might be expected, pulled to invest in their adjacent countries simply by low 
costs; they are also pushed by shrinking local markets due to low home market 
customer purchasing power. Greek investors also are not driven by traditional OLI 
motives such as lucrative financial opportunities or a desire to acquire assets. Rather, 
they are pulled by the geographical proximity of the host markets, which allow better 
everyday control of the relationship between the parent and the affiliate company. In 
addition, the presence of other Greek public or private companies in the host market 
strengths the linkages between companies and acts as an important pull for 
investments. Finally, institutional specificities, such as Bulgaria’s EU membership, 
create further expectations of growth and are a pull factor. Thus, the concept of push 
and pull, in encapsulating differences and disparities in OFDI factors, provides a 
better framework to explain Greek OFDI. 
At the industry level, we explored the appropriateness of the OLI framework. We 
demonstrated the need for operationalisation and addition of new sub-categories to the 
original OLI framework in order to capture the features of Greek OFDI. We used a 
unique set of data on Greek OFDI in four industries (manufacturing, construction, 
services and trade) and explored the industry specific determinants of FDI and 
whether and how the OLI categories and variables vary across industries. This 
investigation revealed that traditional OLI cannot be used to describe the behaviour of 
all industries. The empirical findings show main, pairs and common industry 
characteristics, industry specific advantages, advantages common to all industries, and 
advantages common to selected groups. We have shown that OLI variables vary 
significantly across the four industries, and across all pairs of industries, and also that 
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new variables not included in the original OLI framework, also matter. The 
application of the push-pull framework further confirmed the importance of such an 
approach. Based on two groups of industries - manufacturing and trade, and 
construction and services - we demonstrated that both push and pull factors are 
important for explaining the OFDI behaviour of these industries. Adverse demand 
conditions, such as de-industrialization in the home market, negative institutional 
environment created by a liquidity crisis (e.g. delayed payments between suppliers 
and customers), and increased fixed costs, constitute push factors for industries. 
Simultaneously, we observe that incentives such as prompt raw materials supply and 
services provision from the parent company, financial motives based on bilateral 
agreements, linkages due to the presence of other Greek public/private companies in 
the host market, and asset acquisition investment opportunities, are significant pull 
factors determining industry differences. 
Finally, this thesis field work revealed the diversity in the entrepreneurial behaviours 
of the various investors. Some were shown to be leaders in the Greek market while 
others had serious problems in the home market. We observed also that some 
companies invested in FYROM/Bulgaria simply because they wanted to follow (or 
were invited by) their home business collaborators, and to support them in these new 
markets. To capture these different entrepreneurial behaviours, we proposed and 
explored two new typologies of firms: Crisis vs. Healthy, and Lead vs. Satellite.
140
 
These represent different strategic dimensions of firm behaviour, which are not 
mutually incompatible. For example, Crisis or Healthy investors may be either Lead 
or Satellite investor and vice versa.  
                                                          
140
 We explored different features of firms' behaviour using factor analysis, with the aim of discovering 
whether there are common underlying patterns which could be used to propose a comprehensive 
taxonomy of firms. However, the analysis did not generate reliable results.  
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Crisis investors faced survival issues in the home market and were pushed (not pulled) 
to go abroad in order to survive; many are successful in these markets. Healthy 
investors are "pulled" by the opportunities abroad rather than being pushed by the 
need to survive. Satellite companies follow, or are invited by their home market 
(Greek) customers to establish in other countries abroad, while lead firms are pioneer 
investors, expanding their activities in the host market. We tested both the relevance 
and the robustness of the OLI and push pull approach for these new firm typologies. 
Overall, the results confirmed and strengthened the distinction between these new 
firm classifications, based on the different incentives to go abroad. The analysis also 
showed that OLI has limited power to explain firms' behaviour, and we showed that 
OFDI firms have no major ownership, location or internalization advantages. Thus, 
we can conclude that the proposed push-pull framework analysis more efficiently 
accounts for the variety in firms’ strategic behaviours.  
7.2 Research Achievements  
 
This research constitutes a major contribution to the literature by proposing an 
alternative and robust framework to explain OFDI in cases which include 
characteristics of "forced internationalisation". The joint push-pull model is capable of 
explaining country, industry and firm OFDI and encapsulating the differences and 
disparities identified in the OFDI literature.  
This research was motivated by the fact that mainstream theories on developed 
countries' FDI and more recent theories on EM FDI, were not a sufficient explanation 
of the dynamics and determinants of Greek OFDI. Thus, based on the "paradox" of 
Greek OFDI to SEE countries, we contribute to the debate in the international 
business literature on the adequacy of existing FDI theories and their explanatory 
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power, versus the need for a new conceptual perspective to explain patterns of OFDI 
similar to those in countries such as Greece. 
Our empirical contribution is based on a large-scale, face-to-face survey of 152 Greek 
OFDI companies in Bulgaria and FYROM. The data collected were used to create a 
comprehensive and unique database. The organization of this database was not 
straightforward. To ensure data reliability, some 450-500 phone calls were made to 
identify Greek companies involved in OFDI in these countries. 
We conducted a pilot study consisting of a 41 page questionnaire. This showed that 
the questionnaire was too complicated and too time consuming, and included 
questions based on the literature, which were not relevant to Greek OFDI companies. 
Following this, we devised a more efficient and robust questionnaire without 
sacrificing either accuracy or completeness of data collection. The revised 
questionnaire consisted of 16 pages and approximately 500 questions and data points 
which were used in the research interviews. The greater precision of this questionnaire 
increased validity in terms of outcomes. Since responding to the still large number of 
questions was perceived as difficult by some interviewees, we used cards showing 
rankings in figures and words. This simple and effortless development proved useful, 
invaluable and productive since it dramatically reduced interview times. Note also 
that, although the owners of the companies were Greeks, the survey was administered 
in areas (regions) which were unfamiliar to the researcher who also did not speak the 
local languages. 
Organizing the interview meetings was also not straightforward. It involved collecting 
appropriate information on the company (much of which was not digitized), and 
travelling to the foreign affiliate which was often in the periphery of the country 
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where little English was spoken. The interviews had to be on time: CEOs' availability 
was tight, and it was important not to lose a case. Administering the research 
questionnaire face to face allowed direct contact with decision makers and a high 
level of rapport with respondents compared to other modes of questioning.  
Our research revealed the different characteristics of different industries. We 
interviewed an extensive sample of enterprises, which allowed inter-case and inter-
industry comparisons and avoidance of biased interpretation of data, limited research 
results and loss of valuable information. The participating firms represented 82.9% in 
Bulgaria and 64.1% in FYROM of the total Greek OFDIs in those countries. This 
would suggest that the findings can be generalized with confidence. We believe that 
the scale of the data collected and their uniqueness goes well beyond a typical PhD 
project. 
The contribution of this research consists of the empirical data and our testing of the 
proposed theoretical model to reveal the push and pull factors that explain the 
behaviour of Greek OFDI enterprises. In addition, the pull factors of OFDI have been 
well researched, but the push factors (negative home market conditions) as a part of a 
pattern of OFDI, have been underexplored in the literature (e.g. neither Dunning’s 
OLI framework nor Mathews LLL framework accounts explicitly for push factors). 
We have proposed the term "forced internationalisation" as underpinning the Greek 
pattern of OFDI. In our view, the most useful classification of OFDI push and pull 
factors is provided in the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2006). Based on this 
classification, we expanded these concepts and tested them empirically within a joint 
push-pull framework. To our knowledge, this research is the most comprehensive 
within this perspective. The variables selected reflect a comprehensive empirical 
treatment of push and pull factors. Following Narula and Guimon’s (2010) 
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recommendation for a deeper understanding of OFDI, we tested and analysed the 
framework at the three levels of country, industry and firm. 
Our framework suggests that stronger push factors indicate escape-type investment, 
while stronger pull factors indicate expansion-type investment. This framework could 
become a tool for policy in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of a 
country’s, and an industry’s and a firm’s OFDI patterns in a continuously changing 
business environment, without limiting the analysis to develop or emerging country 
patterns. This development represents both a theoretical and a policy contribution. 
We incorporated new categories and additional variables into the traditional OLI 
framework by including industry specific factors. Thus, we add important empirical 
comparative evidence on OFDI. To achieve this we operationalised, expanded on and 
added new variables to the OLI framework, and tested them empirically. We 
discussed industry differences and similarities in relation to the OLI framework and to 
the push-pull approach, at the main-industry, pair-industry and common-to-all-
industries levels. Our results show that OLI operates differently across the four 
industries, and across all industry pairs.   
Another conceptual and contextual contribution is that we show that firms taking part 
in the internationalisation process do not necessarily possess such strong ownership 
advantages as developed country firms. Although this argument is supported by the 
literature on EM MNCs, we contribute by showing that Greek firms are not pulled 
only by opportunities and potential in foreign countries to develop and enhance their 
ownership advantages; they are also pushed abroad not necessarily to develop and 
upgrade their ownership advantages. From this perspective, Greek outward investor 
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firms are examples of "forced internationalisation" rather than examples of 
opportunity driven internationalisation as demonstrated in the case of EM MNCs. 
We have also identified new OFDI firm strategic behaviours, which we classified 
according to groups of business entities and specific business characteristics. We 
showed the diversity of new OFDI entrepreneurial behaviours and shed light on the 
determinants of their OFDI in the unique context of "forced internationalisation".  
The push-pull framework is intended to be a generic framework which provides a 
conceptual contribution to the literature by proposing an alternative classification to 
explain OFDI. 
7.3 Limitations 
 
The limitations of this study stem largely from the empirical nature of its research. 
The registry listing of Greek OFDI companies in FYROM and Bulgaria is not the 
responsibility of single institution; the data had to be collected from several sources. 
The researcher visited the Economic and Commercial Consulates of the Greek 
Embassies, the Greek Ministry of Economy and Chambers of Commerce in Athens 
and Thessaloniki, in order to get the essential information. To cross check and enrich 
these data, the researcher visited the Inter-Balkan and Black Sea Entrepreneurial 
Centre (ΔΙ.Π.Ε.Κ) and the Greek International Business Association (SEVE) based in 
Thessaloniki. A new and updated list of 633 registered companies has been created. 
However, this did not identify whether the firm was a FDI or simply "Greek interest" 
(Greek owned company in the host country but with no parent company). Browsing 
the companies' history and profile on their websites was time consuming and many 
websites did not contain the required information, and searching for company email 
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addresses, and contacting the firms was ineffective due to low response rates. The 
only effective contact was direct telephone contact. This often involved more than one 
phone call to the firm; this costly and time consuming exercise involved around 500 
phone calls. Nevertheless, based on the data gathered from multiple sources, our time 
consuming sample represents very good coverage of Greek OFD investors. 
Secondly, the main data for this research are based on subjective responses from 
answers by firms’ CEOs. The weaknesses of subjective answers are well known in 
literature, which is usually in favour of "hard" or "objective" data. On the other hand, 
the nature of this thesis research was such that it was difficult to express the 
conceptual categories in "hard" form. If the hard data were available they would be 
inconclusive proxies of OLI and push-pull categories.  
 
7.4 Issues for Further Research   
 
This demanding empirical study and proposed push-pull framework was aimed at 
filling some important gaps, and throwing light on contextual aspects in the OFDI 
literature on both developed and emerging economies. Our findings reveal 
opportunities and suggestions for future research.   
Replicating this study to examine OFDI from other countries also characterised by 
what we call "forced internationalisation" would provide further verification and 
validation of the present work. Ideally, the analysis should be at the country, industry 
and firm levels to allow greater generalization of OFDI patterns. Also, more 
comprehensive country, industry and firm level case studies would provide further 
development of this research.  
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More work is needed also on push factors and a comparative study specifically 
focused on push-pull factors would provide new theoretical perspectives and allow 
comparison with the Greek case.  
7.5 Policy Implications of our Research 
 
FDI policy is usually framed within the pull perspective and based on increased 
incentives for inward FDI. The rationale for supporting OFDI is less clear, but there is 
an emerging literature on the rationale behind OFDI and OFDI policies (Luo, Xue et 
al. 2010, Rasiah, Gammeltoft et al. 2010, Lu, Liu et al. 2011, Sauvant and Chen 
2014). However, there is an assumption that "going abroad" is a sign of strength not 
weakness in local firms. Hence, OFDI policies largely support expansion and 
acquisition of ownership-specific advantages abroad. However, the push-pull 
framework clearly indicates the inadequacy of this perspective for understanding the 
drivers of OFDI. It is not sufficient just to identify the host market opportunities (pull 
factors); equally important are the factors behind the negative home market conditions 
(push factors). Understanding these negative home market conditions, and reducing or 
removing them would diminish the importance of push factors and increase the 
efficiency of pull factors, policies and hence the competitiveness of OFDI firms.   
A second important policy issue that stems from our research is differentiation among 
outward investors that "go abroad" due to either push or pull factors. This distinction 
helps policy design effectiveness since it cannot be assumed that investors go abroad 
for the same reasons. Ideally, OFDI policies should be firm specific or at least tailored 
to different types of firms. 
Policy should acknowledge the existence of both pull and push factors as well as 
different motivations of firms along the pull-push spectrum. This should more 
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accurately target government policy to its objectives. Rather than just attracting 
inward FDI and supporting pull driven or conventional OFDI, policy should recognize 
that many domestic policy factors and conditions indirectly influence and push firms 
to go abroad. The present research shows that non-OFDI policies are strongly pushing 
Greek OFDI. However, these investments are not sign of strength, but mostly a sign 
of weakness of the domestic policy environment. Thus, this type of OFDI has strong 
limitations in terms of its effects on the Greek economy. 
As already mentioned, strong push factors mean "escape investment" while strong 
pull factors indicate "expansionary" investment. So, policy should have a clear picture 
of which firms or industries are being "pushed" and/or "pulled" into OFDI. This more 
real understanding of the drivers of OFDI could translate into more effective policy 
tools. Thus, the challenge for policy is how to convert weak/escape investments and 
their parent companies through concrete supportive measures, into expansionary 
investments promoting and strengthening firms' ownership advantages.     
This research also shows the importance of domestic conditions, the business 
environment and policies that stimulate value added activities and increased 
competitiveness. These are the preconditions for both pull driven OFDI and also for 
substantially reducing the share of push driven investors and their conversion into 
"pull" investors. Given the importance of OFDI, our research would suggest that 
specific factors operating in the local economy and pushing crisis investors abroad, 
should be one of the focuses of policy. By strengthening and resolving obstacles of 
push investors’ governments could strengthen their international position and regain 
some of the losses in the local (home) market. So, this potential double effect of 
support for push investors would have much stronger spillover effects in the home 
market compared to support only for "pull" OFDI. In depth knowledge of their 
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problems in the home market would enhance their stabilization in the home market 
while strengthening their ownership advantages and competiveness in the home and 
host markets.   
Finally, our research shows that the mandate of the Greek FDI agency should include 
OFDI. Channels of communication between firms and the public sector are currently 
very weak - both at home and abroad. Greece should establish a system of support for 
OFDI as an integral part of its export strategy. Also, many structural reforms and 
policies recently implemented in Greece are having indirect, but strong effects on the 
extent and nature of Greek OFDI. Our research shows that given the specific nature of 
Greek OFDI this system of support should recognize the existence of "push 
investors". 
 
 
. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Greek Parent Industries, Investors in Bulgaria & FYROM (Our 
Sample) 
 
  
Source: Author’s survey (152 firm observations)
299 
 
Appendix 2:  Parent Company Export/Investment Activities Prior FDI, 
Ownership Structure, Mode of Entry, FDI in Order to Re-import 
Products/Services.  
 
Note: This table includes 152 firm observations because we need to observe the overall behaviour of Greek 
outward investors. In other cases which we refer to Country level analysis, we use the working database of 130 
observations excluding the 22 companies which invested in both countries. In that way, we enable robust results.  
Source: Author’s survey (152 firm observations) 
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Appendix 3: Three Waves of Outward FDI 
 
Source : (Gammeltoft 2008, p.10) 
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Appendix 4: Push-Pull Frameworks In Other Contexts 
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Appendix 5: Summary Information on a Sample of Firms 
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51 1974 251-500 Bulgaria 2000 2000 Services
52 1934 251-500 Bulgaria 2005 2005 Manufacturing
53 1950 501-1000 Bulgaria 1990 2001 Manufacturing
54 1841 >1000 BG/FYROM 1947 1996 Services
55 1947 >1000 Bulgaria 1997 1997 Manufacturing
56 1950 501-1000 Bulgaria 1990 2001 Manufacturing
57 1988 251-500 BG/FYROM 2000 2000 Construction 
58 1982 51-250 Bulgaria 1993 1993 Trade
59 1977 251-500 Bulgaria 2003 2003 Manufacturing
60 1968 >1000 Bulgaria 1994 1994 Manufacturing
61 1937 >1000 Bulgaria 1999 Manufacturing
62 1960 51-250 Bulgaria 1994 1994 Trade
63 1988 >1000 Bulgaria 1997 1998 Manufacturing
64 1964 51-250 Bulgaria 1998 1998 Manufacturing
65 1988 251-500 Bulgaria 1992 1992 Services
66 1992 51-250 Bulgaria 2001 2001 Construction 
67 1994 BG/FYROM 2000 2000 Construction 
68 1945 Bulgaria 1995 1995 Trade
69 1952 >1000 Bulgaria 1995 1995 Manufacturing
70 1927 >1000 Bulgaria 1995 1995 Manufacturing
71 1898 251-500 Bulgaria 1911 1999 Manufacturing
72 2000 251-500 Bulgaria 2003 2003 Services
73 1974 501-1000 Bulgaria 2003 2004 Manufacturing
74 1981 Bulgaria 1997 1997 Manufacturing
75 1994 501-1000 Bulgaria 1991 2000 Manufacturing
76 1948 251-500 Bulgaria 1992 1992 Manufacturing
77 1882 51-250 Bulgaria 2002 2002 Trade
78 1927 >1000 Bulgaria 2001 2001 Manufacturing
79 2000 11-50 Bulgaria 2004 2004 Construction 
80 1999 >1000 Bulgaria 2006 2006 Services
81 1993 11-50 Bulgaria 1993 1993 Trade
82 Bulgaria 2006 2006 Services
83 Bulgaria 2006 2006 Trade
84 Bulgaria 2005 2005 Construction 
85 Bulgaria 2006 2006 Services
86 1977 251-500 Bulgaria 2003 2005 Construction 
87 1964 501-1000 Bulgaria 1994 1994 Manufacturing
88 1994 >1000 Bulgaria 2001 2001 Services
89 1981 251-500 Bulgaria 1999 1999 Manufacturing
90 1880 251-500 Bulgaria 2002 2004 Manufacturing
91 1984 51-250 BG/FYROM 1996 1996 Trade
92 1984 51-250 Bulgaria 1992 1992 Construction 
93 1952 >1000 Bulgaria 1995 1995 Manufacturing
94 1977 >1000 BG/FYROM 1991 1995 Manufacturing
95 1958 >1000 Bulgaria 1993 1993 Trade
96 1934 >1000 Bulgaria 1992 1992 Manufacturing
97 1925 51-250 Bulgaria 1998 1998 Manufacturing
98 1986 51-250 Bulgaria 2002 2002 Manufacturing
99 1977 51-250 BG/FYROM 1997 1997 Services
100 1971 >1000 BG/FYROM 1995 1999 Manufacturing
101 1957 251-500 Bulgaria 2005 2005 Trade
102 1985 11-50 Bulgaria 2001 2001 Construction 
103 1962 501-1000 Bulgaria 2003 2003 Trade
104 1986 Bulgaria 1996 2000 Services
105 1989 251-500 Bulgaria 2000 2000 Services
106 1934 >1000 Bulgaria 1992 1992 Manufacturing
107 1934 >1000 Bulgaria 1992 1992 Manufacturing
108 1992 >1000 Bulgaria Services
109 1990 >1000 Bulgaria 1993 1998 Services
110 1949 >1000 Bulgaria 1997 1997 Services
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141Source: Author’s survey (152 firm observations) 
 
Table "Summary Information on a Sample of Firms" includes number of companies, 
parent company's year of establishment (registration), company size, and presence of 
subsidiaries in Bulgaria, FYROM or both. It provides the year of expansion overseas, 
year of first expansion in SEE, and industry sector operation.   
The sectors of operation in manufacturing companies include building materials 
(quarrying and shaping of marble), cement and non-ferrous metals production, mined 
                                                          
141
 The period of interviews for our sample was between 2006 -2008.    
111 1982 11-50 Bulgaria 1993 1993 Trade
112 1970 11-50 Bulgaria 2003 2003 Construction 
113 1937 >1000 Bulgaria 2000 Manufacturing
114 1998 Bulgaria 2004 2004 Services
115 1990 >1000 Bulgaria 1993 1998 Services
116 1969 >1000 Bulgaria 2004 2004 Trade
117 1990 0-10 Bulgaria 2003 2003 Services
118 1994 Bulgaria 2006 2006 Services
119 1996 51-250 Bulgaria 2006 2006 Services
120 1982 Bulgaria 2000 2000 Manufacturing
121 1999 11-50 Bulgaria 2003 2003 Services
122 1902 >1000 Bulgaria 1988 1998 Manufacturing
123 1916 >1000 Bulgaria 1989 1996 Services
124 1982 Bulgaria 1986 1992 Trade
125 2000 51-250 Bulgaria 2004 2005 Services
126 1994 Bulgaria 1999 2001 Services
127 1916 >1000 Bulgaria 1996 1996 Services
128 1975 >1000 Bulgaria 2003 2003 Services
129 1989 51-250 Bulgaria 2000 2000 Services
130 1990 Bulgaria 1990 1999 Trade
131 1952 >1000 Bulgaria 1995 1995 Manufacturing
132 1990 11-50 Bulgaria 1992 1992 Trade
133 1978 501-1000 Bulgaria 1991 1991 Services
134 1990 51-250 Bulgaria 2000 2005 Construction 
135 1935 251-500 Bulgaria 1993 1993 Manufacturing
136 1980 51-250 Bulgaria 2000 2004 Manufacturing
137 1964 251-500 Bulgaria 2006 2006 Services
138 1997 11-50 Bulgaria 2004 2004 Manufacturing
139 1959 >1000 Bulgaria 2001 2001 Construction 
140 1963 51-250 Bulgaria 2001 2001 Services
141 1879 >1000 BG/FYROM 1922 1995 Services
142 1923 251-500 BG/FYROM 1981 1994 Services
143 1960 Bulgaria 1991 1991 Trade
144 1972 51-250 Bulgaria 2005 2005 Trade
145 1922 501-1000 Bulgaria 2005 2005 Trade
146 1980 11-50 Bulgaria 1993 1993 Construction 
147 1960 501-1000 Bulgaria 2001 2001 Manufacturing
148 51-250 Bulgaria 2001 2001 Manufacturing
149 1974 >1000 Bulgaria 1999 2006 Services
150 1969 >1000 BG/FYROM 1991 1991 Manufacturing
151 1841 >1000 BG/FYROM 1947 1996 Services
152 1959 251-500 Bulgaria 1999 2006 Manufacturing
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materials, building insulation materials, chemical products, plastic tubing, copper and 
aluminium products, petroleum products (refining of crude oil), industrial minerals, 
glassworks packaging products, artificial wood products, industrial packaging 
materials, and production of solar energy boilers. 
This industry also includes food products (cereals, biscuits, bread, cooked meat 
products, cacao-chocolates, and sweets), non-alcoholic beverages, dairy milk 
products, frozen food, traditional ready meals, flour, and sectors such as cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals, household products, chemicals and detergents, and agricultural 
chemical products. 
In the second industry (trade) investigated in this research the sample companies 
operate in sectors such as: electrical and electronic equipment, medical supplies and 
equipment, industrial metal products, industrial machines and equipment, aluminium 
profiles, food packaging machines, vehicles (agricultural and industrial), gas systems, 
heating/air-conditioning machines, burners, automotive colours, furniture materials, 
supermarket chains, coffee traders, lubricants, and distributors of agricultural 
fertilizers 
Construction industry companies undertake private and public projects in sectors 
such as general infrastructure, telecom infrastructure, industrial buildings, 
greenhouses, etc. 
The services industry includes: banking, telecommunications (fixed and mobile 
telephony), legal, logistics, aviation, marketing services (communication/advertising), 
media (radio, television) information technology (electronic payments systems, 
software networks), healthcare, courier, real estate, leasing, travel agency, hotel 
management, and consulting engineering services.
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Appendix 6: Investment Opportunities in Host Market Vs. Home Market 
 
 
Source: Author’s survey (152 firm observations) 
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Appendix 7: Business Returns of Greek Investors in Bulgaria and FYROM 
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
 
 
Appendix 8: Parent & Affiliate Industry Type of Investments in Percentages % 
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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Appendix 9: Logistic Regression Using OLI Variables (Model Country) 
The dependent variable Country represents the investor’s decision to invest in 
FYROM or in Bulgaria: if the investment is in Bulgaria, (large market, more 
developed, stronger competition) the dependent variable is 0, and 1 for investment in 
FYROM, (small market, less developed, weak competition). 
OLI Variables Used for Logistic Regression Model Country  
 
Based on Dunning & Lundan (2008) 
In this case, we include the traditional OLI variables and more specifically, "Well-
known Brand Name in the Host Country" (Property Rights and/or Intangible Asset 
Advantages Oa, The Resource, Asset, Structure of the Firm), "Capacity to Use 
Specific Technology and Innovate in the Home Market" (Property Rights and/or 
Intangible Asset Advantages Oa, Innovatory Capacity), "Mergers and Acquisitions of 
the Parent Company" (Advantages of Common Governance, that is, of Organizing Oa 
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with Complementary Assets (Ot), Those Resulting Mainly from Size, Product 
Diversity & Learning Experiences of Enterprise (e.g., Economies of Scope & 
Specialisation), "Company Presence (FDI) in Other Countries" (Advantages of 
Common Governance, that is, of Organising Oa with Complementary Assets (Ot), 
which arise Specifically because of Multinationality, Multinationality Enhances 
Operational Flexibility by Offering Wider Opportunities for Arbitraging, Production 
Shifting & Global Sourcing of Inputs) and for O advantages we include "Investment 
in Order to Establish Barriers of Entry for Future Competitors" (Advantages of 
Common Governance, that is, of Organising Oa with Complementary Assets (Ot), 
Ability to Diversify or Reduce Risks) as ownership advantages. 
For locational advantages, we include in the model "Similarities in Mentality and 
Culture to Home Market" (Locational Advantages Institutional, Cross-Country 
Ideological, Language, Cultural, Business, and Political Differences).  
Also, for internalization Advantages we add "Company’s Mode of Entry in the Host 
Market: Acquisition- Joint Venture – Greenfield" (Internalization Advantages (I), To 
Avoid Search & Negotiating Costs).  
Our control variables are "Company Age", "Company Size", "Year of Entry in the 
Host Market", "Headquarters Base" and "Industry Type".    
As already mentioned in relation to the previous analysis in the thesis, the sample 
includes a total of 152 Greek companies - 102 of which invested in Bulgaria and 50 in 
FYROM including 22 which invested in both Bulgaria and FYROM. To enable 
adequate statistical analysis, we excluded these 22 companies wherever we use the 
variable country (Greek investors in FYROM Vs Greek investors in Bulgaria). 
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Appendix 9.(1): Country Model Correlation Matrix Using OLI Variables 
 
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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The initial results of the model are not significant (see, correlation above, appendix 
9.1). To improve the model, we decided not to drop the OLI variables which were 
used to check the robustness of the traditional OLI variables. Instead, we excluded the 
control variable "Company Size", which shows relatively high correlations with two 
Ownership advantage variables - "Mergers and Acquisitions" of the Parent Company 
(-.540**) and "Company Presence (FDI) in Other Countries" (-.587**). Now, with the 
new Correlation matrix we re-run the model. 
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Appendix 9.(2): Country Model Correlation Matrix Using OLI Variables (*Without Control Variable, Company Size) 
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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Appendix 9.(3): Logistic Regression Country Model Using OLI Variables  
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
However, the performance of both the models we tested (a, b) remains the same. The 
significant variables are one OLI advantage variable (Internalization Advantage 
‘Company’s Mode of Entry in the Host Market’), and one control variable ‘the 
Headquarters Base’. So, the determinants of OFDI when only traditional OLI 
variables are used are quite disappointing.  
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Appendix 10:  Correlation Matrix Using Push-Pull Framework of the Model Country (Greek OFDI in a Country Level)  
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies)
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Appendix 11: Foreign Affiliate Company, Competitors in the Host Market 
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
Appendix 12: Foreign Affiliate Company, Presence of Greek Public/Private 
Companies 
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
 
Appendix 13: North (Thessaloniki) South (Athens) Based Greek Outward 
Investors and Their Internationalisation  
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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Appendix 14: Assessment of Quality of Transport Infrastructure & Quality of 
Roads in Bulgaria & FYROM 
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Appendix 15: Operationalisation of the OLI Framework Augmented with the 
Push-Pull Factors  
Overall, the push pull framework can be understood as an alternative to OLI theory. 
Pull factors include and extend Dunning’s list of OLI characteristics. Push factors are 
defined as all those ''negative pressures'' in the home market which force the company 
to internationalise in order to survive. Thus, push factors are not included in the 
classical ''positive based'' OLI framework by their definition. In a way, it can be 
understood and named as "negative ownership advantages'' in a broad context of OLI 
without being categorized in classical OLI elements. In the following tables, for 
reference reasons we operationalise the OLI framework augmented with push–pull 
factors.  
As it can be observed, the first two columns (OLI elements and Operationalisation) 
present OLI variables while in the 3
rd
 column we present our modification for OLI 
factors. The 4
th
 column describes pull factors that are used from OLI framework and 
if these are operationalisations or modifications of OLI. The last column is for push 
factors that by definition are not included in OLI.  
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Appendix:15. (1): Operationalisation of the OLI Framework Augmented with 
the Push-Pull Factors (Ownership Advantages)-A  
 
Note: Operationalisation and expansion/modified categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. Source: Column 1 based on Dunning and Lundan, 
(2008) and columns 2 – 5 author's operationalisations and expansions 
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Appendix  15. (2): Operationalisation of the OLI Framework Augmented with 
the Push-Pull Factors (Ownership Advantages) -B  
 
 
Note: Operationalisation and expansion/modified categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning and Lundan, (2008) and columns 2 – 5 author's 
operationalisations and expansions 
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Appendix 15.(3): Operationalisation of the OLI Framework Augmented with the 
Push-Pull Factors (Ownership Advantages) -C  
 
 
Note: Operationalisation and expansion/modified categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning and Lundan, (2008) and columns 2 – 5 author's 
operationalisations and expansions 
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Appendix 15.(4): Operationalisation of the OLI Framework Augmented with the 
Push-Pull Factors (Location Advantages-Cost Related) 
 
 
Note: Operationalisation and expansion/modified categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning and Lundan, (2008) and columns 2 – 5 author's 
operationalisations and expansions 
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Appendix 15.(5): Operationalisation of the OLI Framework Augmented with the 
Push-Pull Factors (Location Advantages- Institutional Related) -A 
 
 
Note: Operationalisation and expansion/modified categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. Source: Based on Dunning and Lundan, (2008) and 
author's operationalisations and expansions 
Source: Column 1 based on Dunning and Lundan, (2008) and columns 2 – 5 author's 
operationalisations and expansions 
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Appendix 15. (6): Operationalisation of the OLI Framework Augmented with 
the Push-Pull Factors (Location Advantages- Institutional Related) -B 
 
Note: Operationalisation and expansion/modified categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. Source: Column 1 based on Dunning and Lundan, 
(2008) and columns 2 – 5 author's operationalisations and expansions 
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Appendix 15.(7): Operationalisation of the OLI Framework Augmented with the 
Push-Pull Factors (Internalization Advantages) 
 
Note: Operationalisation and expansion/modified categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. Source: Column 1 based on Dunning and Lundan, 
(2008) and columns 2 – 5 author's operationalisations and expansions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
325 
 
Appendix 15.(8): New OLI Factors Used within the Push – Pull Framework   
 
Note: Operationalisation and expansion/modified categories (in bold) refer to advantages to the foreign 
affiliate; italics refer to the home market company. Source: Column 1 based on Dunning and Lundan, 
(2008) and columns 2 – 5 author's operationalisations and expansions 
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Appendix 16:(1) Results Industries Verified by Parametric & Non-Parametric Tests (Separated in Four Parts 16(1), 16(2), 16(3), 16(4)  
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies).  Note: We use medians to compare differences between industries for the Likert scale data. This measure of central tendency is more 
appropriate as medians are not affected by outliers
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Appendix 16: (2) Results Industries Verified by Parametric & Non-Parametric Tests  
 
 
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies).Note: We use medians to compare differences between industries for the Likert scale data. This measure of central tendency is more 
appropriate as medians are not affected by outliers.
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Appendix 16: (3) Results Industries Verified by Parametric & Non-Parametric Tests  
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies). Note: We use medians to compare differences between industries for the Likert scale data. This measure of central tendency is more 
appropriate as medians are not affected by outlier
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Appendix 16: (4) Results Industries Verified by Parametric & Non-Parametric Tests   
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies). Note: We use medians to compare differences between industries for the Likert scale data. This measure of central tendency is more 
appropriate as medians are not affected by outliers. 
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Appendix 17 : Shape Distribution of Parent Industries  
Our dependent variable is Parent industry type (Manufacturing=1, Trade, 
Construction and Services) and the distribution is the following.  
 
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies) 
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Appendix 18:  Logistic Regressions Using OLI Variables (Model Industry) 
We ran a logistic regression model for industry. As already discussed, we use a binary 
logistic regression for industries, thus, we use a dependent binary variable - industry 
type - which is coded as follows: 
 If industry type=0, then the company belongs to the manufacturing or trade 
sector; 
 If industry type=1, then the company belongs to the services or construction 
industry. 
We created a logit model to test whether OLI variables are significant for explaining 
Greek OFDI firms' industry membership. We assume that in some industries OLI 
variables may be more relevant than in others. 
In the initial model correlation matrix, when we run the logistic regression model, 
almost the same problems arose as in the country model with none of the OLI 
variables significantly correlated. We decided to drop one control variable (company 
size), which presented relatively high correlations with two OLI variables, in order to 
retain in the model the traditional OLI variables in line with the objective in the model 
construction.    
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Appendix 18. (1) Industry Model Correlation Matrix Using OLI Variables  
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 130 companies) 
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Appendix 18. (2) Industry Model Correlation Matrix Using OLI Variables (*Without Control Variable Company Size) 
 
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 130 companies) 
Now, with the new correlation matrix we re-run the logistic regression model with the dependent variable industry.  
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Appendix 18. (3) Logistic Regression Industry Model  
 
 Author's survey (based on 130 companies) 
 
In the case of the industry model, the significant variables are two control variables - 
''Company Age (Establishment Year - Parent Company) '' and ''Year of Entry in the 
Host Market (Prior 2001 in the Host Market - After 2001) ''. The  OLI variables have 
little explanatory power to differentiate the drivers of FDI across different industries.  
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Appendix 19: Correlation Matrix of the Model Variables Industry  (Greek OFDI in Industry Level)  
 
 Author's survey (based on 130 companies)
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Appendix 20: Coding Background Information for the Questions Used to 
Identify O-L-I advantages 
Tables 43, 44 and 46 show how each question was translated into OLI advantages. 
We applied two conventions: 
1. For Yes/No questions, we assumed the existence of an OLI advantage if it 
answered yes. In very few cases, if the advantage was to answer No, (e.g. did 
you face risk problems for your investment? No, is an advantage) then we 
consider it appropriately.   
2. Some of the variables were scored on a 1-5 Likert scale, where 1 was no 
incentive, and 5 was a great incentive (pull factors), or 1 was no problem, and 5 
was a major problem (push factor). We grouped 1-2 responses and 3-5 
responses to decide whether there was an advantage, e.g. 
Executives were asked if the host market large customer base was an 
incentive to invest. For those scoring 1-2 (i.e. no incentive) we 
assumed that there were no location advantages; for those scoring 3-5 
we assumed there were location advantages.  
3. There were some special cases where we asked companies if they had a 
problem before they entered the host market and if it persisted after entry. We 
assumed the following cases 
a. If they had no problems before entering the market, and none after 
entry, we assumed they had ownership advantages.  
b. If they had problems when they entered, but not afterwards, they had 
ownership advantages. 
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c. If they had no problems when they entered, but experienced problems 
in the host market, they had no ownership advantages. 
d. If they had problems when they entered, and these persisted, they had 
no ownership advantages. 
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Appendix 21: Questions Used to Identify Ownership Advantages 
 
Source: Author's Survey 
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Appendix 22: Questions Used to Identify Location Advantages 
 
Source: Author's survey 
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Appendix 23: Questions Used to Identify Internalization Advantages 
 
 Source: Author's Survey 
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Appendix 24: Ownership Advantages and the Questions Used to Construct the 
"Management Competencies" Proxy as an Example 
 
  
Source: Author's survey 
The results show that the Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Statistical Test is above the 
0.70 threshold of acceptable reliability. The variables used to construct the 
management competencies are homogeneous and correlated to form a single factor. 
Thus, the underlying results share a common factor as outlined by our conceptual 
framework and measure the same underlying construct. 
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Appendix 25: Location Advantages and the Questions Used to Construct the 
"Geographical Proximity" Proxy as an Example 
 
 Source: Author's survey 
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Appendix 26: New Typology of Firms & Factor Analysis Results 
We consider the two typologies used (Crisis vs Healthy, and Lead vs Satellites) as not 
mutually incompatible since the selection criteria for each group differ. The first 
group (Crisis Vs Healthy) includes companies affected by increased competition and 
industry shrinkage in the Greek market. This leads these firms to invest in FYROM 
or/and Bulgaria in order to compensate for their home market losses. The second 
group (Lead Vs Satellites) is based on companies (satellites) which followed (were 
pulled abroad by) the home market customers in the host market. Hence, the variables 
for each group are not interrelated and measure different dimensions of the firms’ 
strategies or/and behaviour. However, to increase the validity of our results, we run a 
factor analysis on our samples. 
Theoretical underpinning 
The carriers of FDI are firms which are usually diverse entities and whose 
establishment abroad is driven by different determinants. In this part, we identify a 
new typology of firms based on push and pull variables, established at the aggregate 
level, for Greek OFDI. We hypothesize that aggregate push and pull variables may 
operate differently for different types of firms, i.e. we want to identify different types 
of firms based on different push or pull determinants. 
Summary of the Method 
Our participants are 152 Greek OFDI firms invested in Bulgaria and FYROM. We 
have discussed the limitations of existing theories to explain Greek OFDI and shown 
that a push-pull framework can be used to understand Greek OFDI. Factor analysis 
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should contribute to the conceptualization of a new firm typology based on the 
factorability of push and pull factors. 
As already mentioned push variables represent all the negative pressures in the home 
market which push (force) the company to internationalise in order to survive. We 
categorize four types of push variables: "Increased Competition", "Adverse Demand 
Conditions", "Increased Production Costs in the Home Market" and "Adverse 
Institutional Environment". On the other hand, pull variables are host market features 
that pull (attract) the foreign company to invest in the host market. There are eight 
types of pull factors: "Geographical Proximity", "Financial Incentives Provided by the 
Host Market", "Financial Incentives Provided by the Home Government or other 
Regional Institutions", "Business Linkages", "Positive Demand Conditions", "Lack of 
Competitive Pressure", "Asset Acquisition and Institutional Specificities". 
Due to their different conceptualizations, we ran separate factor analyses for push and 
pull variables.
142
 All the data except 10 nominal push variables are measured on a 
Likert scale. The use of nominal data in factor analysis is not allowed (Roper, 1976), 
thus we exclude nominal data from the analysis. Responses on a Likert-type scale, 
range from 1 = "No pressure at all", 2 = "Little pressure", 3 = "Some pressure", 4 = 
"High pressure", 5 = "Highest pressure" for push variables, and from 1 = "No 
incentive at all", 2 = "Low incentive", 3 = "Moderate incentive", 4 = "High incentive", 
5 = "Highest incentive" for the pull variables. 
                                                          
142
 We treat the variables separately due to some concerns.The technical part, i.e. the minimum amount 
of data for factor analysis, should be 5 times more than observations (Hair, Tatham et al. 1998). In our 
case, there are 55 (push and pull variables) *5 = 275 observations needed while our sample size is 152 
observations (firms). Also, the creations of conceptually distinct and efficient factor names which 
provide a useful description of the underlying constructs is difficult for push and pull factors jointly. 
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Factor Analysis Results for Push Variables 
Sample size adequacy: Our sample size is 152 observations (firms) and 15 push 
variables (we exclude 10 nominal binary yes/no variables). The minimum amount of 
data required factor analysis should be five times more than the number of 
observations (Hair, Tatham et al. 1998). In our case, there are 15 (push variables) *5 = 
75 observations, thus this general rule is satisfied, with a final sample size of 152 with 
over 10 cases per variable. 
Based on well-recognized criteria, the factorability of 15 push variables was examined 
first. Visual inspection of the correlation matrix
143
 reveals that 8 of the 15 variables 
were correlated at least .3 with at least one other variable. This suggests that there are 
not sufficient correlations to justify application of factor analysis for push factors. 
However, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, which tests the overall significance of all the 
correlations within the correlation matrix, is significant (2 (105) = 410.437, p 
<.0001). This statistical test is another indicator of the appropriateness of factor 
analysis for this set of data. In addition, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy tests the strength of the relationships among the variables. In our case, it is 
.703, above the recommended value of .6, which suggests that the sample is 
factorable. 
The diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix
144
 values are mostly over .5 except 
for "Limited Customers Due to Small Population"(.486); however, the rest justify 
their inclusion in the factor analysis. 
                                                          
143
 Please, see Appendix 26 (3) Correlations Push Variables FA, (p.356) 
144
 Please, see Appendix 26 (4) Anti-image Push Variables FA,   (p.357) 
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The Communalities
145
 are mostly above .3, except for "Quality of Competitive 
Products" (.252) and "De-industrialization in Greece" (.295) indicating again that not 
every variable shares some common variance with the other variables. These values 
.252 and .295 quite close to .3 so we decided to keep them in the analysis. Although 
there is some degree of inefficiency in some indicators we proceeded with the factor 
analysis using all 15 push variables. Principal component analysis is used to reduce 
the number of variables while explaining the same amount of variance. 
The initial Eigen values
146
, show that the first factor explains 22.9% of the variance, 
the second factor 14.4% of the variance, the third factor 9.2 % of the variance and the 
fourth factor 7.7% of the variance. The four factors extracted 54.3% of all the variable 
variances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
145 Please, see Appendix 26 (5) Communalities Push Variables FA, (p.358) 
146 Please, see Appendix 26 (6) Total Variance Explained Push Variables FA (p.358) 
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Appendix 26 (1) presents the matrix of loadings to obtain orthogonal (independent) 
factors (Varimax rotation) which tries to maximize the variance of each of the factors. 
Appendix 26 (1): Varimax rotated component loadings for 15 push variables 
 
The four factors 
First Factor: Six variables (items) load onto Factor 1: "Wage Cost" (.481), "Input 
Costs" (.451), "Fixed Costs" (.508), "Quality of Competitive Products" (.430), 
"Competitors' Use of New Technology" (.819), and "Competitors’ Use of Different 
Management Models" (.806). The key points of these variables are firms’ operational 
costs, quality of products and services and competitors' profile and position in the 
home market. Conceptually, the variables with the higher loadings "Competitors' Use 
of New Technology", and "Competitors’ Use of Different Management Models" on 
factor 1 should play a more determining role in naming the factor, e.g. this factor can 
be described as competitors' home market position, costs and quality of home market 
firms. However, factors should capture conceptually distinct name and content, which 
in our case is difficult to discern. After many trials, no conceptually meaningful factor 
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could be devised. This becomes more problematic if we recall that the purpose of this 
procedure is to reveal a new typology of firms. 
Second Factor: Three variables load in this case related to "Greek De-
Industrialization" (.451), "Compensatory Investments due to Increase of Home 
Market Industry Competition (.879) and Share Reduction" (.859). This seems to 
resemble a case of cause and effect, i.e. firms go abroad due to de-industrialization. 
De-industrialization, industry competition and market share reduction in the market 
can be said to have forced compensatory investments. Thus, this factor can be labelled 
"firms compensatory investments" though again it is difficult to attribute it to only one 
type of firm. These results suggest that it can be attributed to those firms that feel 
particularly affected by de-industrialization of the Greek economy. However, this is 
not behavioural feature of firm and, thus, seems only indirectly relevant to a typology 
of firms’ behaviour.  
Third Factor: In this case, there are five variables which load on Factor 3: the 
variables and factor loadings are: "Input Costs" (.536), "Fixed Costs" (.536), "Credit 
Time Payment between Suppliers – Customer" (.489), "Low Price of Competitive 
Products” (.637), "Changes in Customer's Habits" (.633).  We start by discussing the 
higher loadings items which are "Low Price of Competitive Products" and "Changes 
in Customers’ Habits". These in combination with the contribution of operational 
(Input, Fixed) Costs and Credit Time Payment for the company make for a very 
difficult business environment. This factor could be labelled "Adverse Internal and 
External Environment"; however, this is not an efficient or distinct label since there 
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are other variables which could fall into this range of adverse external and internal 
factors like those in factor 1, which are difficult to distinguish from this factor. 
Finally, there are four variables (items) that load onto the fourth factor: "Increased 
Taxes" (tax policy) (.665), "Credit Time Payment Between Supplier – Customer" 
(.574), "Low Customer Purchasing Power in the Home market" (.538), "Limited 
Customers Due to Small Population" (-.726). Higher factor loadings are attributable to 
"Limited Customers due to Small Populations" and by "Increased Taxes" (tax policy); 
similarly, these variables should contribute more to the factor name which in 
combination with "Credit Time Payment between Supplier – Customer" and "Low 
Customer Purchasing Power" in the Home market should give a comprehensive factor 
name. However, this factor is difficult to conceptualize. We tried to use the push 
proxies used for the push variables
147
.  Even if we disregard the fact that higher factor 
loadings should contribute more to the factor names because "Limited Customers due 
to Small Populations" is classified within "Adverse Demand Conditions in the Home 
Market proxy", and "Increased Taxes" (tax policy) is classified as "Adverse 
Institutional Environment in the Home Market", this is not an easy task. 
"Limited Customers due to Small Populations" and "Low Customer Purchasing Power 
in the Home Market" are classified under "Adverse Demand Conditions in the Home 
Market" proxy while "Credit Time Payment between Supplier – Customer" and 
"Increased Taxes" (tax policy) are classified under "Adverse Institutional 
Environment in the Home Market". Conceptually, "Adverse Demand Conditions" and 
                                                          
147 Please, see Table 8: Proxies for Push Factors, (p.116) 
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"Institutional Environment in the Home Market" are not really useful names for a 
factor which might reveal a meaningful new firm typology. 
Although statistically we fulfil the minimum requirements of factor analysis, the 
creation of conceptually distinct and efficient factor names which provide a useful 
description of the underlying constructs, is not satisfactory. Hence, we agree with 
Hair, Tatham et al.  (1998), who point out that "the critical assumptions underlying 
factor analysis are more conceptual than statistical". 
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Factor Analysis Results for Pull Variables 
Sample size adequacy: The minimum amount of data for factor analysis, as already 
mentioned, should be five times more than the number of observations (Hair, Tatham 
et al. 1998). In our case, there are 40 (pull variables) *5 = 200 observations needed 
while our sample size is 152 observations (firms). "The common rule is to suggest 
that the researcher has at least 10-15 participants per variable" (Field, 2005 p. 638), in 
our case we have 3.8 participants per variable (152 participants divided by 40 
variables). 
According to Field (2005), sample size inadequacy affects the reliability of the factor 
analysis; however, for "confirmatory" reasons we proceed with our analysis. 
Initially, the factorability of the 40 pull variables was examined using inter-correlation 
between variables (Field, 2005). The data screening of the correlation matrix,
148
 
reveals that only 23 of the 40 variables are correlated at least at .3 with at least one 
other variable. The rest, 17 out of 40 variables, do not show correlation with any other 
variable. This suggests non-satisfactory correlations to justify the application of 
factor analysis for pull factors. To try to solve this problem we adopt the suggestion 
in Field (2005) to exclude variables that do not correlate or that are very highly 
correlated (R<.9). So, we re-run the correlation matrix with only the appropriate 
variables. In order to increase validity we exclude two variables with the highest 
                                                          
148 Please, see Appendix 26 (7) Correlations Pull Variables FA (p.359) 
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number of missing values.
149
 The results show that 10 out of 20 variables are 
correlated with at least one variable at least .3. 
We next tested the other indicators of the appropriateness of factor analysis. The 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant (2 (190) = 833.440, p <.0001), but the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is .559, lower than the 
recommended value of .6, creating concerns about continuing with the analysis. 
We next examine the diagonals of the anti-image matrix values. Again, in this case, 
there is a shortfall, 9 out of 20 diagonal elements are lower than .5 which is the 
minimum for sample adequacy.
150
 In order to overcome also this problem, we adopted 
a more conservative strategy and did not drop all the values (below .5) as suggested 
by Field (2005), but only 3 variables with values around .3
151
 The aim was to 
eliminate all these inefficiencies so that the sample could be factorable under at least 
minimum statistical recommendations. The anti-image correlation table improved and 
revealed only 3 variables with diagonal elements lower than .5. So, we used these 3 
items also to strength our model further. 
The last anti-image matrix
152
 reveals values greater than .5. The new factor analysis 
shows better results for all indicators. 
More specifically, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant (2 (91) = 577.259, p 
<.0001) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is .662, greater 
than the recommended value of .6. All the variable communalities are above .3 as 
                                                          
149 Please, see Appendix 26 (8)   Correlations Pull Variables FA  (p.360) 
150 Please, see Appendix 26 (9)   Anti-image Pull Variables FA   (p. 361) 
151
 Please, see Appendix 26 (10) Anti-image Pull Variables FA   (p. 362) 
152
 Please, see Appendix 26 (11) Anti-image Pull Variables FA   (p. 363) 
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recommended
153
; further confirming that each variable (item) shares some common 
variance with other variables (items). 
Given all these methodological efforts to make the overall test indicators comply with 
at least the minimum standard of statistical recommendations, factor analysis was 
deemed to be suitable for 14 variables (items) out of the initial 40 pull factors. 
The initial Eigen values
154
 show that the first factor explains 20.4% of the variance, 
the second factor 18.8% of the variance, the third factor 9.3 % of the variance, the 
fourth factor 8.8% of the variance and the fifth factor 7.9% of the variance. This 
model explains 65.5% of the variance. 
The results of a varimax rotation of the solution are presented in appendix 26 (2) 
Appendix 26 (2): Varimax rotated component loadings for 14 pull variables 
 
 
                                                          
153
 Please, see Appendix 26 (12) Communalities Pull Variables FA (p. 364) 
154 Please, see Appendix 26 (13) Total Variance Explained Pull Variables FA, (p.365) 
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Factor analysis of the Pull variables (items) revealed five factors 
The five topic factors: 
Three variables (items) load onto this factor. This factor loads onto pull factors 
(incentives) "New Products/Services for the Parent company and Greek market" and 
"Company Participation in the Host Country Privatization Plan". This factor is 
labelled "New Products and Privatization". 
Two items contained in the second factor relate to geographical proximity and 
internationalisation. More specifically, ability to control everyday actions of the 
foreign affiliate by the parent company, due to the short distance involved "Close 
Control Between Parent Company & the Foreign Affiliate" and "Business Know 
How" are loaded onto this factor. This factor is labelled "Geographical Proximity". 
Items for factor three are "Similarities in Mentality & Culture with Home Market" and 
"Investments Due to Geopolitical History & Previous Historical Links in the Area". 
This factor is labelled "Institutional Similarity of the Host Market". 
The fourth factor consists of 2 items, "Large Customer Base" and "Parent Company’s 
Products/Services Market Growth". This factor is labelled "Positive Demand 
Conditions in the Host Market". 
Finally, four factors are loaded onto factor 5, "Higher Host Investment Profit 
Compared to the Home one", " Low Cost of Other Factors of Production/Services", 
"Risk Reduction Investment in Different Countries"  and "Presence of Competitors in 
the Host Market or/and SEE country". It is quite difficult to find a label for this factor 
based on only two variables (items) with higher loadings " Higher Host Investment 
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Profit Compared to the Home one" and "Low Cost of Other Factors of 
Production/Services"  so we label the factor "Higher Profits and Lower Costs". 
We ran factory analysis for pull factors, but at the price of barely acceptable 
statistical standards. We labelled the extracted factors with meaningful names such 
as "Geographical Proximity", "Institutional similarity of the Host Market", "Positive 
Demand Conditions in the Host Market" and "Higher Profits and Lower Costs". These 
factors distinguish different drivers or groups of pull factors.  
However, these types of drivers are not helpful for revealing the typologies of firms 
that are more relevant than those already reported. Nevertheless, this procedure is 
important as it reconfirms the robustness and relevance of our final results. The 
factor analysis results were not very helpful to conceptualize coherent and meaningful 
factors for a typology of firms. 
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Appendix 26 (3): Correlations Push Variables FA 
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Appendix 26 (4): Anti-image Push Variables FA 
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Appendix 26 (5): Communalities Push Variables FA 
 
 
Appendix 26 (6): Total Variance Explained Push Variables FA 
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Appendix 26 (7): Correlations Pull Variables FA 
 
Note: *Variables in red do not correlate, in green correlate very highly R<.9 thus we exclude them from the analysis based on Field (2005) recommendation. 
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Appendix 26 (8): Correlations Pull Variables FA 
 
Note: As we see there are 10 variables out of 20 that they do not correlate each other so we exclude them, see next matrix. 
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Appendix 26 (9): Anti-image Pull Variables FA 
 
Note: *We adopt a more conservative strategy and we exclude only values around .3 and not all under .5:   "Cooperation Offered By Local Company", " Foreign Company 
Cooperation Offered"  and " South East European Regional Business Agreement Representation". 
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Appendix 26 (10): Anti-image Pull Variables FA 
 
Note: **We exclude: "Presence of Greek Public/Private Companies in the Host Market", "EU/Greek Government Financial Support Measures", and "Greek 
Government/Private Sector Loan Support" 
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Appendix 26 (11): Anti-image Pull Variables FA 
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Appendix 26 (12): Communalities Pull Variables FA 
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Appendix 26 (13): Total Variance Explained Pull Variables FA 
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Appendix 27 (1): List of Crisis Vs. Healthy & Satellite Vs. Lead Descriptive Results Verified by Mann Whitney & Pearson’s Chi-square 
Tests (Separated in Four Parts 27. (1),  27. (2), 27. (3), 27. (4)  
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies) 
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Appendix 27 (2): List of Crisis Vs. Healthy & Satellite Vs. Lead Descriptive Results Verified by Mann Whitney & Pearson’s Chi-square 
Tests  
  
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies) 
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Appendix 27 (3): List of Crisis vs. Healthy & Satellite vs. Lead Descriptive Results Verified by Mann Whitney & Pearson’s Chi-square 
Tests  
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies) 
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Appendix 27 (4): List of Crisis vs. Healthy & Satellite vs. Lead Descriptive Results Verified by Mann Whitney & Pearson’s Chi-square 
Tests  
 
Source: Author's survey (based on 152 companies) 
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Appendix 28: Logistic Regressions Using OLI Variables (Model New Typologies 
of Firms: Healthy Vs Crisis Investors) 
 
We ran a logistic regression model for the new typology of firms - Crisis vs Healthy 
investors - and the determinants of the classical OLI variables. The value of the 
dependent variable is 0 for Healthy and 1 for Crisis investors. We test whether the 
classical OLI determinants of FDI differ significantly between Crisis and Healthy 
investors. We would expect that in the case of healthy investors traditional OLI 
variables would have significant explanatory power and, thus, our model should 
differentiate between the two types of firms. The first model with the initial 
correlation matrix
155
 does not provide any useful results, thus, we adopt the same 
strategy as in previous models and exclude the control variable size, which is used in 
the second correlation matrix.
156
  
 
 
 
                                                          
155 Please, see Appendix 28 (1) Correlation Matrix New Typologies of Firms Model: Healthy Vs. Crisis 
Investors Correlation Matrix (p.371) 
 
156
 Please, see Appendix 28 (2) Correlation Matrix New Typologies of Firms Model: Healthy Vs. Crisis 
Investors Correlation Matrix (p.372) 
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Appendix 28 (1): Correlation Matrix New Typologies of Firms Model: Healthy Vs. Crisis Investors  
 
 Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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Appendix 28 (2): Correlation Matrix New Typologies of Firms Model: Healthy Vs. Crisis Investors (*without company size) 
 
 Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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Appendix 28 (3): Logistic Regression New Typologies of Firms Model: Healthy 
Vs. Crisis Investors  
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
In this model the only significant variable is the control variable "Country of 
Investment". Since we have already excluded the control variable size in order to 
improve the next model, we drop the variables with the biggest p values in model a. 
Hence, we re-run model b without the variables "Well-known Brand Name in the 
Host Country” and "Investment in Order to Establish Barriers of Entry for Future 
Competitors". The results are unchanged and there is no essential improvement to the 
model.
 
 
 
374 
 
Appendix 29: Correlation Matrix of the Model Variables Crisis Vs Healthy (Greek OFDI in a Firm Level Analysis) 
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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Appendix 30: Logistic Regressions Using OLI Variables (Model New Typologies 
of Firms: Satellite Vs. Lead Companies) 
 
This model construction is for the new typology of firms and the category Satellite vs 
Lead investors. We test the classical OLI variables in the context of lead and satellite 
investors through logistic regressions where the value of the dependent variable is 0 if 
the company is a lead firm and 1 if it is a satellite firm. As in the previous model there 
is a theoretical expectation that the traditional OLI variables could be relevant to Lead 
investors, but less so for Satellite investors which should generate a robust model. We 
run the model with all the variables.
157
 However, the results are the same (not 
significant) as in previous models, thus, for consistency, we drop control variable 
size
158
 and retain all the traditional OLI variables.  
                                                          
157
 Please, see Appendix 30 (1): Correlation Matrix New Typologies of Firms Model: Lead Vs. Satellite 
Investors (p.376) 
 
158
 Please, see Appendix 30 (2): Correlation Matrix New Typologies of Firms Model: Lead Vs. Satellite 
Investors (p.377) 
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Appendix 30 (1): Correlation Matrix New Typologies of Firms Model: Lead Vs. Satellite Investors  
 
 Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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Appendix 30 (2): Correlation Matrix New Typologies of Firms Model: Lead Vs. Satellite Investors (*without company size) 
 
 Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
Based on the above correlation matrix we re-run logistic regression models.
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Appendix 30 (3): Logistic Regression New Typologies of Firms Model: Lead Vs. 
Satellite Investors 
 
 Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
This is the only model in which two out of seven variables of interest and one control variable 
are significant. However, overall the model is inconclusive approximation of the OLI model 
and we consider the push-pull framework to provide a better representation of the 
determinants of Greek OFDI. Also, the dependent variable (Lead vs. Satellite Investors) is not 
consistent with traditional OLI which does not envisage satellite FDI investors.  
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Appendix 31: Correlation Matrix of the Model Variables Satellite Vs. Lead Companies (Greek OFDI in a Firm Level Analysis) 
 
Source: Author’s survey (based on 130 companies) 
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